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Along the banks of the Susquehanna River in early July 1778, a force of about 600 Loyalist and 
Native American raiders won a lopsided victory against 400 overwhelmed Patriot militiamen and 
regulars in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. While not well-known today, this battle—the 
Battle of Wyoming—had profound effects on the Revolutionary War and American culture and 
politics. Quite familiar to early Americans, this battle’s remembrance influenced the formation of 
national identity and informed Americans’ perceptions of their past and present over the course 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
 
From the beginning, however, Americans’ understanding of what occurred in the Wyoming 
Valley in July 1778 was strongly influenced by reports from partisans not present at the battle, 
reports which wildly differed from eyewitness accounts. In the aftermath of the battle, a 
fabricated myth about Loyalists and Native Americans massacring women, children, and 
wounded soldiers quickly took root in the public imagination and influenced the Patriot war 
effort. Despite having no evidence backing it up, the myth eventually outlasted its Revolutionary 
context, coming back to shape political dialogue and popular culture in the early nineteenth 
century. Indeed, this Revolutionary fabrication was only the beginning of the historical distortion 
related to the Battle of Wyoming. By mid-century, a whole new myth about the battle arose, 
featuring a Native American woman known as Queen Esther who murdered prisoners around a 
rock. Made possible by the cultural atmosphere of the period, this myth proved equally 
sensational.  
 
 This thesis explores how these myths about the battle formed, spread, and influenced American 
society on national and local levels from 1778 to around 1878. Tracing and analyzing how 
Americans have remembered and misremembered the Battle of Wyoming, more popularly 
known as the Wyoming Massacre, its primary focus is to look at the meaning behind the 
narratives that formed around this event and what those meanings say about the individuals and 
cultures that created them. It also scrutinizes some of the ways Americans have tailored their 
remembrances of Wyoming to speak to their present. Ultimately, this thesis points to how 
historical distortions can easily enmesh themselves into popular memory and how they can 
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Introduction   
 
 On July 20, 1778, a New York newspaper editor named John Holt published a gruesome 
and shocking report about the war on the frontier. “Collected” from “many of the distressed 
Refugees…who escaped the general massacre” and “have passed this way,” this report told of a 
violent battle and massacre in the backcountry of northeastern Pennsylvania. According to Holt, 
1600 Loyalist and Native American raiders descended on the Wyoming Valley in late June and 
early July, destroying several small forts and demanding that all Patriot forces in the region 
surrender.1 Though significantly outnumbered, the obstinate Patriots refused and left the safety 
of their main fort, Forty Fort, to face the enemy on the evening of July 3, 1778. The Patriots, 
unfortunately, marched right into an ambush. After 45 minutes of fighting, they retreated in 
disarray, and “a total rout ensued” in which many perished. The next day, the Loyalists and 
Native Americans returned to Forty Fort and demanded that the remaining defenders surrender, 
threatening the indiscriminate killing and scalping of all the fort’s inhabitants. Eventually forcing 
entry, the attackers proceeded to slaughter women, children, and wounded soldiers by burning 
them alive within their own homes. In the coming days, the raiders’ reign of terror extended even 
farther across the region. Holt reported that they burned numerous crops while killing or 
maiming nearly everything that moved—from cattle to their own families.2 
 
1 While situated in modern northeastern Pennsylvania, the Wyoming Valley was also claimed by Connecticut at the 
time. The two states and their settlers quarreled and intermittently fought over possession starting in the 1760s and 
continuing into the first decades of the 1800s. See Anne M. Ousterhout, “Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees 
vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 62, no. 3 (1995): 
330–63. The Wyoming Valley should not be confused with the state of Wyoming, established later in the nineteenth 
century. Interestingly, the Wyoming Valley did provide inspiration for the state’s name. See, Jim Brown, “The First 
Wyoming: What’s in a Name?” WyoHistory.org, Wyoming State Historical Society, 2014, 
https://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/wyoming-name. 
2 “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 1, 4. All the details about the battle 
within this paragraph come from Holt’s account. As a result, they are not all accurate. For instance, closer to 500 or 
Tharp 6 
 
Horribly gruesome, John Holt’s account of this event reached thousands across the 
American colonies during the Revolutionary War, achieving wide circulation in Patriot 
newspapers and helping inflame public opinion against Great Britain. There was only one 
problem—much of his account simply had no basis in evidence coming from eyewitnesses. Most 
glaringly, no massacre occurred at Forty Fort on July 4. While British-backed raiders did win a 
lopsided victory against Patriot militiamen and regulars on July 3, Forty Fort, in fact, surrendered 
peacefully and without bloodshed the next day. In war and politics, however, accuracy does not 
always matter, and the tale of a massacre at Wyoming spread rapidly as Patriot publicists 
capitalized on the propaganda value of this sensational story. Even after the Revolutionary War, 
the narratives advanced by Holt and other Patriots lived on, becoming the basis for many flawed 
accounts about what happened in the Wyoming Valley on July 3 and 4, 1778. Holt’s report 
proved to be only the beginning in a long cycle of historical distortion, resulting in narratives of 
enduring power that shaped Americans’ understandings of the Revolution, and cultivated lasting 
notions of the war’s villains and their allegedly innocent Patriot victims. 
 
While the Battle of Wyoming amounted to a small-scale conflict that only had minor 
effects on the military situation during the Revolutionary War, this brief encounter along the 
Susquehanna River took on massive proportions in the American imagination that reached far 
beyond its limited military significance.3 Ignited by sensational rumors in the aftermath of the 
 
600 Loyalists and Native Americans attacked Wyoming—not 1600. Chapter 1 provides a reconstruction of the battle 
that corrects these smaller details while also tackling the larger historical distortions found in Holt’s report.   
3 I use the term the Battle of Wyoming over the Wyoming Massacre because of the tendency to label any act of 
violence by Native Americans against whites as a “massacre.” Thus, within this thesis, the Battle of Wyoming refers 
to the actual battle fought on July 3, while the Wyoming Massacre refers to the sensational legend about the events 
of July 4 that emerged a few days and weeks after the battle. Whether or not the aftermath of the battle constituted a 
massacre may be debated, especially considering the slaughter of retreating Patriot soldiers by Loyalists and Native 
Americans alike. Though I personally use “battle” to avoid the common tendency to disparage Native Americans 
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battle, an incendiary myth took root just days later that paved the way for the fabricated story of 
John Holt and others to influence the Patriot war effort. This myth, which this thesis terms the 
legend of the Wyoming Massacre, played an integral role in the struggle for independence, the 
formation of national identity, and the outcome of the war on the frontier. Perhaps Wesley 
Johnson, writing close to a hundred years after the event, said it best: “The battle of Wyoming 
was not a great battle directly in its results, as affecting” the struggle for independence or in 
terms of the number of men who fought, but “it was great in this: the exaggerated story of the 
atrocities committed by the British troops and their allies…fired the heart and nerved the arm of 
every American patriot.”4 Through continued use, the Wyoming Massacre became a central part 
of Patriots’ partisan arguments and assisted in the formation of a shared narrative of American 
victimhood that helped shape national identity. 
 The exaggerated myth of the Wyoming Massacre did not just influence the Revolution, 
however. Rather, the fabrications of the 1770s outlasted their original partisan context and came 
to influence political discourse over thirty years later in the era of the War of 1812. Fearing 
Indian war in the backcountry and suspicious of British meddling on the frontier, Americans 
during the War of 1812 turned to the vivid example of British and Indian savagery at Wyoming 
to draw parallels between their current situation and the Revolution. In a very real sense, 
Americans’ understanding of the battle based on this legend influenced both their conceptions of 
the Revolution and their interpretation of their present conflict.  
The legend of the Wyoming Massacre reached its apogee in these tense years during the 
1810s, but it gradually diminished in the later 1800s under the assault of mid-nineteenth-century 
 
and as a more succinct shorthand, perhaps the organizers of the 1878 commemorative observance were more 
accurate in calling it both.  
4 Wesley Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and 
Massacre, July 3, 1778-July 3, 1878 (Wilkes-Barre, Pa: Beardslee & Co., printers, 1882), 25-26.  
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historians. A new myth, however, quickly rose to take its place. Starting in the late 1820s and 
fully blossoming by the late 1840s, this new myth centered around a murderous Native American 
woman popularly known as Queen Esther. While not as featured in political discourse as the 
original legend, this myth still resonated with many Americans and found its way onto the pages 
of numerous histories, works of fiction, and travel narratives. As in 1778 or 1812, a powerful 
legend about the Battle of Wyoming—one now more capable of meeting the needs of antebellum 
and postbellum Americans—continued to color the public’s understanding of the Revolution and 
by extension contemporary society, just in a new guise.  
Though largely forgotten today, the memory of the Battle of Wyoming had profound 
effects on the Revolution and nineteenth-century American culture and politics. In the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, the battle remained a well-known event and an integral part of 
the nation’s Revolutionary mythology, often included along with other more well-known events, 
such as the reading of the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia or the Battle of 
Lexington.5 Americans were indeed quite familiar with the battle, having read about it in 
newspapers, popular histories, poems, short stories, and travel accounts throughout the century. 
Reflecting their familiarity with the battle, Americans utilized its memory for a variety of 
purposes in the years between 1778 and 1878. From using it to justify independence in the 1770s 
to relying on it to explain Native American removal in the mid-nineteenth century, Americans 
connected the battle to numerous national and regional narratives in attempts to explain current 
 
5 This can be seen visually on the bronze doors for the House chamber in the United States Capitol. Drawn up in the 
1850s, molded in the 1860s, but not installed until 1905, this door features the Battle of Wyoming alongside a public 
reading of the Declaration of Independence, the Battle of Lexington, and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783—
among others. That Wyoming was included among these events points to its importance in nineteenth century 
Americans view of the Revolution. Thomas Crawford and William Rinehart, House Bronze Doors, bronze, 1905, 
U.S. Capitol East House Portico, https://www.aoc.gov/art/doors/house-bronze-doors.  
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reality. Narratives about the extreme atrocities of the Battle of Wyoming indelibly shaped earlier 
generations’ understanding of the Revolution and American history. 
Despite its significance during the Revolution and in the nineteenth century, very few 
scholars have examined the memory of the Battle of Wyoming in a detailed way. This thesis 
aims to add to this scholarship, providing new insights into the evolution of this specific 
historical memory. As one of the few others to examine the battle’s lasting effects, Lisa Ann 
Francavilla explored the Battle of Wyoming’s importance to regional identity and briefly 
discussed how different historical actors portrayed the battle from the 1770s to the 1920s in her 
2002 master’s thesis. Building upon her work, this thesis also investigates how the memory of 
Wyoming reflected societal perceptions, but it differs in several important ways. For one, this 
thesis concentrates more on why different people used Wyoming, and it more thoroughly places 
this memory into a wider national context. This work also pursues a divergent chronological 
scope, focusing most of its attention on the Revolution and the early nineteenth century. In her 
work, Francavilla fleetingly mentions these decades before examining the large celebrations that 
commemorated the battle in 1878 and 1928. While these celebrations proved vital to shaping 
Wyoming’s memory, the development of this memory in the earlier parts of the nineteenth 
century was equally, if not more, important. Filling this gap, this thesis analyzes the years 
between 1778 and 1878, specifically detailing the development and effects of the myth of the 
Wyoming Massacre and that of Queen Esther.6 
This thesis additionally draws on scholarship that has explored the ways that fear and 
rhetoric emanating from the frontier played an integral role in the Patriot war effort and in the 
 
6 While this thesis briefly discusses the large celebrations in 1878 and 1928, these celebrations do not constitute the 
main object of inquiry as they did in Francavilla’s work. See, Lisa A. Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and 
‘Massacre’: Images of a Constructed American History” (M.A. thesis, United States -- Virginia, College of William 
and Mary, 2002), iv, 21-25, 59- 63.  
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formation of American identity in the Revolution and beyond. Reports of savagery committed by 
the British, Loyalists, and Indians abounded in Patriot discourse, and these reports shaped 
American attitudes. Peter Silver, in Our Savage Neighbors, details how rhetoric helped solidify 
hate in Patriot minds. According to him, anti-Indian rhetoric united fractious groups of white 
settlers and townspeople together and helped shaped ideas about racial difference. The 
Revolution saw the summation of this process as Patriots associated Great Britain with its 
“savage” allies and perceived their struggle as a defense of home against monstrous enemies.7 As 
scholar Robert Parkinson has similarly argued, stark representations of both the British and 
natives aided Patriot attempts to create a unified national identity separate from Britain and 
harness support for the war.8 Misinformation played a large role as well. In the larger battle to 
control public opinion, Gregory Dowd demonstrates, both prominent statesmen and average 
citizens advanced unsubstantiated rumors about atrocities and misdeeds to advance the Patriot 
cause.9 Negative representations of the British or Native Americans, far from being passive or 
neutral, possessed serious political value.  
These representations also had long-lasting effects on American identity and conceptions 
of the past. As Parkinson argues, negative and often racialized depictions of Native Americans 
became integral to the nation’s founding narrative and forcefully reemerged during the War of 
1812. Dowd similarly maintains that rumors, even if groundless, could endure for generations 
and become incredibly influential in shaping public attitudes.10 Indeed, the exaggerations and 
myths formed from the Revolution and from conflict in the backcountry proved especially 
 
7 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2008), xx, 227-260.  
8 Robert G. Parkinson, The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 9-10, 17-19.  
9Gregory Dowd, Groundless: Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2015), 1-2, 175-201.  
10 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 655; Dowd, Groundless, 1-5, 177.  
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powerful in the American imagination—often not for the better. In his seminal Regeneration 
Through Violence, Richard Slotkin explores the development and power of frontier myths in 
early America. According to him, these myths gave birth to the idea that the frontier could 
provide regeneration for American society. This restoration, however, came at the cost of 
incredible violence against Native Americans, which these myths had to find a way to justify.11 
The myths that formed around Wyoming illustrate some of the ways this justification occurred 
and how Americans used them to reframe the violence of the past in an understandable way. 
From Silver to Slotkin, these scholars’ works offer insight into how false narratives, like those 
that formed about Wyoming, could have massive effects on American mindsets.  
Works on Revolutionary memory similarly inform this analysis, providing needed 
context on how political and cultural shifts influenced Americans’ perceptions of the Revolution. 
For instance, Sarah Purcell’s Sealed with Blood provides a compelling examination of the half-
century after independence that details how the Revolution changed meaning in response to 
growing partisan divides and increasing democratization. Her work also describes how 
Americans used public events, histories, plays, and even material culture to craft an 
interpretation of the Revolutionary past.12 Michael Hattem’s recent book sheds further light on 
the dissemination of historical memory. Exploring how memory interacts with politics and 
culture, Hattem chronicles how Americans created a shared and usable past out of the historical 
experiences of the Revolution. On a methodological level, this thesis also utilizes what Hattem 
calls “history culture,” an approach that examines historical memory not just through written 
 
11 Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (1973; 
repr., University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 3-5. 
12 Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 1-10. Emphasizing the importance of journalist portrayals and popular 
history to both the remembering and forgetting of different aspects of the Revolution, Janice Hume likewise 
highlights the importance of media to the Revolutionary narrative. See, Janice Hume, Popular Media and the 
American Revolution: Shaping Collective Memory (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1. 
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histories but through a variety of media found within a culture.13 James Paxton’s analysis of 
Revolutionary memory in the Mohawk Valley of New York during the nineteenth century 
similarly influenced this thesis’s approach. With its attention to the role of local context in 
creating historical memory, Paxton’s essay demonstrates the complex interplay between regional 
and national narratives at work in historical memory and the need to understand both to fully 
grasp a memory’s meaning.14  
Building upon these works, it is this thesis’s purpose to show the significance of this 
small frontier defeat to Revolutionary history and memory over the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Though Loyalists and Native Americans also remembered the event, this 
thesis focuses on the dominant memory of Wyoming among white Americans who supported 
independence. Paying particular attention to the historical actors who shaped this memory and 
the political and cultural climate they inhabited, this thesis will trace how and why this historical 
memory ebbed and flowed in the American imagination over these decades. While Americans 
repeatedly drew on similar themes of patriotism, sacrifice, and savagery when discussing 
Wyoming from 1778 to 1878, their deployments of this memory were always historically 
contingent and thus require attention to chronology and context. Placing this memory into that 
context, this thesis examines how Americans drew deeper meaning from this defeat along the 
Susquehanna and how the memory of the battle changed over time as a result of both local and 
national developments.  
 
13 Michael D. Hattem, Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2020), 1-7. Like Hattem, I primarily utilize a cultural history approach.  
14 James Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting: War, Memory, and Identity in the Post-Revolutionary Mohawk 
Valley in Michael McDonnell, et. al., eds., Remembering the Revolution: Memory, History, and Nation Making from 
Independence to the Civil War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 179-195. 
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Tracing how earlier Americans have recalled the Battle of Wyoming requires a diverse 
array of primary sources from multiple eras. Just as Americans used Wyoming for numerous 
purposes, they similarly wrote about or referenced the battle in many different media, often with 
very distinct objectives in mind. Any reconstruction of the battle and the development of its 
subsequent myths must recognize that these objectives and the worldview of each observer 
informed each account; it would be impossible to recapture “what really happened” because each 
observer and commentator brought their own biases to their reports, even when they were 
eyewitnesses. The first references to the battle occurred in military correspondence, diaries, and a 
few depositions from 1778. Written or given by firsthand witnesses just a few days after July 3 
and 4, these accounts provide useful information about the battle. As with all sources, one must 
contend with inherent bias, reporting error, and the desire for some military men, especially 
commanders, to exaggerate their successes and minimize their failures. Ultimately though, such 
accounts allow for a composite account of what participants on both sides of the battle claimed to 
have witnessed. Further away from the battlefield, letters and depositions from those who did not 
witness the event also offer tantalizing evidence of the rumors about Wyoming that quickly 
spread throughout the colonies during the summer of 1778. These sources show how Americans, 
working off limited information, often circulated wild rumors for a range of reasons, a trend that 
Revolutionary newspapers only compounded when they saw advantage in doing so.  
As a primary means for communicating news and partisan information across the 
colonies, Revolutionary and eventually early national newspapers serve as some of the most 
important accounts for tracing Wyoming’s memory. Exaggerating the carnage and reporting 
inaccurate information, Patriot newspapers provided sensational accounts of Wyoming, which 
magnified earlier rumors and significantly contributed to the creation of the legend of the 
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Wyoming Massacre. From one paper to the next, fantastic fabrications about the battle and its 
aftermath spread across the colonies, cementing the Massacre in Patriot arguments for 
independence as well as in the popular imagination. Three decades later, newspapers printed 
political speeches and editorials that referenced the Massacre and used it in ways almost 
indistinguishable from their Revolutionary counterparts. Like in the Revolution, American 
newspapers in the era of the War of 1812 underscored the untrustworthiness of the British, 
Loyalists (or at least those accused of Loyalism), and Native Americans while encouraging 
Americans to stay vigilant against them. These newspapers sources highlight the importance of 
the battle to political discourse in the Revolution and beyond, demonstrating how the legend of 
the Wyoming Massacre endured and adapted in new contexts.   
Published histories similarly inform this analysis. Of these, this thesis relies on two 
distinct sets of histories: early accounts of the Revolutionary War and local or regional histories 
in the antebellum period. Revealing changing attitudes about the Revolution and showing how 
different authors conceptualized Wyoming as part of larger regional or national narratives, both 
sets of histories provide a window into the mindsets of their makers. In this case, these histories 
expose differing interpretations of the Revolution, especially as it relates to British and Native 
American savagery. These histories also allow one to trace the development and spread of ideas 
about the battle and the legend of the Massacre. By following early Revolutionary histories from 
the late 1780s to around the turn of the century, a clearer picture emerges about how the 
exaggerated narratives first found in Revolutionary newspapers became an authenticated part of 
the historical record. Early historians of the Revolution, uncritically accepting sensational 
Revolutionary accounts, helped the myth of the Wyoming Massacre to persist into the era of the 
War of 1812. Antebellum histories tell a similar story that elucidate the process through which 
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the legend of Queen Esther emerged. While local historians replaced the legend of the Wyoming 
Massacre with what they believed was a more accurate description of the battle’s aftermath, 
many of these authors reproduced that equally hyperbolic myth in their attempted correctives. As 
with earlier historians, these later authors’ acceptance of historical falsehoods paved the way for 
artists, writers, and politicians to spread these fabrications to a wider audience.  
Along with histories, works of popular literature and commemorative events are essential 
to telling the story of the Battle of Wyoming’s place in American myth and memory. As in the 
twenty-first century (and much to the chagrin of historians then and now), many Americans in 
the nineteenth century learned their history from sources of popular reading and entertainment. 
For one, travel narratives—increasingly popular in the antebellum period—often featured 
accounts of the Battle of Wyoming. Tapping into the tragic and romantic aspects of the region’s 
history, these narratives used the history of the battle to attract visitors or to tell compelling 
stories for the reading public. Fiction played an even larger role in the transmission of this 
memory. From poetry to short stories, Wyoming remained a popular literary topic throughout the 
nineteenth century.15 Literature, like history and newspaper reports, provides insight into how 
Americans conceptualized Wyoming and the Revolution. As literature allows for creative 
fabrication to a greater extent than history, it also indicates how different individuals derived 
meaning from this historical event. In the antebellum period, local commemorative events also 
became an essential aspect of the battle’s memory. Knitting together the local community and 
occasionally reaching others around the country through newspaper and periodical reports, 
commemorative events shaped the battle’s memory and the lessons that Americans took from it.  
 
15 See, for example, Thomas Campbell, Gertrude of Wyoming; or, The Pennsylvanian Cottage (New York: D. 
Appleton & Co, 1858). While not well-known today, Campbell’s 1809 poem, which featured the Battle of Wyoming 
as its climax, remained immensely popular in America throughout the nineteenth century. The poem reproduced 
several misconceptions to readers over the century and became a touchstone to the battle for average Americans.  
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Organized chronologically based on key moments in time when the Massacre reappeared 
in popular consciousness, this thesis will begin by discussing what firsthand witnessed said about 
the battle and the development of the myth of the Wyoming Massacre in Chapter 1. This chapter 
starts with a thorough reconstruction of the battle and its aftermath, creating a basic outline of 
what witnesses said happened on the days of July 3 and 4, 1778. It then shifts to how the myth 
emerged and how Patriots utilized it to their advantage. Starting in the backcountry, the myth 
grew out of exaggerated and misinformed stories of survivors and backcountry settlers who fled 
east in fear. These lurid stories then found a wide audience in newspaper reports, where some 
editors embellished these already sensational rumors for partisan effect. Tapping into a budding 
American narrative of atrocity and victimization, the rumors and newspaper accounts that 
produced the legend of the Wyoming Massacre drew from the conventions of anti-Indian 
rhetoric and stressed the savagery of their enemies—whether British, Loyalist, or Native 
American. As a result, the Wyoming Massacre became a potent political weapon. In the arsenals 
of the Patriot publicists and partisans, Wyoming helped provoke the public’s ire against Great 
Britain and justify frontier attacks against Britain’s Native American allies.  
Chapter 2 focuses on how the Wyoming Massacre became an integral part of 
Revolutionary history and memory for the next generation, especially during the War of 1812. 
The chapter first draws attention to the role of early historians in legitimizing and then spreading 
the myth. Though forged amid the uncertainty and vagaries of war, massacre narratives of the 
Revolution indeed proved remarkably resilient, and the legend of the Wyoming Massacre did not 
die with the Revolution. Instead, as this part of the chapter argues, the real and fabricated 
atrocities of the battle endured and gained further legitimacy through early histories, which too 
readily accepted Patriot reports at face value. These histories’ endorsement of these narratives 
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had lasting consequences as other writers and artists drew from these accounts in creating their 
own works, further spreading the legend. Early nineteenth century Americans’ familiarity with 
the event enabled a new generation to return to the legend of the Wyoming Massacre when they 
found themselves once again at odds with Great Britain and their native allies on the frontier. 
 The second part of the chapter picks up in the early nineteenth century as tensions with 
Great Britain worsened and eventually erupted in the War of 1812. During this fraught time—a 
second Revolutionary War to some—the relevancy of Wyoming to the republic’s political 
discourse increased. Political commentators, like in the Revolution, turned to memories of the 
battle and Massacre to again disparage the British or encourage frontier violence. In this era of 
provocative and inflammatory rhetoric, political writers did not merely use Wyoming’s example 
to denounce the British and Native Americans, however. Some of the most vociferous rhetoric 
was instead reserved for members of the other political party, who many tried to depict as secret 
Loyalists bent on destroying America. Even after the threat from Great Britain dissipated, 
Wyoming remained ideologically valuable, either to criticize foreign interventions on the frontier 
or to reinforce the nation’s founding mythology. In showcasing Patriot suffering at the hands of 
the British and Indians, Wyoming helped sanctify the American cause. 
Shifting to the period after the War of 1812, Chapter 3 details the creation of the myth of 
Queen Esther and the Bloody Rock, examining the role mid-nineteenth century historians and 
culture played in its growth and acceptance. The first half of the chapter traces how local 
historians from the late 1820s to around 1860 worked to discredit many of the Revolutionary 
fabrications that informed the myth of the Wyoming Massacre. It also details how certain 
cultural ideas influenced their interpretations. Dedicated to authenticity, these historians took 
pains in their search for truth and partially succeeded in dismantling the Wyoming Massacre, but 
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they simultaneously allowed Queen Esther’s legend to arise. After showing how historians 
attacked the myth of the Wyoming Massacre, the chapter outlines the nebulous origins of Queen 
Esther’s myth before showing how these new historians—much like their earlier counterparts—
advanced a myth about the battle in their own work.  
Historians were not the only means through which the myth of Esther grew, however, and 
the second half of Chapter 3 explores how several cultural currents converged to increase 
Esther’s relevancy in this period. Americans’ desire for regional romance and the continued 
literary use of Wyoming’s history, for instance, created an atmosphere where the fantastical story 
of Queen Esther could flourish. Local commemoration, which increased considerably in the 
1830s and 1840s, also contributed to Esther’s acceptance and later dissemination by encouraging 
locals to look for and possible even fabricate interesting stories about their region’s history. An 
interest in stories about Native Americans within popular literature contributed to Esther’s 
emergence on a national level as well. For purposes of entertainment or making meaning out of 
the past, Esther’s myth fit antebellum needs quite nicely.   
 
The significance of the Battle of Wyoming in history and memory ultimately reaches far 
beyond the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. Relevant to the political and cultural life of early 
Americans, Wyoming had an outsized influence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Understanding its effects remains important as the story of Wyoming’s place in the culture and 
politics of this period illuminates some of the ways Americans have tailored their history to 
speak to the present and how they forged national and local identities in the process. As scholars 
of historical memory have long realized, memory “is an active, constructive process” that entails 
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reshaping recollections of the past to serve current conceptions.16 Wyoming’s memory proved no 
different, adapting to the purposes of several generations living in markedly different contexts. A 
reminder of the malleability of historical memory, this exploration of Wyoming accentuates how 
the present continually exerts an influence on the retelling of the past.  
Such present-minded manipulation of the past had consequences for identity formation in 
this era. Then as now, the memory of the Revolutionary War remained important to the 
articulation of a shared past and a common national mythology. “Military memory, especially 
memory of the Revolutionary War,” wrote Sarah Purcell, stands “at the heart of American 
national identity.”17 An example of Patriot suffering and sacrifice, the Battle of Wyoming fit 
nicely into this mythology, helping Americans make sense of the suffering of war and imparting 
patriotic lessons to future generations. On a regional level, local interpretation of the battle 
helped reaffirm community identities while simultaneously reinforcing national narratives about 
the Revolutionary past. Often hopelessly intertwined, local and national identities gained 
strength through reference to each other.18 More nefariously, such stories of suffering at the 
hands of savage enemies, especially the exaggerated myths of the Massacre and Queen Esther, 
could also work for exclusionary purposes. As historians like Parkinson have related, negative 
founding narratives about native people became the basis for their political exclusion and 
physical removal.19 Put bluntly, in defining what it meant to be an American or who was or was 
not an American, Revolutionary memories of events like the Battle of Wyoming mattered. 
 
16 Barry Schwartz, “The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory,” Social Forces 61, no. 
2 (December 1982): 374. See also, David Thelen, “Memory and American History,” The Journal of American 
History 75, no. 4 (1989): 1120. 
17 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 1. See also, Hume, Popular Media and the American Revolution, ix-1.  
18Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 179-195. 
19 See, for example, Parkinson, The Common Cause, 650- 655. 
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Indeed, they still matter in that they can illustrate how past Americans perceived the Revolution, 
themselves, and others.  
Along with accentuating the influence of the present on conceptions of the past and the 
significance of Wyoming to identity formation in early America, the story of the Wyoming 
Massacre’s staying power in the American imagination points to how the exaggerated rhetoric of 
wartime and the fabrications of a few can enmesh itself into history and popular memory. Even if 
fabricated, the myths about the Battle of Wyoming wielded tremendous influence over many 
decades. Born from exaggerated rumors, partisan reports, and local folklore, these narratives 
became lasting aspects of the battle’s historical remembrance that informed the public’s 
understanding of the Revolutionary past. These exaggerations, often legitimized by historians 
and spread by popular media, wielded tremendous influence over many decades. In the end, the 
pervasive effects of these sensational myths offer a warning about the danger of uncritically 
accepting and reproducing information, especially information formed in the uncertainties of war 
or intended for partisan effect.  
In an era of fake news, acrimonious political partisanship, and countless cases of 
misinformation, modern readers would do well to remember the example of Wyoming.  
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Chapter 1 
“These monsters in human shape” 
Transforming a Battle into a Massacre 
 
 When Patriots collided with Loyalist and Native American raiders in the Wyoming 
Valley in July 1778, bloodshed ensued. Outnumbered and outmatched, Patriot troops suffered 
horrendous casualties in the subsequent battle and lost control of frontier forts across the region. 
In the aftermath of this inglorious defeat, distressed frontier families and those soldiers who 
managed to escape the slaughter fled the area, spreading fear and distorting the details of the 
failed defense of Wyoming and the fate of the valley’s inhabitants. The histrionic stories and 
rumors from these survivors served as the basis for even more embellished newspaper coverage 
of the event. Sensationalizing the narrative about the Battle of Wyoming, newspapers cemented a 
lasting, if hyperbolic, view of the event into the public mind. In effect, as this chapter 
demonstrates, they created the legend of the “Wyoming Massacre,” an exaggerated tale of 
murder, arson, and parricide. This portrayal of the battle, especially in the largely unsubstantiated 
depiction of its aftermath, had real uses and consequences for Revolutionary Americans.  
From humble frontier petitioners to the highest civilian and military leaders, supporters of 
the Patriot cause quickly subsumed the Wyoming Massacre into pre-existing and interconnected 
arguments about independence and British savagery. At the same time, a similarly diverse cast of 
characters evoked the example of Wyoming to justify retaliatory strikes on the frontier against 
Native Americans and those Loyalist and British militants who allegedly instigated the attacks. 
In its many iterations within Patriot discourse, the story of the Massacre often encouraged 
additional violence by perpetuating a lasting American narrative of atrocity, suffering, and 
victimization. Depicting their enemies as monstrous villains and savages harming innocent 
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backcountry families, Patriots utilized the real and imagined details of the Wyoming Massacre to 
support a simplified narrative of frontier war that vindicated their own political positions on both 
national and more local levels. As they used the example of Wyoming to advance their own 
aims, Patriot revolutionaries and backcountry settlers alike fabricated a frontier horror story that 
possessed an enduring mythic appeal for generations of future Americans.  
In tracing the evolution of the story of Wyoming from a battle to a full-fledged massacre, 
this chapter offers a thorough reconstruction of the reports as they initially appeared in military 
accounts and their eventual transformation in anecdotal and newspaper reports. Focused on the 
growing popularity of narratives demonizing Loyalists and Indians as barbaric enemies, this 
composite account draws on the insights about anti-Indian rhetoric made by Robert Parkinson 
and Peter Silver, as well as a vast scholarship on Native Americans, frontier warfare, and the 
Wyoming Valley during the Revolution. Though others have briefly touched on the 
transformation of Wyoming into legend, this chapter more extensively details the process, 





To understand the Battle of Wyoming’s place within local and national memory, it first 
becomes necessary to understand what participants in the battle said they witnessed in early July 
1778. What they recorded and what later backcountry residents and newspapers reported often 
proved to be at odds.  
 As the Revolutionary War entered its third year in 1778, violence had engulfed the 
backcountry of the mid-Atlantic. In a brutal war that pitted neighbors, families, and tribes against 
each other, Patriot and British forces battled for control over the valuable borderlands of New 
Tharp 23 
 
York and Pennsylvania. The preceding year had seen two large British expeditions traverse the 
New York countryside, attempting but ultimately failing to bifurcate the colonies along the 
Hudson River. After the disappointment of the botched expedition against Fort Stanwix in 
central New York and Burgoyne’s disastrous defeat at Saratoga in 1777, the conduct of the 
frontier war changed. While Burgoyne had brought a large army into the frontier, his costly 
failure forced British military commanders to reevaluate their strategy. Their revised approach, 
characterized by irregular warfare and raiding, aimed to minimize expenses while maximizing 
destruction to vulnerable frontier settlements.1  
Thinly manned yet vitally important, the settlement in the Wyoming Valley was an ideal 
target within this new strategic conception. Situated along the banks of the Susquehanna River in 
northeast Pennsylvania, Wyoming defended a crucial waterway and produced a significant 
amount of grain that helped feed the Continental Army. While the Patriot government recognized 
the importance of defending the valley, the settlement still lay exposed to attack. From 1776 to 
1778, the Continental Congress had passed several acts related to this frontier region’s 
protection, setting aside funds for the raising of companies as well as the construction and 
arming of forts.2 The companies organized for Wyoming’s benefit, however, instead served with 
General Washington, providing fresh manpower to the depleted Continental Army. The defense 
 
1 For strategic context of the frontier war in 1778-1779, see Joseph R. Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure: The 
Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, July-September 1779 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1997), 9-33, esp. 27-28. See also Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1972). In particular, the British wished to divert Continental soldiers from Washington’s 
army to defend this territory while also hoping to severely cripple the colonists’ agricultural heartland.  
2 Edwin Horace Hayden, The Massacre of Wyoming. The Acts of Congress for the Defense of the Wyoming Valley, 
Pennsylvania, 1776-1778: With the Petitions of the Sufferers by the Massacre of July 3, 1778, for Congressional Aid 
(Wilkes-Barre, PA: Wyoming Historical and Geological Society, 1895), 1-6, 64, 70. The Wyoming Valley 
contained five principal forts that were constructed in 1777 to defend this valuable region: Forty, Jenkins, Pittston, 
Plymouth, and Wintermont. See also H. Melchior Muhlenberg Richards, et al., Report of the Commission to Locate 
the Site of the Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, PA: Cm. Busch, 1896), 423-465.  
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of Wyoming thus fell mostly to the local militia, a much less disciplined and battle-tested 
adversary than their Continental counterparts.    
Coupled with the valley’s lackluster manpower, the inhabitants of the region were also 
internally divided. This was not new. Starting in 1769 and as recent as December 1775, different 
groups of settlers from Connecticut and Pennsylvania had briefly come to blows over conflicting 
claims to the land. Tensions remained high in the community throughout the Revolutionary War, 
with the added political divide over whether to support independence or the crown 
“superimposed” onto “the existing division” between Connecticut “Yankees” and “Pennamite” 
Pennsylvanians over claims to land in the valley. As historian Anne Ousterhout has argued, the 
Revolution exacerbated this societal partition within Wyoming and gave both sides opportunities 
to seek revenge against their neighbors.3 By employing several Loyalists from the region within 
his army as well as utilizing disaffected locals to garner military intelligence, Major John 
Butler’s military expedition to Wyoming in late June and early July of 1778 readily exploited 
these old animosities.4  
Traveling along the Susquehanna River, Major John Butler and his combined force of 
Loyalist rangers and Native American auxiliaries reported arriving in Wyoming on the last day 
of June 1778. His small army, whose Indian component was commanded by the Seneca chief 
 
3 See, Ousterhout, “Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley,” 330–63, 
esp. 337-347. Ousterhout maintains that with the coming of war in 1776 Yankee settlers increasingly associated 
Pennamites with Great Britain to justify taking actions against them. In turn, Yankee threats and damages eventually 
forced many Pennamites to join with the British. In the expedition against Wyoming in 1778, many Tory 
Pennamites were given the chance to enact revenge against their former neighbors. See also Paul B. Moyer, Wild 
Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary Frontier (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 34-35, 51-52.   
4 See Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain (No.9), New York, September 10, 1778, in K.G. Davies, ed., 
Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783, Colonial Office Series, XV, Transcripts, 1778 (Dublin, 1876), 
199.  Guy Johnson specifically mentions how Butler “augmented” his forces with Loyalists from the countryside in 
his letter. See also, Richard McGinnis, “Journal of Occurrences Respecting Our Suffering in the Late Rebellion,” 
Carol Lind., ed., NY Genealogical & Biographical Record, vol. 105, no. 4 (Oct 1974), 14-18. In his diary, the 
Loyalist soldier McGinnis mentions how several locals provided cattle for the soldiers upon their arrival. 
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Sayenqueragtha, consisted of roughly “500 rangers and Indians” ready to make war upon the 
valley.5 As they camped on a nearby cliff overlooking the frontier settlement, Butler sent out 
scouting parties to report on the strength of the nearby Patriot defenses. His scouts, along with 
two local Loyalists, provided him with valuable information as well as a small number of 
prisoners and scalps. According to their reports, about 800 Patriot defenders were spread out 
among several forts in the nearby vicinity. Armed with this intelligence, Butler and his men set 
out the next day to accomplish their objective: destroy these frontier posts and prevent 
Wyoming’s inhabitants from harvesting their crops.6  
 On July 1, the British expedition quickly and bloodlessly captured the two poorly manned 
forts of Wintermoot and Jenkins. At Fort Wintermoot, Lieutenant Turney of Butler’s command 
demanded the Patriots’ immediate surrender, and the beleaguered defenders quickly complied. 
Turning over all public and private stores and promising to not “bear Arms” for the duration of 
“the present contest,” the surrendering Patriots obtained Butler’s promise of protection for 
themselves and their families. The aged defenders of Jenkins Fort, numbering just about 
 
5 Major John Butler to Lieut.-Colonel Mason Bolton, Lackawanna, July 8, 1778, in K.G. Davies, ed., Documents of 
the American Revolution, 1770-1783, Colonial Office Series, XV, Transcripts, 1778 (Dublin, 1876), 165. Butler 
provided no exact numbers, but the most reliable accounts usually place the number of British and Indian troops 
engaged in this expedition close to 500 or 600. In his journal, Loyalist Richard Cartwright maintained that 110 
Rangers came with Butler, while 464 Indians accompanied the expedition. See Richard Sir Cartwright and C. E. 
Cartwright, Life and Letters of the Late Hon. Richard Cartwright, Member of Legislative Council in the First 
Parliament of Upper Canada, Born 1759, Died 1815 (Toronto: Belford Bros., 1876), 29-32. One deposition from 
about a week after the battle noted that the number of Tories “did not exceed two hundred,” which lends partial 
support to Cartwright’s assertion. See George Washington Papers, series 4, General Correspondence: Jacob Wise, 
July 10, 1778, Deposition on the Wyoming, Pennsylvania Massacre, manuscript/mixed material, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw451152/.  
6 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166. It seems likely that most of the “eight prisoners and scalps” reportedly 
brought in by Butler’s scouts on June 30 were from the nearby Fort Jenkins. In her recollections, Mrs. Jenkins, an 
eyewitness at the fort, mentioned that seven men garrisoned there had been killed two days before its surrender on 
July 1. While this would put their deaths on June 29, it is more likely that her recollection was just slightly off since 
she recalled this event more than 60 years after its occurrence. For her testimony, see Hayden, The Massacre of 
Wyoming, 47.  
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seventeen, likewise accepted Butler’s terms. They refused, however, to swear that they would 
never rejoin the Patriot military.7  
After the British successes at these locations, John Butler then demanded the surrender of 
the remaining 400 or so Patriot troops stationed in Forty Fort, the largest and best defended of 
the region. The commanding American officer Colonel Zebulon Butler (no relation to the British 
commander) and his men refused and remained within their fortifications. Despite the initial 
objections of Colonel Butler and his second in command, Colonel Nathan Denison, however, the 
Patriots did not stay put for long. Understandably, most of the militiamen and many of the 
subordinate officers wished to attack the British in order to prevent further damage to their 
homes and preclude a lengthy siege. Colonel Butler, against his better judgment, eventually 
acquiesced to this plan.8 Moving out for an attack at 5 P.M. on July 3, about 400 Patriots left the 
safety of Forty Fort to engage the enemy, or to use the more dramatic phrase of one historian, 
“having refused terms,” Zebulon Butler’s men “sallied out of the fort and into history and 
legend.”9  
Once committed to the battle, Zebulon Butler hoped to catch his adversary unprepared. 
Several British scouting parties, however, foiled this design and gave John Butler’s men ample 
 
7 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165; Articles of Capitulation, Q15, p. 225, Public Archives of Canada, as quoted in 
Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 168. On the age of the defenders of Jenkins Fort, see the 
petition of Mrs. Jenkins in Hayden, The Massacre of Wyoming, 47. For an account that largely corroborates Butler’s 
letter, see Cartwright, Life and Letters, 29-32.  
8 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 169. As an officer in the Continental Army who was on 
furlough in Wyoming when this expedition occurred, Colonel Zebulon Butler had been chosen by the valley’s 
inhabitants to lead them in this emergency. One suspects that his temporary position, based as it was on his 
popularity among the settlers, along with the democratic tendencies of many militia units likely made him more 
willing to acquiesce to his troops’ desire to meet the invaders outside the fort.     
9 Gregory Dowd, Groundless: Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2015), 176. Most primary sources agree that around 400 or 500 Patriots left the fort that 
morning. See Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166; George Washington Papers, series 4, General 
Correspondence: Solomon Avery, July 8, 1778, Deposition on the Wyoming, Pennsylvania, Massacre, 
manuscript/mixed material, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw4.050_0795_0795/; Cartwright, Life and Letters, 29-
32; McGinnis, “Journal of Occurrences…,” 14-18.  
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warning. Unfazed by Forty Fort’s obstinacy or the news that 400 American troops were on the 
march, Major John Butler cunningly burnt the captured fort in his possession to give the 
impression that his men had withdrawal from the valley. He and his native allies then chose an 
ideal battleground “in a fine open wood” that would allow for concealment and cover. Lying 
down for the greatest protection, John Butler’s Loyalist rangers and Sayenqueragtha’s warriors 
waited to spring a deadly trap on the unsuspecting Patriots.10  
Thus, lured onto the battlefield with hopes of driving off the retreating invaders, Zebulon 
Butler’s troop moved quickly to attack. Focusing on the Loyalists who had been specifically 
positioned to draw the Patriots’ attention, Zebulon Butler’s men berated their enemies with 
insults and called out: “Come out ye villainous Tories! Come out if ye dare and show your 
heads…to the brave Continental Sons of Liberty.”11 They then fired three ineffectual volleys at 
the Loyalist rangers’ position from about two hundred yards away, which did little damage to the 
prone British forces. Unaware that each movement forward drew them deeper into the ambush, 
the Patriots advanced towards the rangers who remained behind their cover instead of returning 
fire. When the American army had advanced to just 100 yards away, the Loyalists and Native 
Americans finally struck back. With a brutal close-range volley, the Loyalist and Indian army 
exacted a heavy toll, and the ambush’s success quickly became apparent. The Native American 
wing soon flanked, or in some reports surrounded, part of the American army and engaged in 
close-quarter combat with the Patriots.12 When a Patriot officer ordered his men to fall back to 
 
10 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165. See also, McGinnis, “Journal of Occurrences…,” 14-18.  
11 McGinnis, “Journal of Occurrences…,” 14-18.  
12 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166; Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778; Governor Blacksnake, 
Chainbreaker: The Revolutionary War Memoirs of Governor Blacksnake as Told to Benjamin Williams, ed. Thomas 
S. Abler (Lincoln: Bison Books, 2005), 135. One of the only Native American accounts of this engagement, 
Blacksnake’s memoir offers some unique perspectives on the frontier during the Revolutionary War. While it is not 
certain if Blacksnake is talking about Wyoming, the editor of this volume believes that his description of a battle, 
which has Loyalists attacking first and drawing the attention away from the natives who came “behind the enemy 
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escape from the Native American flanking maneuver, many confused and undisciplined 
militiamen misinterpreted this as a sign of retreat, and they quickly broke ranks.13  
What started as retreat swiftly transformed into a rout. Many Patriots fled and attempted 
to cross the Susquehanna back to Forty Fort, but Native American soldiers cut off their escape. 
In the brutal type of warfare that characterized the frontier conflict by both sides, the Native 
Americans killed as many of the retreating soldiers they could.14 A few desperate militiamen 
attempted to avoid this fate by jumping into the river, and several saved themselves from death 
and dismemberment by swimming to safety. Others, either drowned or got shot while in the 
river. Many never made it to shore.15 Still more, according to some improbable testimony, were 
ritually tortured by an Indian queen.16 In the end, the entire battle, the retreat of the Patriot 
forces, and the decimation of their numbers had lasted only about thirty minutes.17  
Predictably, the casualty numbers at the Battle of Wyoming matched the lopsided nature 
of the fighting. John Butler and his Indian allies lost almost no soldiers; in his letter to his 
superior, Butler maintained that he suffered only about three killed and eight wounded.18 
 
hills, and put our tomehawk on back side of their [the Patriots’] heads,” could perhaps describe the flanking trap at 
Wyoming.  
13 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 169.  
14 Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure, 27-28. See again, Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 166. According to Butler, “the 
Indians gave no quarter” to those inhabitants who had taken up arms against them.  
15 Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778; Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 169-171.  
16 See the testimony of Colonel Ransom in Hayden, The Massacre of Wyoming, 51. See also, Captain John Franklin 
in William Zierdt, Narrative History of the 109th Field Artillery Pennsylvania National Guard 1775-1930 (Wilkes-
Barre: Wyoming Historical and Geological Society, 1932), 33-34. The probably apocryphal story of Queen Esther 
will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.  
17 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166. This reported length comes directly from Butler’s own estimation. 
Another Loyalist at the battle claimed that the fighting “lasted about fifteen minutes” before the Patriots retreated. 
See Cartwright, Life and Letters, 29-32. This recollection does not directly contradict Butler. The Loyalist 
recollections are probably more accurate than Solomon Avery’s deposition from July 8, 1778 or his later account 
given to Patriot newspapers on July 17. Avery maintained that the battle lasted quite long, saying that the Patriots 
fought for about one or two hours before the retreat occurred. With such a lopsided result, it seems more likely that 
the encounter did not last nearly as long as Avery described. See Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778 and “New 
London, July 17,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 2. 
18 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166. His language is somewhat ambiguous. He writes that “on our side were 
killed one Indian, two rangers and eight Indians wounded.” It is unclear whether the rangers were wounded or killed.  
Tharp 29 
 
Recalling the battle many years later, Blacksnake, an Indian veteran of the conflict, put the 
Indian losses at close to eight, while Loyalist Richard Cartwright reported that “Major Butler’s 
loss was only seven wounded, two of who died of their wounds.”19 The Patriots suffered much 
greater loses. Two different Patriot officers claimed that the American dead numbered close to 
200, while Loyalist accounts place the loss at well over 200. According to the testimony of one 
witness, “the number of those who escaped did not exceed thirty men.”20 Indeed, other reports 
corroborate this ghastly toll. Writing to his superior, John Butler reported that his men had 
“taken 227 scalps and only five prisoners” during the action. Considering that many Patriot 
militiamen drowned or were killed in the river and thus did not suffer the ignominy of scalping, 
this conservatively puts the number to at least 250.21 Ultimately, historians will probably never 
uncover the exact number of those who died, but they can comment on the battle’s effect by 
discussing the ranges of casualties typically ascribed to it. In the words of military historian 
Joseph Fischer, “Regardless of whose figures one accepts, put in perspective, this means the 
engagement [at Wyoming] ranks as one of the most costly frontier battles in the nation’s 
history.”22 In fact, one could consider Wyoming to be one of the American military’s most 
lopsided frontier defeats.  
 
19 Blacksnake, Chainbreaker: The Revolutionary War Memoirs of Governor Blacksnake, 97; Cartwright, Life and 
Letters, 29-32. Some Patriots put Loyalist casualties at 80, but this seems much too high. See, for instance, Colonel 
Nathan Denison to Jonathan Trumbell, Governor of Connecticut, Lower Smithfield Township, Pennsylvania, July 
28, 1778, in Winsor et. al., Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 3 (2), October 1887, 342-344. 
20 Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778. He also repeated this number in a deposition which many Patriot papers 
would later print. Though supposedly an eyewitness to the battle, he was not present for the events of July 4. See, for 
instance, “New London, July 17,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 2.  
21 For Patriot accounts, see Denison to Trumbell, July 28, 1778, 342-344 and the account of Captain John Franklin 
in Zierdt, Narrative History of the 109th Field Artillery, 33-34. For a sample of Loyalist accounts see Butler to 
Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166 and Cartwright, Life and Letters, 29-32. See also Jacob Wise Deposition, July 10, 
1778. In his testimony, Wise says that the Indians “complained because they could not get the scalps of the 
drowned.” Thus, if one accepts Butler’s report on the number of scalps in addition with Wise’s deposition, the 
casualties clearly exceeded 232. On the number of scalps collected, Cartwright’s account closely aligns with Butler: 
226 scalps and 3 prisoners.  
22 For a detailed look at casualty numbers along with this quote, see Fischer, Well-Executed Failure, 205 note 52. 
Tharp 30 
 
In the wake of this military disaster, Forty Fort capitulated the next day: July 4. Filling 
the place of Zebulon Butler, who had escaped the carnage the day before and fled to safety away 
from the valley, Colonel Denison now negotiated for the badly beaten Patriots. In no real 
position to offer resistance, Denison readily signed Butler’s terms.23 The articles of surrender 
ordered Denison’s men to lay down their arms, destroy their garrison, give up their prisoners, 
and commit to not serving in the Patriot military for the duration of “the present contest.”  In a 
nod towards Pennamite Loyalists in the valley, John Butler also made Denison promise to give 
back “the properties taken from the people called Torris” and allow them “to remain in peaceable 
possession of their Farms and unmolested in a free Trade.” For surrendering peacefully, the 
British victors agreed to do their best to protect the private property of the valley’s inhabitants 
and promised to allow the occupants to live peacefully on their farms.24 
Although some later reports propagated vastly different notions of what occurred during 
the surrender, most evidence suggests that John Butler’s men did not harm any of Forty Fort’s 
inhabitants during its capitulation. Bragging to his superior about his men’s conduct, John Butler 
wrote “what gives me the sincerest satisfaction is that I can with great truth assure you that in the 
destruction of this settlement not a single person has been hurt of the inhabitants but such as 
were in arms.”25 While Butler potentially stretched the truth in writing to his superior, his 
statement still stands out as more substantiated than later reports, which describe lurid scenes of 
destruction and bloodlust levied against civilians. Reporting that their Native American allies did 
not engage in wanton massacre of civilians, other accounts, such as those from Loyalist soldiers 
 
23 Denison to Trumbell, July 28, 1778, 342-344.  
24 Articles of Capitulation, Q15, p. 225-27, Public Archives of Canada, as quoted in Graymont, The Iroquois in the 
American Revolution, 171. Butler’s use of language here is interesting. He does not say that Tories should get their 
land back, rather he says that people called Tories should. This suggests that some false labeling was likely 
occurring. For quotes throughout this thesis, I have retained the source’s original spelling.  
25 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 166.  
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Richard Cartwright and Richard McGinnis, support Butler’s recollection that there was no 
civilian massacre at the fort.26 According to the questionable testimony of one former inhabitant, 
however, Butler did briefly lose control of his Indian allies while negotiating the initial 
surrender. They stole minor effects from the fort’s inhabitants.27 Regardless, this indicates that 
only a negligible amount of plundering and destruction occurred within the fort.  
While Butler’s men did not likely harm the fort’s occupants, they did break their 
promises regarding protecting private property and allowing the region’s occupants to remain 
peacefully in the surrounding countryside. After the surrender, Butler’s forces ravaged the 
Wyoming Valley, driving off droves of frontier families and setting much of the region’s 
infrastructure alight. Having eliminated Patriot resistance by July 7, the expedition’s raids 
continued, crippling the ability of the region to produce needed foodstuffs for the Patriot army.28 
Not only did Butler’s men target farms and homes, but they also stole or killed large numbers of 
livestock. Commenting on the success of his expedition in a letter, Butler estimated that “we 
have taken and destroyed eight palisaded forts and burned about 1000 dwelling houses, all their 
mills, etc. We have also killed and drove off about 1000 head of horned cattle, and sheep and 
swine in great numbers.”29 Native American soldiers additionally plundered houses, and some 
returned home with their canoes laden with stolen goods.30 Some Loyalist and Indian soldiers 
took the devastation yet one step further when they killed fleeing frontiersmen on the roads out 
of the region.31 
 
26 See Cartwright, Life and Letters, 29-32 and McGinnis, “Journal of Occurrences…,” 14-18.  
27 Hayden, The Massacre of Wyoming, 49.   
28 According to Cartwright, the other Patriot forts in the region “were either abandoned or surrendered…before the 
7th Instant.” See Cartwright, Life and Letters, 29-32.  
29 Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166.  
30 Jacob Wise Deposition, July 10, 1778.  
31 Denison to Trumbell, July 28, 1778, 342-344. In a letter written less than a month after the event, Denison wrote 
that he saw the bodies of five dead frontiersmen on the road the day after the surrender as he left the valley.  
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To the Patriot inhabitants of Wyoming, the disastrous battle brought immense loss, 
dislocation, and terror. Reflected in tax records from the valley, the extent of the physical 
destruction reached far and wide. Before the raid in 1777, the valley had £20,322 worth of 
taxable property. Afterwards in 1780, it had only £2, 353, or about one tenth of the prewar 
total.32 In just a few short days, Butler’s men had destroyed much of the frontier community’s 
farms, crops, and equipment. Even more damaging to the prosperity of the region, however, was 
the mass exodus and psychological terror engendered by Butler’s victory.    
From Wyoming, Butler traveled down the Delaware River, destroying a settlement along 
his way before returning via the Susquehanna to the British stronghold of Fort Niagara by mid-
July 1778.33 While this ended Butler’s Wyoming expedition, the story of the Wyoming Massacre 
was only just beginning.  
 
Distressing News  
Understanding the full influence of reports and news about the Battle of Wyoming on the 
wider Patriot public requires seeing it within a larger cultural context that focuses not on the 
details of “what really happened” but on why certain narratives about Loyalists and their native 
allies easily proliferated at this point in time. Notably, the battle occurred during a period that 
saw a dramatic increase in anti-Indian rhetoric. Focusing on victimization at the hands of 
“savages” and fueled by fear of Indian war, colonists had long cultivated what scholar Peter 
Silver calls the “anti-Indian sublime,” the propensity to use atrocity-filled stories to argue for a 
variety of social and political goals. In the Revolutionary War, Patriots applied this rhetoric to 
 
32 Moyer, Wild Yankees, 58.  
33 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 172. For another description of the Battle of Wyoming see, 
Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 1-6. 
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Great Britain, connecting the British with their “savage” allies and presenting themselves as the 
victims of numerous “barbarities.”34 The language used in such frontier accounts had immense 
power. To communicate the inhumanity of Indians and those perceived as engaging in “savage” 
behavior, atrocity stories and news from the northern frontier consistently utilized words such as 
“slaughter,” “defenseless,” “butchered,” and “scalped.” These and similar words worked on 
multiple levels. Not only did they suggest the cruelty and monstrous nature of Patriot opponents 
on the frontier, but they also presented settlers as innocent residents undeservedly suffering from 
violence and inhumane mutilation.35 In the aftermath of the Battle of Wyoming, the anti-Indian 
sublime and its histrionic language often colored Patriot reports with an eye towards provoking 
governmental action or encouraging continued opposition to Great Britain.  
Before the news of Wyoming reached the papers, it underwent an initial transformation in 
the backcountry. As settlers and survivors fled in the aftermath of the battle, they disseminated 
accounts that played up the extent of destruction and death that occurred in the valley. Suffering 
from emotional trauma and the discomfort of forced migration, historian Barbara Graymont 
notes, grieving settlers “easily…embellished their own very real misfortunes with tales of even 
greater horror.” These embellished accounts informed Patriot reports on the battle, presenting the 
aftermath in such a way that did not bear much resemblance to the course of events reported by 
eyewitnesses. Moreover, when “others who had not been there” got hold of such information, 
they “readily fill[ed] in the details [that] they lacked to the greatest extent that their imaginations 
permitted.”36 Indeed, James Fenimore Cooper’s description of the response to a military defeat in 
 
34 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2008), xx, 227-260. Both Wise’s testimony about Indian misbehavior after the battle and Avery’s emphasis on 
victimization readily illustrate that this trend affected views on Wyoming. 
35 Gregory T. Knouff, The Soldiers’ Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging of Early American 
Identity (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2004), 161-163. Frontier accounts implicitly presented 
Native-Americans and their allies as aggressors.  
36 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 174.  
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The Last of the Mohicans mirrors the reaction of many on the Revolutionary frontier to 
Wyoming:  
A wide frontier had been laid naked by this unexpected disaster, and more 
substantial evils were preceded by a thousand fanciful and imaginary dangers. 
The alarmed colonists believed that the yells of the savages mingled with every 
fitful gust of wind that issued from the interminable forests of the west. The 
terrific character of their merciless enemies increased immeasurably the natural 
horrors of warfare. Numberless recent massacres were still vivid in their 
recollections; nor was there any ear…so deaf as not to have drunk in with avidity 
the narrative of some fearful tale of midnight murder…the blood of the timid 
curdled with terror, and mothers cast anxious glances even at those children 
which slumbered within the security of the largest towns.37  
 
As Cooper’s passage relates, frontier disasters like Wyoming produced distress and set off the 
anxieties of much of the populace at the same time that they confirmed a longstanding pattern of 
portraying Native Americans as barbaric. By seemingly confirming previous tales of massacres 
and “midnight murder” as well as stereotypes about their adversaries, such news could shake the 
confidence of entire towns and set Patriot imaginations on fire. Already awash in tales of frontier 
violence, many unquestioningly believed the worst.  
When the news of the disastrous defeat at Wyoming reached the inhabitants of the region, 
dozens of settler families fled eastward, away from the invading army. While the July 4 treaty at 
Forty Fort offered relatively conciliatory terms to the settlers, most Wyoming inhabitants either 
did not put much stock in John Butler’s promises or had simply fled before his men descended 
on the fort the day after the battle. Fearing for their lives, some settlers quickly formed an 
impromptu convoy of “boats, canoes, hogtroughs, [and] rafts hastily made of dry sticks” to 
escape. Guarded on both sides of the river by “the men of the settlement,” this panicked convoy 
 
37 James Fenimore Cooper, The Last of the Mohicans (New York: Signet Classics, 2005), 10. Though set in the 
French and Indian War, Cooper’s description accurately reflects attitudes on the Revolutionary frontier as well.  
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illustrates the fear that gripped the countryside after the battle.38 In the numerous recollections of 
former inhabitants, eyewitnesses uniformly made mention of the general confusion and fear that 
accompanied their flight from the valley. Like many other loaded frontier accounts, the plight of 
women and children featured prevalently in these narratives as did rumors of grisly death and 
dismemberment at the hands of savage enemies. As they emphasized “the suffering of the day” 
brought about by the defeat and subsequent panic, the valley’s survivors repeated similar sets of 
stories about destruction and suffering. Capturing the displacement that many felt, former valley 
resident Ishmael Bennet recalled that “the loss and ruin seemed universal; the distress no tongue 
can tell.”39  
As fearful settlers left the valley and spread their often groundless stories of loss and 
dislocation, the panic engendered by the Patriot reversal at Wyoming quickly spread across the 
northern frontier. Though the first newspapers only reported on the battle starting on July 16, 
several earlier documents indicate that news of a costly defeat began to disseminate almost 
immediately across the backcountry, sowing panic wherever it went. Just two days after the 
battle on July 5, citizens of the frontier town of Goshen, New York invoked “the disagreeable 
news of Wyoming” to petition Governor George Clinton for guns and ammunition to protect 
their vulnerable town. Reporting that the settlement of Wyoming had totally surrendered after an 
ill-fated battle, the authors of the petition attested to the effect this intelligence had on the 
condition of the backcountry. In their own words, this news “gives the people…so much 
uneasiness that many families are moving off and we have the greatest reason to believe that 
 
38 Robert Covenhoven’s Account of the Great Runaway, n.d., Journals of Fort Augusta, vol. 21, as quoted in 
Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure, 28.  
39 See Hayden, The Massacre at Wyoming, 42-75, esp. 53-54. In general, these stories revolved around a woman 
giving birth while fleeing, the vast destruction of farms and livestock, and the murder of many frontier men at the 
hands of Native Americans. 
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unless something be done…our frontiers will soon be reduced to the greatest distress.” This 
petition’s bleak picture of the frontier effectively demonstrates how news of Wyoming’s 
surrender influenced settlers and contributed to an atmosphere of fear that caused many in nearby 
regions to flee to the coast like their Wyoming counterparts.40 
For several days, news continued to trickle out about Wyoming, first to other frontier 
towns and then quickly to Philadelphia. By July 8 and 9, several prominent Patriots reported 
information about the battle.41 On July 10, the Loyalist deserter Jacob Wise related his 
experiences with Butler’s expedition to the Patriot judge John Cleeve Symmes in Minisink, New 
York. Roughly fifty miles east of Wyoming, Minisink lay directly on the path of many panicked 
frontier settlers trying to leave the backcountry. Presenting Butler and his allies in a negative 
light and commenting on the slain Patriots, Wise’s account likely exaggerated the immoral 
actions of Butler’s Native American soldiers during and after the battle. In particular, he focused 
on how the Indians “complained because they could not get the scalps of the drowned” from the 
battlefield and how many left the region loaded with stolen goods.42 As it accentuated Indian and 
British misconduct, Wise’s account foreshadowed later retellings of the Wyoming Massacre, 
which would ascribe even greater horrors to the Patriots’ opponents.   
 
40 Citizens of Goshen to Governor George Clinton, Goshen, 5 July 1778, in George Clinton, Public Papers of 
George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777-1795, 1801-1804, vol. 3 (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1900), 522-
523.  
41 See “To Alexander Hamilton from Elias Boudinot, 8 July 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0502, Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778, and 
“James Lovell to Abigail Adams, 9 July 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-03-02-0049. As fleeing settlers spread the news, Patriot political 
elites quickly caught on.  
42 Jacob Wise Deposition, July 10, 1778. Though not as focused on atrocities, Wise’s account still utilized the anti-
Indian sublime. Aside from Wise’s deposition, Symmes recorded testimony from the militiaman Solomon Avery on 
July 8, and he quickly forwarded it to General Washington. At least by July 10, Washington knew about the battle. 




Along with Wise, other travelers, many of them former residents of Wyoming, also 
spread news of the Patriot defeat, amplifying the attendant horrors. On the same day that 
Symmes recorded Wise’s testimony, several Patriot officers also located in the town of Minisink 
referred to Wyoming in a letter to Governor Clinton. Upon their arrival a few days earlier, the 
officers reported that they had “found things in the greatest confusion” as a result of the upheaval 
on the frontier. According to their account, “some few men with women and children by [the] 
hundreds [were] flocking from Wyoming where by the concurrent testimony of numbers the 
most horrid scenes of savage barbarity ha[ve] been exhibited.” After considering this information 
as well as other distressing news, these officers, like the townspeople of Goshen, recommended 
that the governor take offensive action as soon as possible.43 As terrified settlers fled and 
disseminated the grisly news about Wyoming, they thus not only helped create a general panic 
across the northern frontier but also encouraged other Patriots to begin thinking about retaliation 
as a way to defend themselves.   
Informed by fear and rumor, frontier men and women told stories of destruction and 
bloodshed about Wyoming that were both gripping and wildly exaggerated. As Graymont writes, 
“almost as soon as the [British] invaders left, the rumors began to fly, magnifying the horrors of 
the battle and fabricating atrocities.”44 For example, along with showcasing the frontier panic, 
the Goshen petition from July 5 illustrates how quickly new details could suddenly emerge in 
narratives about Wyoming. Within their appeal, the townspeople maintained that both John 
Butler and Joseph Brant, a prominent Mohawk leader who despite his role in much of the 
frontier war was almost certainly not present at Wyoming, had attacked the valley. This 
 
43 Benjamin Tusten, Jacob Newkirk, and Henry Wisner to General George Clinton, Minisink, 10 July 1778, in 
George Clinton, Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777-1795, 1801-1804, vol. 3 
(Albany: James B. Lyon, 1900), 539-541. 
44 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 172.  
Tharp 38 
 
groundless detail about the battle would have a major impact as it was eventually repeated in 
popular histories and fiction well into the next century.45 Even more egregious cases of this 
hyperbole plagued early depositions as well as Patriot newspapers. In particular, one Patriot 
militiaman’s testimony, first recorded by a judge and later disseminated through a widely 
circulated account published in a Connecticut newspaper, illustrates the wide-reaching effects 
that such reports had on popular understanding of the battle.  
No stranger to exaggeration, the Patriot militiaman Solomon Avery contributed 
significantly to the atmosphere of misrepresentation surrounding the Battle of Wyoming. Avery 
first told his story to Judge Symmes on July 8 in northern New Jersey, nine days before a 
somewhat similar printed account by him emerged in a Connecticut newspaper.46 Presenting a 
rosier picture of American conduct on the battlefield than Loyalist accounts, Avery’s deposition 
recalled the Battle of Wyoming and the rout of Patriot forces through a decidedly partisan lens. 
The Patriots in Avery’s account, for instance, did not retreat like cowards after only thirty 
minutes like they did in John Butler’s report to the British high command. Instead, they fought 
for “some time” until “all prospect of success was over.” Small embellishments aside, Avery’s 
description of the battle and retreat remained consistent with other non-Patriot sources. His 
comments about the aftermath, however, wildly exaggerated the death and destruction suffered 
by the valley’s residents. As he quickly fled “the night after the action of the third,” Avery 
claimed to have seen the settlement at Wyoming “all on fire” from his overlook to the east. 
 
45 See, for instance, Campbell, Gertrude of Wyoming. See also, Letter to the Mohawk Chief, Ahyonwoeghs, 
commonly called John Brant, Esq. of the Grand River, Upper Canada, from Thomas Campbell, London, January 20, 
1822 in William W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon County: Or, The Border Warfare of New York, During the 
Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1924), 210-218. Much to the chagrin of his family, Brant became a 
major villain of the battle for generations. 
46 Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778. See also, Parkinson, The Common Cause, 413-414. Parkinson provides a 
detailed discussion of the Wyoming Massacre in Patriot newspapers and popular memory up to the 1820s. In her 
thesis, Francavilla also mentions Avery, noting that he might have had a relative named Christopher who died in the 
battle. Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 7.  
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Moreover, he liberally estimated that 2000 inhabitants had “perished in the carnage.”47 His 
guesses proved wrong on both counts, yet his comments would have long lasting effects.  
In a widely reprinted newspaper account printed a few days later, Avery repeated many 
of the same details from his deposition about the Battle of Wyoming but added yet more 
embellishments to his portrayal of the aftermath. Within the newspaper retelling, Avery first 
accentuated the plight of the inhabitants of the valley who left everything behind as they made 
“their escape naked through the wilderness.” Following the language conventions of frontier 
accounts, he particularly drew attention to the “most forlorn condition” of the women and 
children, and he used certain keywords, such as “distressed,” “naked,” and “escape,” to present 
Patriots as pitiable victims. Though he doubtlessly exaggerated the nakedness of the emigrants, 
this aspect of his expanded testimony speaks to the fear that gripped the northern frontier after 
the battle and the deplorable state that many frontier refugees found themselves in as they moved 
away en masse. Avery followed with his most shocking information, which significantly 
diverged from his earlier deposition that had circulated to a much smaller number of readers. Not 
mentioning any fire this time, he estimated that about 2500 people, or one half of the settlement 
and 500 more than in his original approximation, were “killed” or “taken by the enemy [as] 
prisoners.” The other half, he maintained, attempted to escape the region by any means 
necessary.48 Once again, Avery’s claims about the days after the battle deviated significantly 
from what other participants claimed to have seen.  
 
47 Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778. 
48 “New London, July 17,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 2.  Avery’s account appeared in 
many Patriot newspapers. For example, see the Connecticut Courant (New London), July 21, 1778, 3, the 




While Avery had witnessed the Battle of Wyoming firsthand, his knowledge of the 
aftermath was at best confused and at worse fabricated for political effect. Since he left by his 
own admission relatively soon after the battle, it is tempting to disregard the information in 
Avery’s testimony and his newspaper account about this stage of events as completely flawed 
and pass him over for other accounts. His suppositions about the aftermath of the battle, 
however, speak to Patriot attitudes about the frontier war and the politicization of information. 
Of course, his claims that a large fire engulfed the settlement, that 2000 or more died, and that 
the inhabitants fled naked through the wilderness should not be taken at face value; none of these 
things likely occurred, especially considering that no eyewitnesses from July 4 reported any 
similar events. Nonetheless, through Avery’s comments, one can better understand the attitudes 
and responses of many Americans in reference to Wyoming and similar instances of frontier 
violence.  
As he worked without much concrete information about the events of July 4 and after, 
Avery may have reported what he believed had happened, thus demonstrating his ignorance of 
the actual occurrences in the days after July 3. Probing deeper into his account from July 8, one 
must first wonder what flames or smoke he mistook for fire, since John Butler’s Loyalist and 
Indian army did not set Forty Fort or any major settlements alight on the night of July 3.49 With 
only a brief description of a fire in the valley from Avery, a definite answer does not present 
itself. Most likely, however, as the frightened and exhausted soldier viewed the valley from a 
distant mountain, he mistook the smoke leftover from the battle or perhaps the blaze of Fort 
Wintermont for the general settlement. As for the casualties of this alleged fire, Avery’s estimate 
clearly had no basis in fact. Nowhere in the document does Avery explain how he reached this 
 
49 See Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 165-166. 
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number, and since he left town on the night of July 3, he likely could not have received any 
reliable intelligence from anyone in the settlement.50 Rather, his contention that a fire occurred 
and that thousands died could come from his misreading of events. Similarly, the belief espoused 
in the newspaper account that John Butler’s forces killed or captured 2500 civilians and that 
many fled completely naked likely emerged from his own misinterpretations or from information 
he heard from other settlers as he traveled away from Wyoming. Politics and the exigencies of 
war could have also played a role in Avery’s depictions. Possibly hoping to encourage Patriot 
retaliation against the victorious Loyalist and Indian force or to convince the government of the 
need to better protect the frontier, Avery might have possessed political motivations to 
exaggerate the damage inflicted upon the valley.  
The leaps made in Avery’s account speak volumes to his mindset and those of many 
Patriots. If he had simply misread the evidence, then Avery not only believed that his enemies 
could commit such horrible atrocities on civilians, but he naturally assumed they would carry 
them out. Recognizing the intense violence of the frontier war and that Avery had just witnessed 
the deaths of hundreds of his fellow soldiers, suggests that such a hyperbolic response would 
make sense within this context. He may well have been one of the many who conceived of their 
Loyalist and Indian adversaries as villainous murderers. In turn, this type of thinking colored his 
interpretation in the face of limited concrete information, leading him to make sensational 
inferences about the destruction wrought by Butler. Amplified by the hyperbolic accounts of 
settler emigrants, whom Avery almost certainly encountered in his trek east, this proclivity for 
extrapolation could have led him to report high casualty numbers without verification. Even if 
solely political motivations drove Avery to sensationalize his account of the aftermath, his 
 
50 Solomon Avery Deposition, July 8, 1778. 
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portrayal would still demonstrate that he thought others would believe Loyalists and Indians 
capable of enacting such violence. These documents from Solomon Avery thus showcase how 
fear, rumor, and shock worked on the Patriot mindset, creating an environment conducive to 
imaginative and political fabrication and detrimental to the truth.  
Demonstrating the power of fear in feeding rumor and exaggeration, Avery’s account and 
other early reports about Wyoming show how the process of transforming the Battle of 
Wyoming into the Wyoming Massacre began: it started with settlers and survivors before 
moving out to others who similarly distorted Wyoming to fit their own preconceived notions 
about frontier violence, Native Americans, and the morality of the combatants on both sides. 
Though most informants remained anonymous, their accounts still influenced Patriot reporting. 
Since these news bearers were fueled by grief, anger, and despair over the humiliating defeat and 
sudden upheaval as well as political animus against the British and their allies, it is easy to see 
why they may have reported and responded in these ways. Nonetheless, such exaggerated stories 
from fearful settlers contributed to a general sense of panic and misinformation not only in the 
backcountry but also further east. In an emotionally charged atmosphere, rumors of real and 
exaggerated horrors from survivors “grew [even more] monstrously in rumor” as an information 
hungry public got hold of them.51 As newspapers transmitted the news of Wyoming to the 
broader Patriot public, the hyperbole of frontier settlers soon found its way into such accounts, 
often in even more embellished forms.  
 
Once newspapers took up the story of Wyoming, the dynamics of the Patriot press began 
to play a significant role in seeking to sway the opinions of Americans about the event. Central 
 
51 Dowd, Groundless, 176-178. Dowd also argues that the Wyoming Massacre mixed with legendary aspects of 
Indian martial prowess and heartless violence, amplifying these colonial fears.   
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to the Patriot war effort and the fashioning of a new American identity, Patriot newspapers 
served as crucial sources of information and important ideological weapons during this period. 
As historian Robert Parkinson relates, Patriot publicists, particularly newspaper printers, worked 
to convince the wider public to support independence or what they considered to be the common 
cause. In creating that cause, they often relied on negative depictions of the British assisting or 
encouraging Native Americans to commit depredations on the frontier.52 As Parkinson has 
demonstrated, the political necessity of creating a common enemy dovetailed nicely with anti-
Indian rhetoric already in widespread use. Appealing to deep-seated cultural fears, 
newspapermen commonly used Native Americans as negative reference points for articulating a 
nascent American identity.53 Tellingly, Patriots also dissociated themselves from Loyalists and 
the British by accusing them of engaging in “savage” behavior and thus connecting them to the 
negative cultural stereotypes associated with Native Americans. The hyperbolic coverage of 
Wyoming fits within these trends as Patriots used widely-circulated published tales of massacre 
to convince others of the need for continued dedication to the war effort, argue for political and 
cultural separation from Great Britain, and distance themselves from Loyalists and the British.  
As the first two newspaper mentions of the action at Wyoming appeared on July 16 
within New York and Pennsylvania papers, both authors used their stories in service of the 
Patriot cause by utilizing atrocity-filled depictions to describe the battle and its aftermath.54 
Likely drawing on intermittent pieces of news from the settlers who had arrived in Fishkill after 
escaping the frontier, the July 16 account from the New York paper only provided its readers 
with a few lines about the event. While the paper gave only a basic outline of the course of the 
 
52 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 9-10, 17-19. Parkinson also discusses how African Americans were similarly 
demonized in the press.  
53 Knouff, The Soldiers’ Revolution, 158-183, 216-219. See also Parkinson, The Common Cause.  
54 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 412.  
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battle, it made effective use of this small amount of space to craft a thoroughly effective partisan 
narrative. Most notably, when detailing the Revolutionary soldiers’ retreat and loss at the hands 
of John Butler’s Native American forces, the author noted that the defenders of the settlement 
“being overpowered with numbers” had been “scalped and butchered by these inhuman allies of 
Britain.”55 Turning to powerful atrocity language to demonize Loyalist and Indian conduct, this 
paper presented a clear example of British barbarity that would have encouraged Patriots and 
even those on the fence to distance themselves from Britain.  
The July 16 account from the Pennsylvania Packet even more explicitly argued that the 
news from Wyoming showcased British inhumanity and illustrated the necessity of supporting 
the Patriot cause. As it broadcasted the anxiety that many Pennsylvania felt about a joint 
Loyalist, Indian, and British “incursion” into the interior of the state, the paper painted a vivid 
and distressing picture of the Pennsylvania backcountry. Within its report, the British-backed 
invaders emerge as clear villains, “committing the most horrid murders on defenceless farmers, 
women and children, and also laying waste and destroying the plantations of the inhabitants.” 
The message the paper drew from these actions was unequivocally clear. Using the deplorable 
state of the frontier and the misconduct of the British at Wyoming and beyond as evidence of 
insidious British designs, this article harshly criticized Great Britain’s overtures for peace in 
1778. In aiming to convince others of this, the author caustically wrote “thus, while our 
defenceless wives and children are cut off by merciless savages…is the humane King of Britain 
offering his idle and delusive propositions of peace!—Let this fresh act of his cruelty and 
wickedness stimulate every good man to support, with redoubled vigor, that Independence which 
 
55 “Fish-Kill, July 16,” New Jersey Gazette (Trenton), July 22, 1778, 3. I base the assumption that the editor heard 
about Wyoming from settlers heading east from his own writing, since he directly mentions that “several of the 
distressed families passed through here this week.”  
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Nature, Necessity, and Reason have dictated to us.”56 The onslaught of overwrought terms 
characterizing the Patriot residents as “defenceless” and the Loyalists, Britons, and Native 
Americans as “merciless savages who la[id] waste and destroy[ed]” the Patriots’ property drew a 
sharp moral line between the two sides. For this paper, British depredations on the frontier like 
Wyoming simply confirmed their belief that complete separation through independence was the 
best course of action for the young nation.   
Over the next few days, Solomon Avery’s exaggerated newspaper account started to 
circulate. As it encouraged Patriots to believe that massive numbers of civilians had been 
slaughtered, it set the stage for a second and even more influential (and sensational) account to 
emerge on July 20. This account, a narrative written by New York Journal editor John Holt, 
“became the standard tale of the Wyoming Massacre” despite its woeful exaggerations. Printed 
by “nearly every active American paper…in full,” as Robert Parkinson has explained, Holt’s 
telling of the Wyoming Massacre deserves an in-depth analysis.57    
Like Solomon Avery’s account, John Holt’s description embellished the course of events 
at the Battle of Wyoming and even more significantly exaggerated in its depiction of the 
aftermath. Beginning with a brief description of the natural abundance of the Wyoming Valley, 
Holt moved into a partisan retelling of the battle. In his version, Zebulon Butler and his men 
fought valiantly against 1600 Loyalist and Indian troops—more than double the actual number. 
As the Patriots almost forced their numerically superior enemy to fall back, a cowardly or 
traitorous soldier spread confusion in the Patriot ranks by yelling for a retreat. This act doomed 
 
56 “Extract of a letter from Charlestown (South Carolina) dated May 13, 1778,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), 
July 16, 1778, 2. The more contemporary news from the Pennsylvania frontier was included with this more dated 
letter from the South. The peace overtures alluded to in this paper was the Carlisle Commission sent by Great 
Britain in 1778 to attempt to negotiate a peace settlement that would keep the colonies within the empire.  
57 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 412-415. According to Parkinson, about ten Patriot papers printed both Avery’s 
and Holt’s account.  
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the Patriot army and started the rout. Portraying the battle as a heroic and almost successful 
attempt that was brought to ruin through treachery, Holt reframed this embarrassing loss to 
explain away Patriot blundering and exonerate Zebulon Butler and his men from blame.58  
While Holt used facts creatively in his depiction of the battle, his story of what happened 
on July 4, the day after the battle, presented a largely invented narrative of death and destruction 
that in turn became a potent American legend.59 According to Holt’s account, upon gaining entry 
to the fort, the Loyalists and Indians proceeded to burn down most of its buildings, gathering up 
women, children, and wounded soldiers to burn alive within their homes. They then went across 
the river to another fort and repeated their atrocities.60 Not content with merely destroying these 
forts, Holt reported, “they proceeded to the destruction of every building and improvement…that 
came within their reach.” Nothing, not even crops and livestock, remained safe from the 
invaders. The Loyalists and Indians even went so far as to cut out the tongues of cattle, leaving 
them to die a pitiable death from thirst. The enemy’s depravity did not stop there though, as 
several Patriot officers endured horrific torture at their hands.61 Most infamously, however, Holt 
reported that John Butler offered only one term of surrender to the beleaguered Forty Fort: “the 
Hatchet.”62 This threatening phrase, a creation of Holt’s imagination or perhaps gleaned from 
settlers’ rumors, implied that Butler had encouraged atrocities against Patriots in the valley and 
had done nothing to contain his savage auxiliaries.  
 
58 “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 1 and 4. This account achieved wide 
circulation. For example, see the Connecticut Courant (Hartford), July 28, 1778, 2 or the Independent Chronicle 
(Boston, Massachusetts), July 30, 1778, 3. See Parkinson, The Common Cause, 412-415 for a more exhaustive 
discussion of its circulation.  
59 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 414.  
60 It seems possible that Holt’s depiction of Wyoming being set on fire might have been influenced by Solomon 
Avery’s earlier account.  
61 First filled with painful splinters, several men were burned alive in a fire while “held...down with pitch forks.” 
62 “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 4.  
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As Holt tapped into anti-Indian rhetoric and the language of frontier atrocity in crafting 
his narrative, he mostly used these rhetorical weapons to attack the conduct of fellow “whites.”63 
While perhaps surprising to modern readers, the British and Loyalists—not Native Americans—
received the most vitriolic criticism for engaging in frontier violence in these years. As Peter 
Silver notes, “At least through 1778, the revolutionary press’s fascination with Loyalists who 
tried to cross over to the Indians and conspire with them…still easily exceeded its interest in 
Indians.”64 Holt’s account reflects these attitudes, and his descriptions often blurred the line 
between Loyalist and Native American. For instance, he reports that the Tories present at the 
battle overwhelmingly dressed like Native Americans and even decorated themselves with 
Indian war paint. The Loyalists additionally engaged in many of the same behaviors as the 
Indians, such as torture and the mutilation of fallen combatants.65  
Sometimes, according to Holt, Loyalists even surpassed native cruelty.  As Holt wrote in 
a later article about Wyoming, “the behavior of the Tories to our people was abundantly worse in 
every respect than that of the Indians.”66 This emerges most egregiously in his description of the 
murderous “Partial Terry,” the Loyalist son of a respectable Wyoming family. After sending 
horrific threats to his father about bathing in his blood, “the monster [Partial]…murdered his 
father, mother, brothers, and sisters, stripped off their scalps, and cut off his father’s head.”67 
Alongside Holt, other Patriots indulged in spreading similar tales of Loyalists killing and 
mutilating family members. The story of Henry Pensell, a Patriot soldier shot in cold blood and 
 
63 Knouff, The Soldiers’ Revolution, 158-183, 216-219. As Knouff argues, the frontier war helped to solidify ideas 
about race, especially the idea of a racial binary of white versus non-white.  
64 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 240.  
65 “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 1. Holt was not alone in conflating 
Loyalists, the British, and Indians. This was a common practice in Patriot reports about the frontier. For example, 
one Patriot criticized the “worse than savage Tories” in a letter. See “Poughkeepsie, December 14. Extract of a 
Letter from Tyron County, dated November 24, 1778,” New Jersey Gazette (Trenton), January 13, 1779, 2-3. 
66 “Poughkeepsie, August 10,” Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia), August 18, 1778, 2. 
67 “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 4.  
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then scalped by his Tory brother in the aftermath of the battle, lived on in the American 
imagination for decades. According to one 1779 account, Henry begged his brother to spare him, 
yet his brother John simply loaded his gun and called him “a damned rebel.” After one final plea 
from Henry, John shot his brother and collected his scalp.68 However fantastic, such gruesome 
reports about Loyalists killing their own families held immense political power.  
Though these stories about Loyalist and Native American brutality at Wyoming had 
power, many of the tales were simply invented with little or no evidence to support them. Holt’s 
narrative again illustrates this larger trend as his story peddled unverified claims about many 
aspects of the event. For instance, Holt claimed that John Butler only offered “the Hatchet” and 
that Butler’s forces burnt Patriot civilians alive within the fort.  Most participants in the 
surrender, however, said that the troops at Forty Fort surrendered peacefully, accepted Butler’s 
lenient terms, and suffered no civilian casualties during the capitulation. That John Holt accepted 
groundless claims about Loyalist and Indian depravity at Wyoming should come as no surprise. 
Twice in the first three years of war, British actions compelled him to relocate his newspaper 
business after they captured the two places he worked: New York City and then Kingston, New 
York. Both times, British and Loyalist troops destroyed his equipment and printing press, forcing 
him to rebuild and eventual settle in the frontier town of Poughkeepsie. In debt and doubtlessly 
angry at the British for his misfortunes, Holt had plenty of reason to propagate wild stories about 
a cruel massacre committed by Loyalists and their Indian allies—and perhaps to believe those 
stories as well. 
 
68 Zebulon Butler told this version of the tale to Reverend William Rogers, which he then reproduced in his journal. 
See William Rogers, The Journal of a Brigade Chaplain in the Campaign of 1779 against the Six Nations under 
Command of Major-General John Sullivan (Providence, Rhode Island: Sidney Rider, 1879), 55-56. A version of the 
story also exists within the account of Captain John Franklin in Zierdt, Narrative History of the 109th Field 
Artillery, 33-34.  
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As other information came in though, even the bitter John Holt recognized some of the 
ways his earlier report had erred. Three weeks after his initial article, he printed a correction, 
noting “that the account…published in our paper of the 20th July, tho’ right in general, was in 
sundry particulars erroneous.” In this retraction, Holt slightly modified his account, informing 
his readers that the fort surrendered and that the British army did not indiscriminately kill women 
and children. Even the story about Partial Terry, the supposedly murderous Loyalist, proved 
wrong. While Terry had cursed and stolen from his family, “he did not actually murder…any of 
the family,” as Holt admitted in his retraction.69  
Despite walking back his initial information, the damage Holt had unleashed regarding 
the wider public’s understanding of Butler’s attack on Wyoming had already been done. The 
idea of a barbaric Wyoming Massacre quickly embedded itself into American consciousness, and 
John Holt’s correctional letter did little to alter this trend. In fact, the notice only achieved 
circulation in a third as many newspapers as the initial report.70 Across the colonies, Patriots 
believed the most sensational accounts of Wyoming, and these became the baseline for a 
sensational legend. One New York doctor’s August 5 letter illustrates how widespread this tale 
became. Certain that his wife had access to similar information from “the Boston papers,” Dr. 
Samuel Adams wrote “the unparalleled barbarity and worse than diabolical behavior of the 
Tories and Savages at Wyoming on Susquehanna, you will no doubt have account of.”71 The 
Wyoming Massacre had become a national story.  
 
69 “Poughkeepsie, August 10,” Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia), August 18, 1778, 2.  
70 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 416, fn. 9.  
71 Dr. Samuel Adams to Sally Preston Adams, August 5, 1778, item 29 in Sol Feinstone Collection of the American 
Revolution, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia as quoted in Parkinson, The Common Cause, 415-416. 
Parkinson mentions several examples of journals and private letters discussing the reports of Wyoming from places 
as far away as Virginia and New England. In one Virginia diary, he notes how the diarist believed that civilians had 
been burned alive in their homes—a clear indication that the diarist had drawn from Holt’s widely published 
newspaper report.  
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As the event quickly became embedded into the national imagination, Patriots harnessed 
the rhetorical power of the Wyoming Massacre for a variety of political purposes in the coming 
months and years. For one, these accounts of Wyoming helped Patriots morally distance 
themselves from the Loyalists and the British. For many Patriots, Loyalist and British 
involvement with Native Americans and frontier violence signaled their former countrymen’s 
descent into barbarism. Indeed, many accounts disparaged Loyalist and British conduct on the 
frontier and used it to equate their white enemies with murderous Indians. As one Pennsylvanian 
wrote in reference to the destruction of the settlements in the Wyoming Valley, “the devastations 
and murders of the British and Indian savages, are not to be paralleled.”72 Other accounts about 
Wyoming further denigrated the character of the British and Loyalists by describing them as 
“merciless villains” or “monsters in human shape.”73  
In accusing the British and their allies of succumbing to savagery, Patriots attempted to 
articulate a distinct identity by differentiating themselves from their former neighbors and 
compatriots. Moreover, within a culture increasingly anxious about the cultural degeneration of 
whites as a result of living on the uncivilized frontier, Patriots worked to address these cultural 
worries by casting their new white enemies into the role of “new-made Indians,” who “contract 
the vices of both” white and Indian society.74 Especially in the focus on the gruesome family 
murders of those like Partial Terry or in the erroneous rumors that John Butler and Zebulon 
Butler were cousins, frontier accounts tried to show how their opponent’s tendency towards 
betrayal and brutality matched that of Native Americans. According to Silver, such accounts 
 
72 “Extract of a letter from an officer of distinction at Sunbury, dated September 1, 1778,” Pennsylvania Packet 
(Philadelphia), September 5, 1778, 3.  
73 “From the Rebel Paper, Chatham, June 29,” The New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury (New York City), July 5, 
1779, 3; “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 4.  
74 J. Hector St John De Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, ed. Susan Manning (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 52-53.  
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gave “pro-revolutionary readers a satisfying feeling of moral distance…it was a relief to see that 
the real parricides were on the other side.” Far from a model of enlightenment, Great Britain and 
their similarly polluted Loyalist allies had become base and depraved in Patriot eyes.75 As part of 
a wider Patriot discourse about the frontiers, the attention given to Loyalists and the British in 
hyperbolic renditions of Wyoming ultimately helped Patriots articulate a separate identity and 
justify their support for independence.  
The themes of British misconduct and American tragedy at Wyoming readily fit within 
the larger revolutionary narrative that Patriot publicists and newspapermen had constructed to 
convince others to support independence. As a now well-known example of the British 
encouraging Indian depravities and supposedly engaging in the atrocities themselves, the 
Wyoming Massacre reinforced the chief arguments of those advocating for political 
independence, who painted the British as diabolical and unfit to rule. The last line of Holt’s 
lengthy account encapsulates this idea. Arguing unabashedly for independence, John Holt wrote 
“this [the Wyoming Massacre] it is hoped will be the concluding scene of the tragedy acted by 
the British tyrant and his murderous diabolical emissaries, in a part of his late kingdom, which he 
has justly forfeited, and which is now forever departed from him.”76 For Holt, the atrocities at 
Wyoming discredited the British and illustrated why Americans should control their own fate. 
A shameless promoter of the American cause abroad, Benjamin Franklin also recognized 
how incendiary tales about British cruelty, like the Wyoming Massacre, advanced the cause of 
independence. Around May 1779, Franklin planned to weave such portrayals into a partisan 
depiction of the war for foreign and domestic audiences, drafting a list of twenty-six potential 
illustrations to include in a book for children. Though never produced, the images he proposed 
 
75 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 239-241, 252-253.  
76 “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 4.  
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utilized the common atrocity tropes of the period to support separation from Great Britain and 
the Patriot cause. Intended to accentuate the depravity of the British, Franklin’s illustrations 
would have drawn attention to their wrongdoings including the burning of cities, the abuse of 
prisoners, and the use of formerly enslaved men as soldiers. Alongside these perceived injustices, 
the frontier loomed large within Franklin’s negative portrayal of “British Cruelties.” While 
critical of Indians, Franklin’s frontier images mostly focused on British collusion with Native 
Americans and how such actions perpetuated injustices on the frontier. Harnessing the anti-
Indian sublime to harshly condemn his former country, Franklin envisioned several provocative 
illustrations that would have shown British officials and even the king endorsing brutal violence, 
scalping, and cannibalism. Within his draft, Franklin painted a grisly picture of “Savages killing 
and scalping the Frontier Farmers and…Women and Children, [while] English Officers mix’d 
with the Savages…giving them Orders & encouraging them.” 
 The Wyoming Massacre, especially in its most exaggerated forms, naturally fit within 
this histrionic narrative of British backcountry atrocity. Indicative of the Wyoming Massacre’s 
national clout among Patriots, Franklin mentioned the settlement by name in his draft, stating his 
intention to commission an illustration of the British commander at Niagara paying for “the 
Scalps of the Wioming Families.”77 Franklin’s description implicitly accepted exaggerated 
accounts of civilian death at the settlement further entrenching popular misperceptions of the 
event. Moreover, his words illustrate how Patriots quickly integrated this sensationalized view of 
the massacre into their arguments for independence and in their overarching critique of Great 
Britain. A visceral example of British savagery and American suffering, the Wyoming Massacre 
became an integral part of the pro-independence argument.  
 




Patriot accounts of Wyoming additionally encouraged retaliation in the backcountry. In 
the wake of the Battle of Wyoming, many appealed to the government and army to defend the 
frontiers, invoking the language of frontier victimization and stressing the inhumanity of 
Loyalist, British, and Indian troops to galvanize governmental action. Discussing rumored 
pockets of Loyalist and Indian raiders, Holt commented, “it is hoped speedy and effectual 
measures will be taken to punish and extirpate these monsters in human shape from the face of 
the earth.”78 Connecticut governor Jonathan Trumbull echoed these sentiments in an appeal to 
General Washington. Stressing “the distressed situation of the Inhabitants…who survived the 
more than barbarian cruelty of Indians and Tories,” Trumbull hoped to convince Washington to 
act on behalf of the Connecticut settlers still in the valley and send roughly 2000 men to “pursue 
that detestable Banditti [the Loyalists and Indians] into their own Country.” He further 
admonished Washington to “chastise them for their insolence and cruelty towards the innocent 
Inhabitants…and effectually prevent their making any further Depredations on that, or any other 
of our back settlements.”79 Presenting Wyoming as a tale of settlers suffered at the hands of 
monstrous invaders, Trumbull ultimately argued that the Loyalists and Indians deserved 
punishment for their crimes and that the defense of the frontier required a retributive strike.  
Starting in late September 1778, Colonel Thomas Hartley took up the task of punishing 
Loyalist and Indians for the massacre at Wyoming with his own expedition into the interior of 
Pennsylvania. Hartley, clearly influenced by the news coverage of the battle, began his account 
by reminding his readers about the dangerous state of the frontiers after the destruction of the 
settlement in the Wyoming Valley. Utilizing the common frontier tropes of fleeing settlers, the 
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murder of women and children, and “villainous Indians and Tories,” Hartley presented his 
offensive action as a defensive measure aimed to prevent another Wyoming Massacre. Like 
Trumbull, he believed retaliation was necessary to punish former atrocities and safeguard the 
backcountry from future attack. As he envisioned his men’s movement as “an aid and 
assistance….to the distressed people” on the frontier, Hartley detailed his men’s destruction of 
Native American settlements without any sense of contradiction. In his encounters with Native 
Americans, Hartley revealingly saw “no alternative but conquest or death.”80 Stories of violence 
at Wyoming allowed Hartley to endorse a morally unambiguous view of the frontier war that 
justified his punitive expedition.  
For national military leaders, exaggerated reports from Wyoming played a crucial role in 
convincing them to approve an even larger expedition in 1779. Indeed, from the time the news 
about Wyoming broke, national politicians had called for a concentrated attack on the frontier. 
As the Patriot James Lovell wrote just five days after the battle, “The Indians and Tories have 
cut off Wyoming; and They must be eradicated Root and Branch as soon as ever we get a little 
Relaxation from War on the Sea Coasts.”81 Other Patriots concurred, arguing that a frontier sortie 
might provide “a breathing spell for the People” and that a successful attack against Indian 
country might prevent the Indians “from acting hostily against us” for the rest of the conflict.82 
George Washington, the architect of the large expedition that set off in the summer of 1779, 
endorsed these arguments in his justification for a raid. Ordering General John Sullivan, 
commander of the Patriot troops in the raid, to demolish Indian villages and take as many 
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prisoners as possible, Washington asserted that “our future security” rested on driving the 
Indians away and in leaving them “in the terror with which the severity of the chastisement they 
receive will inspire them. Peace without this would be fallacious and temporary.”83 In other 
words, Washington presented invasion and the destruction of Indian towns, farms, and 
communities as a necessary precursor to peace on the frontier. Influenced by reports of 
destruction and chaos engendered by Wyoming and other similar frontier disasters late in 1778, 
Patriots advocated for offensive invasions and total war on the frontier, rationalizing them as 
justifiable retaliatory maneuvers meant to prevent future atrocities. Ironically, such actions, far 
from securing the frontiers as Washington and other Patriots had hoped, only deepened the cycle 
of violence and encouraged ravaged Native American populations to seek revenge.84  
While Patriots used the example of Wyoming to reinforce the national cause of 
independence or endorse violence, their arguments and depictions had local import as well. From 
the beginning, local and national currents intertwined within the struggle over the Wyoming 
Valley. Of course, the battle was part of the larger Revolutionary contest, but it was also an 
intensely local affair in which older conflicts between Pennamite and Yankee settlers reemerged 
with new window dressing. As Patriots conflated Tories and Indians for a more national 
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audience, settlers on the ground in the Wyoming Valley saw their neighbors, whom they 
mislabeled as Tories, in the same light. Imbibing and spreading stories of Loyalist depravity, so 
Paul Moyer writes, Yankee settlers and Patriot publicists alike “portrayed Tories [and 
consequently Pennamites] as people who possessed the same savagery, mercilessness, and 
brutality that supposedly characterized Indians.” Such “white savagery,” as historian Gregory 
Knouff terms it, was seen as even worse than traditional Indian savagery, since by acting like 
Indians white Loyalists betrayed their communities and race.85 In the Wyoming Valley, these 
depictions allowed Yankee settlers to justify brutal treatment of their Pennamite neighbors. 
Though Patriots and settlers primarily drew on exaggerated accounts of the Wyoming 
Massacre to advance their own political goals, such reports also influenced Native American and 
British perspectives on the battle and its aftermath. Most dramatically, as some Iroquois heard 
about the cruelties Patriots accused them of committing, they “smoldered with…resentment” and 
reacted most violently.86 Their resentment came to a head at Cherry Valley, New York in 
November 1778, when a large Loyalist and Native American raiding party attacked the small 
town and massacred most of its inhabitants. Unlike the Battle of Wyoming, Cherry Valley 
needed no exaggeration after the fact as Native Americans and Loyalists brutally killed any 
Patriots outside of the defending fort. A far cry from the relatively peaceful surrender of Forty 
Fort less than six months before, these murders signaled a shift in the frontier conflict, leading 
both sides to commit violence against combatant and civilian alike.  
In part, Patriot propaganda about Wyoming contributed to this shift. Though Indian 
raiders expressed anger at the sight of Patriot soldiers violating their paroles during the attack, 
Native Americans primarily reacted to popular misperceptions of their conduct at Wyoming. As 
 
85 Moyer, Wild Yankees, 34-35; Knouff, The Soldier’s Revolution, 217-218. 
86 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 174.  
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British officer Walter Butler revealingly argued in a letter to his superior, the violence at Cherry 
Valley resulted from Patriot reports that “falsely accused the Indians of cruelty at Wyoming.”87 
Incensed by Americans’ accusations about the Wyoming Massacre, some Indians embraced the 
violence that Patriots had earlier accused them of committing. Casting long shadows over 
frontier relationships both during and after the Revolutionary War, exaggerated and 
unsubstantiated accounts of the Battle of Wyoming contributed to the backcountry’s descent into 
distrust and retaliation.  
 
Conclusion  
 From rumors of frightened backcountry settlers to national newspapers to prominent 
statesmen, the legend of the Wyoming Massacre spread rapidly across the thirteen colonies 
during the Revolutionary War, accruing meaning and potency with each successive use. This 
sensational story, which had been suspect to exaggeration from its very beginning, served a 
variety of purposes to Patriots and more local settlers in the aftermath of the battle. On a national 
level, Patriot propagandists used the Wyoming Massacre to bolster their arguments for political 
and cultural separation from Great Britain, while national policymakers called on the recent 
memory of Wyoming to either provoke action or rationalize punitive raids into the backcountry. 
Seemingly confirming Patriots’ fears about Native American savagery and Britain’s part in 
perpetuating it, Wyoming played an indispensable role in the larger propaganda war that raged 
during the Revolution. As the emerging memory of the battle resonated with national audiences, 
it struck a chord with locals and others on the frontier as well. While some, like the townspeople 
 
87 Captain Walter Butler to Lt. Col. Mason Bolton, Unadilla, Nov. 17, 1778, in K.G. Davies, ed., Documents of the 
American Revolution, vol. XV, 261-263. Native Americans, according to Butler, also expressed anger that Patriot 
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of Goshen, used the events in the valley to petition the state or national government for much 
needed defense, others turned the rhetoric of savagery and the anti-Indian sublime against their 
former neighbors and countrymen. As they denigrated their opponents as diabolical and evil, 
Patriots and settlers commonly justified retributive frontier violence by referring to Wyoming.  
Though firmly situated in the context of the Revolutionary War, the legend of the 
Wyoming Massacre outlived the conflict. As the Revolution slowly receded into memory, 
Americans still evoked this increasingly mythic event for their own political or rhetorical 
purposes. Wartime narratives and arguments utilizing the characterization of Wyoming as a 
massacre rather than a mere battle indelibly effected these later depictions. Indeed, the 
exaggerations of the moment cast a long shadow over the remembrance of the Battle of 
Wyoming as future historians, politicians, writers, and artists would uncritically affirm and pass 
down the exaggerations of their forebears to succeeding generations.88 Due to its importance in 
national and regional narratives, Wyoming remained entrenched within the country’s 
Revolutionary mythology and the valley’s local politics. As one British paper perceptively noted 
in 1781, the events in the valley “have only served to fix a bitter and lasting resentment in the 
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Chapter 2 
“Let Britain and Wyoming butchers tell!” 
Authentic History, British Barbarity, and Frontier War in the Early Republic 
 
The Revolutionary War officially ended in 1783, but the legend of the Wyoming 
Massacre lived on in the Early Republic. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the battle did not 
receive much attention in contemporary political discourse, but it remained a well-known event 
for most Americans—in part due to the influence of the first historians of the Revolutionary 
conflict. 1 Working to provide truthful and authentic accounts, these historians helped ensure that 
Americans would not forget Wyoming and its role in the Revolution. What these historians 
wrote and what Americans remembered about July 1778, however, often relied on the 
embellishments of wartime Patriot propaganda. The ephemeral, often groundless reports from 
the Revolution thus became verified parts of the historical record, bolstering the credibility of the 
legendary massacre narrative and allowing it to spread in new ways.  
As historians reaffirmed unsubstantiated narratives from 1778 and assisted their ongoing 
dissemination, they made it possible for the Massacre to return to national political attention. 
 
1 National newspapers primarily focused on concerns that more directly spoke to the present, such as the struggle of 
forming a new federal government. If government officials or national newspapers did talk about Wyoming, they 
most often focused on the violence of the Wyoming land dispute and worried about its deleterious effects on the 
young nation. Nevertheless, some national figures occasionally commented or exchanged material on the battle as 
did Thomas Jefferson and the author St. John de Crèvecoeur. See, “From Thomas Jefferson to St. John de 
Crèvecoeur, [ca. February 1787],” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0201. In fact, Crèvecoeur wrote a brief account of the 
battle in a manuscript copy of his literary work Letters from an American Farmer, but that letter never made it to 
publication and was only rediscovered in the twentieth century. See, St. John de Crèvecoeur, Sketches of Eighteenth 
Century America: More “Letters from an American Farmer,” ed. Henri Bourdin et al (New York: Benjamin Bloom, 
INC., 1972), 10-25. Crèvecoeur’s depiction of the battle mostly aligns with many eyewitness accounts, though he 
does claim that Joseph Brant participated in the attack. One wonders how the publication of this account might have 
affected early European and American perspectives on the event and whether it could have counteracted the 
negative influences of Holt’s hyperbole. Of course, Loyalist papers had more restrainedly reported on the event 
during the war, and their reports did little to alter public perception. Perhaps, Crèvecoeur’s account would have had 
little effect.  
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With relations with Britain deteriorating, especially after 1807, older accounts of British 
misconduct regained much of their political import, and they served as a way for Americans to 
tie past British barbarity to new circumstances. Once again assisting Americans in calling for 
unity against the British and their “savage” Native American allies, the legend of the Wyoming 
Massacre returned in full force for the War of 1812. Like Patriots before them, however, 
Americans during the new conflict did not simply utilize Wyoming’s example to attack the 
British or even Native Americans. Rather, they also turned its rhetorical force against each other, 
using it for partisan advantage in one of the most divided moments in American history.  
Throughout the war with Britain and even later as Americans continued to fight against 
native tribes in the West and South, the familiar language of atrocity consistently accompanied 
depictions of Wyoming. The legend of the Wyoming Massacre readily spoke to white fears of an 
Indian war on the frontier, a fear shared with many Patriots during the Revolutionary War. 
Repeatedly invoking the Massacre in ways indistinguishable from their Patriot counterparts, 
Americans used it to justify retaliation and blame the British for inciting the violence. In 1812 as 
in 1778, Wyoming’s tale of British and Indian savagery packed a powerful punch.  
This chapter seeks to explain how and why Americans elected to remember the myth of 
the Wyoming Massacre during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. After examining 
how historians legitimized groundless accounts from the Revolution, this chapter then explores 
how these reified narratives reemerged to influence national discourse. Informed by works on 
Revolutionary memory and the War of 1812 by such scholars as Alan Taylor, Sarah Purcell, and 
Robert Parkinson, this chapter aims to show how the legend of the Wyoming Massacre not only 





Exaggerated and unverified wartime narratives continued to foster misunderstandings 
among the American populace about Wyoming long after the end of the Revolutionary War. 
While newspapers of the early Republic rarely mentioned the battle before the nineteenth 
century, the stories of the Wyoming Massacre were given new life in early histories of the war. 
In the writing of these histories, especially in the period before 1815, American historians made 
ample use of Revolutionary newspaper accounts.2 As media historian Janice Hume recounts, 
these historians commonly relied on and even reproduced press stories from the Revolution in 
their works, helping “ensure that the iconic narratives [of the Revolution] endured in American 
collective memory.”3 Despite these historians’ professed aims to present truthful history, they 
duplicated many of the uncorroborated claims presented in these wartime accounts, showing how 
Patriot propaganda outlasted the fighting and continued to shape the public’s understanding. 
According to Robert Parkinson in The Common Cause, the first histories of the Revolution 
allowed “war stories, which Patriot publicists often crafted in frantic, anxious settings” to 
transform into durable narratives by reaffirming them in supposedly “detached [historical] 
volumes.” Like Hume, Parkinson maintains that history helped temporary, partisan news 
accounts from the Revolution become a “permanent fixture” of the American Revolutionary 
story.4 Forged in fear, nationally known, and having no basis in evidence, the Wyoming 
Massacre—especially as related in Holt’s account—was exactly the type of war story passed 
down in these early histories. Taking newspaper accounts at their word, these historians further 
solidified the Wyoming Massacre’s place in the American imagination.  
 
2 While I usually call the authors of these histories “historians,” they might more properly be called amateur 
historians or amateur historical writers.  
3 Hume, Popular Media and the American Revolution, xvi, 3-12.  
4 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 598-612, esp. 604 and 612.  
Tharp 62 
 
One of the first influential histories set the stage by reproducing and reifying many of the 
elements of Holt’s unsubstantiated narrative. First published in London in 1788, William 
Gordon’s four-volume The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment, of the 
Independence of the United States claimed in the preface to uphold a “sacred regard to truth,” yet 
its retelling of Wyoming appeared to treat Holt’s 1778 newspaper report as a trustworthy 
source.5 Gordon provided several details that he likely picked up from Holt. For instance, he 
maintained that John Butler led 1600 Loyalist and Native American raiders, a wildly exaggerated 
number that came directly from Holt’s account. Gordon’s description of the battle also resembled 
typical Patriot narratives that stressed that Patriot troops had fought bravely, almost won, and 
suffered defeat only because of the cowardice or betrayal of a soldier who called for a retreat. 
Most importantly, Gordon reproduced the most infamous of Holt’s fabrications, the myth that 
John Butler refused to allow Forty Fort’s surrender and then let a massacre occur. According to 
Gordon, the commanding Patriot officer asked Butler for the terms of surrender for the fort, but 
Butler, “with more than savage phlegm,” only “answered…[with] two short words—the 
hatchet.” Gordon’s account then insists that the outmatched Patriot defenders fought 
unsuccessfully against a besieging force of Loyalists and Indians, who after taking the fort 
massacred the inhabitants and burned the remaining buildings. Gordon also illustrated the 
brutality of the British and their Indian allies by focusing on how they cut out the tongues of 
cattle, cruelly torturing the animals. Charges of parricide and the torture of Patriots at the hands 
of Loyalists reemerged in Gordon’s account as well. In effect, he rehashed Holt’s overwrought 
 
5 William Gordon, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of 
America (New York: John Wood, 1801), I: 3-6. This is the third American edition of Gordon’s work. The first 
appeared in London in 1788.  
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narrative, giving it an enhanced status as part of a supposedly authenticated history that further 
fueled a “bitter and lasting resentment…in the minds of the Americans.”6 
Even without succumbing to Holt’s level of exaggeration, South Carolina historian David 
Ramsey’s discussion of Wyoming largely legitimized American retaliation and highlighted the 
depravity of Loyalists just as Patriot rhetoric had during the Revolution. Writing at the same time 
as Gordon, Ramsey published his history of the American Revolution just a year later in 1789. 
Unlike Gordon, however, he did not reproduce the hyperbole of Patriot news sources about the 
battle, and his account of the course of events at the Battle of Wyoming and in its aftermath 
aligned with most eyewitness reports.7 Indeed, Ramsey did not need Holt’s or Gordon’s 
fabrications to explicate the lessons that Americans should take away from Wyoming and other 
similar instances of frontier violence during the war. Just by showing how the Patriots had 
“fought gallantly” and by mentioning the suffering of those fleeing Wyoming in fear, Ramsey 
could expound upon how “the savage part of the war was carried out in America.” Emphasizing 
its cruelty, horror, and waste, Ramsey placed the blame for frontier violence firmly on “the 
savages, encouraged by British presents and agents, and led on by American refugees 
[Loyalists].”8 Like they did a little more than a decade before, Americans like Ramsey still 
referenced the events at Wyoming to justify their actions on the frontier and their conduct during 
the war.   
Ramsey’s account demonstrates that not all historians or writers of this period uncritically 
accepted the Patriot press’s original reporting on the battle, but most authors writing about 
 
6 Gordon, The History of the Rise, II: 385-390. Also see Holt’s account, “Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania 
Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 1 and 4.  
7 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 600-603.   
8 David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution (Trenton: James J. Wilson, 1811), II: 184-189. This is a 




Wyoming before 1830 more closely followed Gordon’s account than Ramsey’s. Writing in the 
1790s, John Lendrum’s history illustrates this larger trend as he took aspects of Ramsey’s 
writing but mostly relied on Gordon’s history to craft his account of the battle. Lendrum’s 
recounting of the Loyalists and Native Americans who had mustered under John Butler’s 
command, for instance, more closely followed the numbers offered by Ramsey.9 In most other 
ways, however, Lendrum clearly drew most of his material from Gordon and by extension John 
Holt’s 1778 report.  
This influence emerges clearly in Lendrum’s thinly veiled paraphrasing of Gordon’s 
words. When he writes that “Butler, with all the phlegm of a real savage, answered [the query 
about surrender terms], in two short words, ‘The hatchet,’” Lendrum just slightly altered the 
earlier historian’s line about Butler’s “more than savage phlegm.”10 His subsequent description 
of “barbarous conquerors” and “merciless ravagers” immolating defenseless women and children 
before directing “their animosity against every part of animated nature” also clearly hewed to 
Gordon’s and Holt’s narratives. Moreover, Lendrum’s account similarly painted an idealized 
picture of life in the valley before the battle.11 In an era when authors commonly copied each 
other without acknowledgment, this somewhat blatant plagiarism should not come as a 
surprise.12 Nonetheless, Lendrum’s paraphrasing shows that he relied on Gordon and other 
 
9 John Lendrum, A Concise and Impartial History of the American Revolution (Boston: I. Thomas and E.T. 
Andrews, 1795), II: 230-234. See also, Ramsey, The History of the American Revolution, II: 185. Ramsey estimated 
that Butler commanded 1100 men, 900 of them Native American. Lendrum perfectly reproduced Ramsey’s number, 
writing that Butler’s force was “estimated at 1100 men, 900 of which were Indians,” (230).  Gordon, however, 
suggested that 1600 men had been arrayed against the Wyoming defenders.  
10 Lendrum, A Concise and Impartial History, II: 232.  Gordon, The History of the Rise, II: 234.  
11 Lendrum, A Concise and Impartial History, II: 229-234. Lendrum maintained that “this settlement exhibited such 
a picture of primeval happiness, as can scarcely be supposed to be exceeded…in the present state of humanity.”   
Bizarrely, this line about the “primeval happiness” of the valley comes in the same paragraph that discusses the 
conflict between Pennamite and Yankee settlers. This conflict does not seem to affect the author’s idea of Wyoming 
as a peaceful, bucolic settlement before the war. Interesting, this line about the settlement’s pre-war status may come 
from another historian. See notes 52 and 66. 
12 George William Pilcher, “William Gordon and the History of the American Revolution,” The Historian 34, no. 3 
(1972): 461.  
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flawed historical accounts for his own work. Utilizing extremely similar terms and phrases to 
discuss the state of the settlement and the supposed massacre on the day after the battle, 
Lendrum partially reproduced Gordon’s account, further reifying the story of the Wyoming 
Massacre from the Revolution itself.  
In legitimizing this story, Lendrum added other material that subsequent historians would 
replicate in their own work, and with each successive use they rendered more support for the 
legend of the Wyoming Massacre. For instance, Lendrum used the massacre to transition from 
his discussion of the “reprehensible” behavior of the British and Hessians to the far worse 
conduct of Native Americans and Loyalists. He especially expounded upon the evils of John 
Butler and Joseph Brant, accusing the latter of participating in the attack on Wyoming.13 Writing 
in the next decade, noted female historian Mercy Otis Warren employed the same transition in 
her discussion of the Massacre. The beginning of her account closely followed Lendrum’s, 
including this transition and a similar pastoral image of the Wyoming settlement as a fertile 
“happy spot.”14 Her account of the battle likewise relied on hugely exaggerated numbers and 
reproduced “the hatchet” myth, going so far as to claim that John Butler “had nothing human 
about him, except a rough, external figure of a man.” In offering such portrayals, Warren clearly 
based her interpretation on her reading of other amateur historians and the original reports. 
Though she did not mention any other historians by name, her narrative choices and the use of 
certain phrasing points to connections to Gordon and Lendrum, while the influence of Holt and 
other similar Patriot accounts are explicitly referenced within the text. In a revealing footnote, 
 
13 Lendrum, A Concise and Impartial History, II: 229-231. 
14 Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution… (Boston: 
Manning and Loring, 1805), II: 111-112. While this suggests that Lendrum’s work likely influenced Warren, 
Warren’s history added other emphases to which Lendrum did not draw attention, such as her discussion of the 
family divisions and atrocities committed by neighbors against one another during the Revolution. 
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Warren admits that “the transactions at Wyoming are recorded above, agreeably to the most 
authentic accounts at the time.”15 By “authentic accounts,” she must have meant Holt and his ilk.  
Warren’s “authentic” depiction of Wyoming advanced a partisan interpretation of frontier 
violence during the Revolution. Noting, among other alleged atrocities, the enemy’s “internal 
pleasure of seeing” women and children inside Forty Fort “perish promiscuously, in the flames 
lighted by their bloody hands,” Warren drew a vivid picture of British and Indian savagery 
during the Massacre. She then used this to partially justify American frontier reprisals. While 
admitting that George Rogers Clark’s attack on Native Americans in Illinois country during the 
war “awakes compassion,” Warren largely dismissed this act of violence perpetrated by Patriots. 
Citing Wyoming, she commented that “perhaps the law of retaliation may, in some measure, 
justify the depredations of Clark.”16 Like many Patriots before her, Warren called upon the 
political power of the sensationalized tale of Wyoming to denigrate British and Indian conduct 
while simultaneously defending the rectitude of Patriot frontier attacks. Justifications like these, 
premised on fabricated evidence, had powerful ideological effects on an American readership. 
As information from Holt’s and Gordon’s accounts got repeated, they gained the veneer 
of truth and became adopted by other historians in the early nineteenth century. In 1803, John 
Marshall’s multi-volume biography of George Washington again replicated earlier historians like 
Gordon in describing Butler’s “more than cannibal ferocity” and repeating his hatchet story to 
even more readers. Marshall also commented on the atrocities committed during the battle in a 
list that mirrored Holt’s original recounting. Recalling instances of familicide and other “peculiar 
instances of barbarity…at which human nature recoils,” Marshall lamented how political 
 
15 Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, II:111-114.    
16 Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, II:114-116.   
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division could led to such violence.17 Even across the Atlantic, similarly histrionic retellings of 
the Wyoming Massacre took hold. For instance, a history of North America published in Dublin 
in 1820 referred to the Massacre by parroting John Holt’s account of 1600 Loyalists and Indians 
killing inhabitants, burning residents alive, and ruthlessly maiming cattle.18 This development 
would have major consequences for the public’s remembrance of the event.  
While groundless accounts of the battle gained increasing acceptance by the amateur 
historians of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it did not go unchallenged. In 
1806, Charles Miner, a congressman and later a local historian from the Wyoming Valley, wrote 
to John Marshall to complain about his inaccurate depiction of the battle. Twenty-five years later 
in 1831, John Marshall finally responded to Miner and revealingly acknowledged his reliance on 
both Ramsay’s and Gordon’s early histories. Primarily blaming these historians for any 
inaccuracies in his own work on Wyoming, Marshall directly spoke to how the wartime Patriot 
press operated and how this later influenced the writing of history. “It is surprising that they 
[Ramsay and Gordon] should have so readily given themselves up to the newspapers of the day,” 
Marshall wrote. “It was certainly our [Patriot] policy during the war to excite the utmost possible 
irritation against our enemy, and it is not surprising that we should not always have been very 
mindful of our publications.”19 Acknowledging the partisan function of newspapers during the 
 
17 John Marshall, Life of Washington, Commander in Chief of the American Forces, During the War Which 
Established the Independence of His Country, and First President of the United States… (Philadelphia: C.P. Wayne, 
1804), III: 559-560.  Marshall seemed to follow Gordon’s account much more than Ramsey’s, especially 
considering that he reproduced the hatchet myth. Marshall’s account of Wyoming, moreover, cites Gordon’s history 
within the text.  
18 James Gordon, The Historical and Geographic Memoir of the North American Colonies and Its Nations and 
Tribes (Dublin, Ireland: John Jones, 1820), 245, quoted in William Lewis, “The Changing Story and Historical 
Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished manuscript, 2020), provided and cited with permission of the 
author.  
19 Charles Miner, History of Wyoming: In a Series of Letters, from Charles Miner, to His Son William Penn Miner, 
Esq., (Philadelphia: J. Crissy, 1845), 257. Miner reproduced Marshall’s letter in his 1845 history. Bizarrely, 
Marshall claims that Ramsey led him astray along with Gordon, but as discussed Ramsey did not give much 
credence to the alleged massacre on July 4.  
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war, Marshall recognized the inherent issue with using these accounts to obtain the true course of 
events, and his comments illustrate how such newspaper reports found their way into one history 
after another. History’s supposed authenticity indeed gave the partisan stories of the Patriot press 
credibility and even authority.  
The acceptance of these unsubstantiated accounts by self-described truthful historians opened 
the way for those less concerned with verifiable facts to further spread these stories. With the 
increasing popularity of Indian atrocity literature after the Revolution, some disseminated these 
narratives as part of larger works on Indian-settler relations. An 1800 publication, for example, 
included the tale of the Wyoming Massacre with six other stories of encounters between whites 
and Native Americans, most of which resulted in violence. To present these stories, such books 
often simply reproduced Gordon’s account, considering it “authenticated in the most satisfactory 
manner.”20 Presenting Native Americans in a negative light, this 1800 work and another book 
that reproduced Gordon’s account of the massacre—appropriately subtitled the Outrages 
Committed by the Indians in Their Wars with the White People—reflect a growing hostility to 
Native Americans in the period.21 According to historians Philip Deloria and Colin Calloway, 
white Americans increasingly saw Native Americans as enemies to the nation, ignoring the 
sacrifices of loyal tribes during the Revolution and instead focusing on atrocities committed by 
natives during the conflict. These books fit within this trend, and they used historians’ accounts 
to advance a certain view of Native Americans as savage, less than human, and unfit to become 
citizens in the new American nation.22 As they took historians’ accounts of Wyoming at face 
 
20 Chapman Whitcomb, Affecting History of the Dreadful Distresses of Frederick Manheim’s Family (Leominster, 
MA: Chapman Whitcomb, 1800), 1-4, 34-39. 
21 Archibald Loudon, A Selection of Some of the Most Interesting Narratives, or the Outrages Committed by the 
Indians in Their Wars with White People (Whitehall, PA: A. Loudon, 1808), I: 122-132.  
22 Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 43-45. Calloway, The 
American Revolution in Indian Country, 291-295. According to Calloway, “after the war, lurid accounts [about 
Native Americans] tended to increase rather than diminish” (294).   
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value, the authors of these works of atrocity literature used this largely unfounded history to 
shape the public’s understanding of Indian-settler relations, assisting white Americans in 
justifying the exclusion of native people from the body politic.   
Poets also spread the sensationalized tale of the Massacre to the reading public, further 
solidifying the legend of Wyoming as they used Revolutionary history for inspiration. In 1810, a 
poem printed in The District of Columbia’s National Intelligencer spoke to the direct influence 
that Revolutionary historians had on depictions of the battle in popular print culture. Detailing 
the horrors of the Massacre in verse, this poem painted a disturbing picture of merciless “savage 
bands” burning buildings and slaughtering innocents at Wyoming—an image that fit with most 
historians’ accounts. Revealingly, the poet’s vivid description presented the event as a hellish 
nightmare inspired by a nighttime reading of a Revolutionary history. “Thus far I read, and 
clos’d the blood-stain’d page,” the poem began, “And sought in sleep my horrors to assuage.” 
This nightmare-inducing page came directly from William Gordon’s history, which the poet 
referenced in a footnote to the piece. Even more fittingly, another paper paired a reprinting of 
this same poem with an excerpt from Mercy Otis Warren’s history about Wyoming.23 This 
explicit reference to Gordon and the pairing of Warren with this poem shows the influence that 
historians wielded in shaping Americans’ understanding of the battle. As historians uncritically 
duplicated the baseless stories of Patriot publicists, poets and other artists likewise reproduced 
these narratives, now authenticated by historical works, within their own creations. These 
popular poems ensured that the legend of the Wyoming Massacre would live on. 
 
23 “Wyoming: --a Vision,” National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), November 29, 1810, 3. For the reprinting of 
the poem with Warren’s history see, “Poetry: From the National Intelligencer,” Independent Chronicle (Boston, 
MA), December 10, 1810, 1.  
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Scottish poet Thomas Campbell’s 1809 epic poem, Gertrude of Wyoming, exemplifies how 
the legend of Wyoming passed first from newspapers to histories and then to works of popular 
culture and literature. Based on the events of 1778 and reaching its climax with the battle, this 
Romantic tale followed a young heroine, a noble patriarch, and a dashing hero as they witnessed 
Wyoming’s settlement transform from a pastoral refuge to a place of horrors.24 Drawing from 
popular history and adding dramatic flair, the poem embellished some events and invented a few 
characters. Overall, though, Campbell based the poem on historical facts he gleaned from 
popular histories and contemporary reports.25 The accounts he relied on, however, led him 
astray, especially with who he chose to portray as the main perpetrator of the massacre: Mohawk 
leader Joseph Brant, who had not been there according to the testimony of participants. No 
matter, “the Monster Brandt,” as Campbell called him, became the chief villain of the work.26  
Brant’s incensed family eventually wrote to Campbell about this major oversight in 1822, 
eliciting revealing admissions from the poet that illuminate some of the ways that history and 
partisan reporting from the Revolution negatively informed his and the public’s understanding of 
Wyoming. Campbell responded by expressing regret that he had misrepresented Brant’s 
character. He claimed that he had taken it “as I found in in popular history” and had “adopted 
accusations against him [Brant] which had stood…uncontradicted, for thirty years.” Campbell 
then directly spoke to how historians and other author’s repetition of these Revolutionary 
narratives influenced his inclusion of those same accusations within his narrative. According to 
 
24 “Art. I. Gertrude of Wyoming, a Pennsylvanian Tale, and other Poems, by Thomas Campbell, Author of the 
Pleasures of Hope, &c. 4to. Pp. 130. London, Longman. 1809,” Quarterly Review, London (May 1809): 242-258. 
This British review gives a useful overview of the poem’s basic structure and plot. Of course, also see, Campbell, 
Gertrude of Wyoming.  
25 See, Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present, 
1st Vintage Books ed edition (New York: Vintage, 1979), 79-80. One of the things that Campbell added, according 
to Berkhofer, was a friendly “Noble Savage” character. For information on what sources Campbell relied on, see 
Letter to John Grant from Thomas Campbell, January 20, 1822, 210-218.  
26 Campbell, Gertrude of Wyoming, 62.   
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him, “A number of authors have repeated them [the accusations against Brant] with a confidence 
which beguiled at last my suspicion, and I believe that of the public at large.” Campbell’s frank 
admission reveals the massive extent to which historians reified these sensationalized narratives. 
Repeated enough times by historians, these stories became disassociated from their original 
partisan intent and emerged as indisputable historical fact for many in the American and even 
British public. The sheer number of contemporary sources and historians who duplicated the 
same falsehoods from Patriot accounts gave those hyperbolic details a plausibility that proved 
difficult to question.  
Even after admitting he mistakenly made Brant the villain of his poem, Campbell still 
refused to accept the suggestion that the legendary version of the Massacre might rest on 
baseless rumors. He argued, “an error about him [Brant] by no means proves the whole account 
of the business [at Wyoming] to be a fiction…who would not wish its atrocities to be disproved? 
But who can think it disproved by a single defender, who writes anonymously, and without 
definable weight or authority?” In ascertaining the truth as to what occurred at Wyoming in July 
1778, Campbell still trusted the collective judgment of historians over that of Brant’s family 
despite the revelation that these same sources had led him to error. In the end, the authority 
afforded to history by Campbell and “the public at large” gave the legendary narrative of 
Wyoming an almost unassailable legitimacy.27  
Gertrude of Wyoming increased the staying power of the sensationalized image of the battle 
as it became popular in nineteenth century America. Despite meeting mixed reviews from 
American critics at first, the poem found great popularity in the United States.28 Partially, this 
 
27 Letter to John Grant from Thomas Campbell, January 20, 1822, 210-218.  
28 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 646. Parkinson ties the popularity of Campbell’s poem to rising tension on the 
frontier, especially around 1811. For a commonly reprinted criticism of the poem from 1809, see “For the American: 
The Latitudinarian—No. X,” American (Providence, RI), August 25, 1809, 1. The Republican Watch-Tower in New 
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came from growing tensions with the British and Native Americans, especially on the frontier. 
As Americans again worried about Anglo-Indian connections around the advent of the War of 
1812, the poem’s story of British and savage barbarity in the backcountry fit many Americans’ 
preconceived notions and their growing suspicions of native people.29 Of course, this view of 
native people and the historical and artistic works that supported it were not based in historical 
fact but partisan fiction. That fiction, however, had gained legitimacy in its repetition, and 
Campbell’s work simply cemented it further into American memory. As a result, Campbell’s 
work became part of the very same cycle that led Campbell himself to portray Brant 
inaccurately. One of the many authors to duplicate baseless narratives about the Wyoming 
Massacre, Campbell passed on these stories to generations of readers. Supported by histories and 
literature, the legend of Wyoming—and the lessons it imparted about both the British and Native 
Americans—became firmly entrenched in the American imagination.  
As more historians, writers, and even poets duplicated details from partisan accounts of 
Wyoming in the years between the end of the Revolution and the beginning of the War of 1812, 
the story became a fixture in early American’s historical remembrance. While national 
 
York City reprinted this article on September 15, 1809, stating “Never were we so disappointed in a new 
publication.” Some Americans enjoyed the poem, however. A writer for the Orange County Patriot called it an 
“exquisite performance.” See, “Gertrude of Wyoming. An Extract,” Orange County Patriot (Newburgh, NY), 
January 21, 1812, 4. See also, Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 19-21. Francavilla 
mentions several negative reactions to the poem’s subject matter from British critics like Sir Walter Scott. While 
they criticized the topic, British critics did not dispute the story, showing how the legend had truly taken hold on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
29 In Parkinson’s words, Gertrude of Wyoming “kept with what many Americans believed happened along the 
Susquehanna, including who was to blame.” See, Parkinson, The Common Cause, 646. The poem’s depiction of 
Native Americans, however, was not simply negative as evidenced by the “Noble Savage” character that Berkhofer 
mentions. See, Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian, 79-87. Though practically unknown today, Gertrude of 
Wyoming was a widely read piece of literature for Americans throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, a few 
American students emulated Campbell and produced lines on the Wyoming Massacre for commencement 
ceremonies throughout the antebellum period. See for instance, E. Emelius Leclerc, “The Massacre of Wyoming. A 
Poem, Delivered at the Commencement of Dickinson College, July 19th, 1838,” Lady’s Book 18, Philadelphia (June 
1839): 247-248; R. Weiser, “Lines on the Massacre of Wyoming. Composed at Wilkes-Barre, Oct, 1846,” Literary 
Record & Journal of the Linnaean Association of Pennsylvania College 3, no. 3 (January 1847): 70. Moreover, 




newspapers did not say much about the massacre before 1807, Wyoming, in the words of 
Parkinson, “never really left the American vernacular.”30 In part, the legend of Wyoming 
remained known and its sensationalized aspects more ingrained because of these historians and 
those influenced by their work. Of course, as historian Sarah Purcell rightly points out, history 
was not equivalent with popular or collective memory of the Revolution.31 These histories did, 
however, influence that memory by replicating some of the hyperbolic narratives of that period, 
allowing Revolutionary stories such as Wyoming to reemerge in different media. The 
perpetuation of the legendary version of the battle through history and then fiction set the stage 
for Wyoming’s narrative to return to political relevancy as Anglo-British relations soured in the 
first decade of the 1800s. As the political winds shifted, even more Americans returned to the 
example of Wyoming to speak to the present, nurturing misconceptions that these histories had 
further entrenched.  
 
New War, Same Enemies  
If American newspapers rarely discussed the Battle of Wyoming in the first few decades 
after the Revolutionary War, they changed their tune during the eight years between 1807 and 
1815. This considerable upswing in national attention to the memory of Wyoming resulted from 
rising tensions with Great Britain and the growing fissure between American political parties in 
the first decades of the nineteenth century. As the British continued to impress American sailors 
into their navy and supply hostile Native American tribes on the frontier with arms, Anglo-
American relations noticeably declined in these years, and memories of British savagery during 
 
30 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 648. 
31 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 6. See also, Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press), 58-59. According to Travers, historians shaped Americans’ historical consciousness.  
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the Revolution became increasingly relevant once again. As Purcell has noted, politicians, 
especially Democratic-Republicans (also known as Republicans), cultivated a “bloody 
patriotism” based on memories of British misconduct to turn the public against Great Britain and 
maintain the people’s resolve first for anti-British policies and later for war starting in 1812. 
Even years after the Revolution, she contends, “carefully deployed memories of the 
Revolutionary War had the power to make resistance to the British seem like a national 
imperative.”32 Along with anti-British sentiment, the fervently partisan political climate of the 
day also affected the usage of highly charged Revolutionary memories like that of Wyoming. In 
a nation divided on party issues, especially as they related to foreign policy and conflict with 
Great Britain, past stories of British savagery like the legend of the Wyoming Massacre could 
have quite the political force. 
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain remained strained in the 
post-Revolutionary period. They only worsened starting in the 1790s as Britain’s continued 
presence in the northwestern frontier and disagreements over shipping rights and impressment 
pushed the countries closer to war.33 Locked in a virtual cold war starting in 1783, both nations 
attempted to gain the upper hand in the strategic Great Lakes region throughout this period. 34 As 
the British hindered American expansion into the region by continuing to man frontier forts and 
supplying weapons to resistant native tribes, many Americans grew increasingly resentful and 
often blamed the British for inciting Indian attacks on the frontier. Tensions over shipping, 
neutrality, and impressment also heightened in the early 1790s as the French revolutionary wars 
 
32 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 143-154. See also, Parkinson, The Common Cause, 648.  
33 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 67-75. 
34 Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies, illustrated 
edition (New York: Vintage, 2011), 15. For context on foreign relations between Britain and the United States in 
this period, see Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 67-121.  
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began. Attempting to defeat France, Britain further angered Americans by infringing upon their 
shipping neutrality and turning to the impressment of United States’ merchant sailors to 
supplement the Royal Navy’s numbers. In 1794, the two countries narrowly averted war through 
diplomatic talks that resulted in Jay’s Treaty, which bettered relations for a brief period and 
accomplished some American goals, such as the removal of British troops from some forts in the 
northwestern frontier.35 While Jay’s Treaty produced a brief thaw in Anglo-American 
interactions, the same issues revolving around rights on the high seas and the British role on the 
frontier reemerged in the next decade and only became more volatile as partisan politics remade 
the American political scene.  
With a growing suspicion of the British and each other, Americans turned to memories of 
Revolutionary violence to advance their own political aims in the years leading up to war. The 
United States’ first two-party system reshaped the political landscape of the nation, and it opened 
the way for a more divisive rhetoric to emerge—a rhetoric where Wyoming gained increasing 
resonance.36 As Americans divided into separate parties, the conservative and pro-British 
Federalists and the more populist and anti-British Democratic-Republicans (also known as the 
Republicans), newspapers became a key weapon in the fight to sway public opinion and gain 
partisan support. Within this newspaper coverage, Revolutionary stories such as Wyoming often 
featured, either to challenge British aggression, denigrate political enemies, or accomplish a 
combination of these aims.37  
 
35 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 75. Part of the conflict over impressment stemmed from differing 
interpretations of citizenship between Britain and the United States. While Americans believed that immigrants 
could naturalize and choose to become citizens, Britain subscribed to the common belief that subjects remained 
subjects even when they moved to other lands. Thus, most British captains considered British-born sailors as fair 
game for impressment even though those sailors may have immigrated to the United States and claimed citizenship. 
36 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 7. According to Herring, the two parties began to form because of foreign 
policy debates over Jay’s Treaty in 1795. 
37 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 149-154.   
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Republicans needed only to mention the legendary Wyoming Massacre to sully Britain’s 
reputation and by association that of the Federalist Party in the minds of many Americans. A 
1798 editorial speaks to this dynamic and Wyoming’s place within the partisan divide of the 
period. Criticizing “those…known by the name of Federalists” for refusing to condemn “the 
perfidious conduct of the British,” this writer attempted to highlight the hypocritical and 
treacherous nature of the Federalists by accusing them of collaborating with Great Britain. This 
invective particularly utilized negative memories of the British during the Revolution to discredit 
the Federalists. As it recalled “the horrors of a Jersey prison-ship, the massacres at 
Wyoming…and such other trifles as we experienced a few years since,” the editorial used 
examples of past British atrocities to paint Federalists as “homebred lordlings[s]” beholden to 
Britain.38 The memory of the battle invoked by this editorial clearly had potent political uses, 
helping turn public opinion against the British and by extension the Federalists. An early 
example of what was to come in force just a decade later, this 1798 inclusion of Wyoming 
demonstrates how the battle’s remembrance regained political relevancy because of political 
division and the deterioration of relations with Britain.  
While the Massacre reentered national political rhetoric briefly in the 1790s, it truly 
reemerged as a potent political weapon around 1807, a year marked by an inflammatory incident 
off the coast of Virginia that almost led to war. With war in Europe raging again starting in 1803, 
the Royal Navy turned once more to impressment to man their ships in the fight against 
Napoleon. Britain’s navy worked to acquire the necessary men as the conflict renewed, yet they 
lost many able sailors to American vessels which offered consistently better pay. In late June 
1807, this cycle of competition, desertion, and impressment reached its culmination in the 
 
38 “For the Bee: Mr. Holt,” The Bee (New London, Connecticut), August 8, 1798, 2.   
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Chesapeake-Leopard Affair. When the British warship HMS Leopard stopped the USS 
Chesapeake, demanded to search it for deserters, and then fired on the merchant vessel, it 
incensed Americans across the country even in typically Federalist locales.39 Americans seemed 
unified in anger—even if only temporarily.  
Just as when Britain threatened the nation more than thirty years prior, Americans 
invoked the memory of Wyoming in the aftermath of the Chesapeake Affair to demonstrate the 
insidious nature of the British and encourage a unified resistance. In the Federalist stronghold of 
Luzerne County, which included the site of the Battle of Wyoming, locals reacted with outrage. 
Responding angrily to the news, the editor of the regional paper drew on the local memory of the 
battle to influence national dialogue. In an editorial first printed on the anniversary of the battle 
and later reprinted in other cities, the Luzerne editor argued for a decisive response against the 
British. Railing against them for dishonoring the nation and shedding “the blood of American 
citizens,” he called his countrymen to arms by connecting the present injustice of the Chesapeake 
with the past actions of the British in 1778. The editor used familiar, revolutionary-era language 
to do so. He claimed that while “many a brave man fell beneath the knife of the Savage and the 
British” during the battle, “the savage has [since] become humane, while the British, with greater 
professions of civilization, retain all their ferocity.” Reminiscent of the anti-British and “white 
savagery” rhetoric that Gregory Knouff identified in Revolutionary accounts, these remarks 
reveal a remarkable rhetorical continuity.40  
 
39 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 100-106. For anger across the country, see also Travers, Celebrating the Fourth, 
178-179.  
40 Editorial from the Luzerne Federalist, Spectator (New York City), July 11, 1807, 2. Another New York City paper 
and a Connecticut-based newspaper reprinted this account as well. See the Commercial Advertiser (New York City), 
July 9, 1807, 3, and the Middlesex Gazette (Middletown, Connecticut), July 17, 1807, 2. For a discussion on “white 
savagery” during the Revolution, see Knouff, The Soldier’s Revolution, 217-218.   
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Like the response of the Luzerne editor in 1807, Republican arguments and the prominent 
place of Wyoming within their rhetoric resembled Patriot discourse during the war, especially in 
how it emphasized American victimhood and argued for unity. One 1810 article, for instance, 
drew a link between British wrongdoing during the Revolution and the post-Revolutionary 
period. Including Wyoming within a lengthy list of British transgressions, this article 
incorporated the Massacre into a larger narrative about America victimization, mimicking 
Revolutionary rhetoric as it defended the Republicans’ anti-British stance.41 Indeed, one of the 
most colorful Republican diatribes against Great Britain could have just as easily been written in 
1778 as 1808. “The conduct of the British, or as they have been aptly termed the Brutish,” wrote 
one Republican, “were totally unworthy of a civilized people. Remember the massacre at 
Wyoming.”42 Venomously attacking the British like his Revolutionary forefathers, this 
Republican articulated why the United States must resist British aggression. This critique 
noticeably employed the Massacre to illustrate British savagery and promote a unified response 
in the same way that John Holt’s narrative used his account of the Massacre to urge Americans 
to support independence. The story of Wyoming still shaped public attitudes as it had in the 
Revolution. 
 This moment of agreement between Federalists and Republicans would not last long. 
Despite the bellicose statements and calls for unity in 1807, Great Britain and the United States 
did not go to war, and the Federalists and Republicans returned to their bickering, reviving the 
partisan usage of Wyoming in the process. “Unwilling to compromise and unable to fight,” in the 
words of George Herring, President Thomas Jefferson “fell back on an embargo of American 
commerce” after the Chesapeake Affair. Jefferson had hoped to force France and Britain to 
 
41 “Great Britain; Ireland; America; Germany,” New York Journal (New York City), April 24, 1810, 4.   
42 “Paragraph Second,” The Public Advertiser (New York City), August 13, 1808, 2.   
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respect American neutrality with the embargo. Instead, he severely damaged the American 
economy and did not secure any major concessions from the two foreign powers.43 This lack of 
concessions from the British further damaged relations, while Native American activity on the 
frontier added to the list of American grievances.44 The embargo and differing responses to 
frontier concerns created internal division as well. Reflected in the disparate rhetorical uses of 
Revolutionary memory, these political occurrences drove the Federalists and Republicans further 
apart. Although both parties employed this memory to call for unity in response to foreign 
indignities, as Sarah Purcell has argued, they fundamentally disagreed on what adherence to that 
memory should look like.45 As a result, Americans, especially Republicans, just as commonly 
used highly charged Revolutionary memories—like that of Wyoming—to defame their fellow 
countrymen as to attack British aggression. 
Always more likely to deploy emotional memories of the Revolution, Republican 
denouncements of Britain, while genuine, pointedly targeted Federalists and sought to expose 
their “treasonable devotion” to Great Britain.46 The same Republican who spoke of “the 
Brutish,” for instance, presented “the atrocities of the” British to counteract Federalist critiques 
about Republican foreign policy. Arguing that Federalist concerns about Napoleon were simply 
“a chimera,” this writer insisted that Federalists worked “to advance the British interest…[and] 
destroy the American administration.”47 Other Republicans even more directly utilized the 
memory of Wyoming to condemn the Federalists. One “old Whig of 76,” as he styled himself, 
recalled when some Federalists or their fathers “were arrayed in arms against us, when they were 
 
43 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 119-121.  See also, Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 117-118. 
44 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 125-126.   
45 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 154.  
46 Marcus Morton, An Oration, on American Independence (New Bedford, MA: Elijah Billings, 1806), 16.  
47 “Paragraph Second,” The Public Advertiser (New York City), August 13, 1808, 2. 
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united with the English, Hessians, and Indians in the work of murder, conflagration and ruin.” 
The old Whig then cited the legend of the Wyoming Massacre to express his doubt in current 
Federalists. “How can I forget the capture of Wyoming in 1778, when man, woman, and child 
were indiscriminately burnt together,” he wrote. “And how can I command my patience when I 
see many of this infernal gang now claiming confidence as patriots and power as legislators and 
statesmen?”48 Casting modern Federalists as the new Tories by utilizing the Massacre, this 
Republican attempted to delegitimize the opposition. Amazingly, some Republicans even more 
bluntly connected Federalists to Tories through the example of Wyoming. Attacking Federalists 
in Luzerne County, one Republican paper wrote, “The farmers of Luzerne…should remember 
the Wyoming Massacre, the TORIES of that day—and then MARK the conduct of the TORIES 
of the present day.”49 Using the memory of Wyoming as a weapon to paint their political 
enemies as in league with the villains of the Revolution, Republicans simultaneously vilified 
Britain and their Federalist rivals.  
Republicans in this period clearly evoked Wyoming with an eye towards their own 
political agendas. During the lead-up to the 1810 midterm elections, for example, a Republican 
paper courted Irish immigrant votes by creating a narrative of shared oppression between Ireland 
and the United States that utilized the example of Wyoming. Claiming that “We were born the 
subjects of one king” and “have been the fellow victims of a common oppressor,” this 
Republican contended that “the assassins at Wyoming…were instruements of the same ferocious 
tyrant who has spread havook, death and desolation in Hibernian fields.” The editorial then 
 
48 “For the Bee: The Old Whig of 76,” The Bee (Hudson, New York), September 19, 1809, 5.  
49 “Citizens!” Gleaner (Wilkes-Barre, PA), August 7, 1812, 3. The quote is originally from a Baltimore paper but 
was reprinted by the editors of the Gleaner in Wilkes-Barre to respond to the accusations.  
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stressed that good Irish and American patriots should support the Republicans over the 
Anglophile Federalists.50  
Memories of Wyoming could likewise assist Republicans in justifying their anti-British 
policies. In the face of flagging support for the embargo, some utilized historical accounts of the 
battle to tilt public opinion in their favor. Directly reproducing an excerpt from an English 
historian’s work, which replicated most of the groundless stories from Holt’s account, a few 
Republicans used this excerpt to show how the embargo remained viable and to cast their 
Federalist opponents as modern-day Tories.51 The reprinting of this historical account—based on 
unsubstantiated narratives from the Revolution—as a piece of political commentary highlights 
the role history played in perpetuating and authenticating Patriot propaganda. Finding their way 
into political discourse, the exaggerations of Holt and the historians who reproduced his account 
influenced the way that Americans conceptualized current events. By this time, the legendary 
story of the Massacre was so ingrained in the American imagination that most Republicans only 
needed to reference Wyoming to accomplish their aims.52 
Wyoming also found a ready place within Republican commentary about the nation’s 
frontier. The frontier and Native Americans featured heavily within Republican rhetoric, 
especially as the party drew considerable support from western states and as the charismatic 
 
50 “The Election,” New York Journal (New York City), April 4, 1810, 1.   
51 “A Picture of War: For the consideration of those who condemn the Embargo,” The Bee (New London, CT), April 
5, 1808, 2. “Toryism,” Carthage Gazette (Carthage, TN), May 31, 1809, 2. The Bee article directly addresses those 
who do not support the embargo, while the Carthage article indirectly connects Revolutionary Tories with modern 
Federalists. The history these papers reprinted was purportedly Joseph Gerrald, a British political dissident. His 
account reproduced myths from Holt about the hatchet and murders committed by Loyalists. See, Purcell, Sealed 
with Blood, 159 and Parkinson, The Common Cause, 648 for brief discussions on how Republicans used 
Revolutionary memory to paint Federalists as crypto-Loyalists.  
52 Indeed, Federalists sometimes criticized Republicans for using Wyoming as the only evidence of current British 
machinations. An 1809 article, for instance, mocked a Republican whose only evidence that Britain was responsible 
for recent fires at American manufactories was because they had sanctioned the Glencoe Massacre in the Scottish 
Highlands in the late 1600s and the Wyoming Massacre in 1778. See, “Editor’s Closet,” Northern Whig (Hudson, 
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Indian leader Tecumseh threatened the country’s expansion in the west.53 As both the British and 
Indians remained enemies with American settlers in the backcountry, Americans in this period 
lived in a context comparable with their Revolutionary forebearers. Instances of frontier violence 
from the Revolution thus remained relevant and capable of speaking to early nineteenth century 
concerns.54 One Republican in 1808, for instance, referenced the Battle of Wyoming to 
encourage compliance with the embargo on the frontier. Urging his countrymen to not engage in 
smuggling with the British, this man recalled the horrors of the Revolution to highlight the 
“hostile designs of the English, [as] manifested in their stirring up the Indians against us.” 
Mentioning his memory of Wyoming, he argued that Americans must remain true to Republican 
policy to prevent the British and their savage allies from perpetrating another frontier massacre.55 
Upon hearing of fresh instances of Indian attacks, an 1812 editorial similarly lamented that “the 
murdered innocents at Wyoming bleed afresh” and insisted that only a strong American response 
could “prevent a repetition of slaughter and death.”56 Another article from the Lexington 
Reporter also utilized Wyoming to highlight Britain’s perfidious designs in the backcountry.57 
Though decades distant, the legend of Wyoming still spoke to deep-seated backcountry fears 
about Britain’s savage allies. 
These Republican examples of frontier rhetoric show that a younger generation of 
partisans used Wyoming in ways that Revolutionary Patriots would have recognized and likely 
approved. Like in the Revolution, these Republican accounts tapped into the legend of the 
 
53 See Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 123-124 and Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 126-130.   
54 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 645. In the words of Parkinson, “Many people, places, and events from the 
Revolution had disappeared… but memories involving Britain and their ‘savage allies’ had not” in the years before 
the War of 1812 (645).   
55 “From the Albany Register: Patriotic Association,” City Gazette (Charleston, SC), August 16, 1808, 2.   
56 “From Niles’ Weekly Registers: Foreign Relations,” New Hampshire Patriot (Concord), January 7, 1812, 1.  
57 “From the Lexington Reporter: For Congress and the Administration,” Columbian (New York City), December 
12, 1811, 1. The Reporter turned to “the savage British tortures at Wyoming and Wilkes-Barre, and to all the horrors 
of the revolutionary war” as evidence of hostile British intentions in the present. 
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Wyoming Massacre and the accompanying language of atrocity to enhance their arguments. 
Republicans used this language and the example of Wyoming to provoke action on the frontier 
or to argue for resistance against the British, just as Patriots like John Holt had in the late 1770s. 
Republicans also ignored Native American agency, often claiming, as the Lexington Reporter 
did, that “the Indians are instigated to war by the British.”58 Blaming the British for the massacre 
and other instances where Native Americans attacked settlers, Patriots and Republicans alike 
presented themselves as innocent victims of outrageous aggression and ignored their own 
culpability in provoking such responses. As one Republican claimed without any sense of irony, 
“all our difficulties with the Indians have originated with the British.” 59  
 
While Americans consistently evoked the example of Wyoming before the War of 1812, 
the outbreak of war provided new opportunities to use the battle’s memory as a political tool. 
With violence escalating in the backcountry, especially after the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, 
and without concessions from the British on shipping rights, President James Madison finally 
asked Congress to declare war in early summer 1812. In the closest vote on a declaration of war 
in United States history, Congress passed the motion on strictly partisan lines. While Federalists 
opposed the war, Republicans supported it and hoped that it would unify the country behind their 
party.60 Political unity ultimately eluded the nation, however, and partisan divides grew more 
evident during the conflict; indeed, some Federalists even considered secession from the Union. 
With the onset of war, the first party system and relations with Great Britain thus met their 
 
58 “From the Lexington Reporter: For Congress and the Administration,” Columbian (New York City), December 
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breaking points. Similarly, the trends affecting political rhetoric and Revolutionary memory 
during the previous half-decade reached their culmination in this same period, affecting the use 
of Wyoming within national discourse. As in the five years leading up to the War of 1812, 
Wyoming still served as a rhetorical weapon that could accomplish many of the same political 
aims, but American usage of the battle’s remembrance took on an added urgency with the higher 
stakes of war.   
For many Republicans, richly embroidered memories of the Revolution assisted them in 
waging a propaganda war to garner support for the fight against Great Britain. According to Alan 
Taylor, the War of 1812, like the Revolution, was a “highly political war, waged in newspapers 
as well as on the battlefield.”61 Republicans thus used news coverage to attack the enemy and 
bolster American resolve, like Patriots had done in the struggle for independence. In fact, 
Republicans relied on many of the same foundationless war stories from the Revolution to 
discredit the British.62 Republican editorials claimed that the British had traded in scalps or 
encouraged the wanton murder of women and children in both the Revolution and the current 
conflict. Unsurprisingly, they also evoked the legend of the Wyoming Massacre.63 Blending old 
and new examples of British barbarity, Republican rhetoric during the war portrayed the British 
as savage to demonstrate American’s own superiority and show why the American people must 
support the war. This rhetorical continuity with the Patriot’s propaganda efforts demonstrates the 
 
61 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 259. For the propaganda war during the Revolution, see Carl Berger, Broadsides 
and Bayonets: The Propaganda War of the American Revolution (San Francisco: Papamoa Press, 1961), 10.  
62 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 655-658. As Robert Parkinson maintains, Americans resurrected pro-
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involved the frontier and Native Americans.  
63 “From Niles’ Weekly Register: Desultory Remarks,” Saratoga Patriot (New York), August 19, 1812, 2. The 
editorial certainly used Wyoming in its picture of British barbarity. According to the author, “the British government 
has always been deliberately cruel and base…the massacres at Paoli and Wyoming, with their notorious avowed 
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durability of Wyoming’s memory and its ability, along with other revolutionary memories, to 
bridge the past and present for early nineteenth-century Americans.  
The legend of the Wyoming Massacre featured in Republican denouncements of Britain 
and helped connect memories of the Revolution with current events. About a month after the 
beginning of the war, for instance, two papers printed an excerpt about the supposed history of 
the Massacre. Far from simply printing this history for its own sake, these papers intended the 
excerpt to speak to the present conflict. As one editor wrote in an introduction to the piece, “The 
following dreadful picture is one of the most horrid exploits of our present enemy” and “is more 
peculiarly interesting at this time and in this state… [as] the same course of cruelties [has] been 
recommenced.” Republicans readily drew on such resonate memories and easily connected them 
to the nation’s current situation. They based their comparisons, however, on uncorroborated 
rumors solidified by historians in the years after the Revolution. Reproducing most of the Holt 
account’s and in language that Lendrum copied into his own work, this reprinted excerpt 
indicates how historic accounts shaped political conversations and disseminated unverified and 
explosive narratives to the public.64  
With a faulty understanding of what occurred at Wyoming in July 1778, Republicans 
continued to associate the sensationalized account of the battle with recent examples of British 
misdeeds to argue that the British were no different now than during the war for independence. 
As the Baltimore Patriot caustically wrote in October 1813 after tying “the shocking massacres 
of Cherry-Valley and Wyoming” to the latest British atrocities in Maryland, “let him [the reader] 
 
64 For original article that reprinted excerpt see, “Destruction of Wyoming,” Baltimore Patriot, July 9, 1813, 2. For 
editorial quote see comments attached to reprinting of the Baltimore Patriot article in “Destruction of Wyoming,” 
New Hampshire Patriot (Concord), July 27, 1813, 3. Based on the line “this settlement exhibited such a picture of 
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determine for himself how far these noble English are consistent with their former character.”65 
While this Maryland article linked Wyoming with violence between whites, Republicans more 
commonly partnered the battle with instances of racial warfare in the backcountry. These 
accounts again accused America’s white opponents of succumbing to Indian barbarism and 
pushed for governmental action. A July 1812 article from the Lexington Reporter, for instance, 
explicitly referenced Wyoming with other instances of frontier bloodshed to argue that the 
British stirred up the Indians to frontier murder “as in 1777” and 1778. According to the 
Reporter, “the old revolutionary soldier…can well recollect the massacre of Wyoming. He has 
not forgotten that a horde of Tories and Indians…inflicted a barbarity of torture, unequalled in 
the annals of human history” there. Nor could he forget “who hired and paid those savages and 
tories…The BRITISH.” Calling for a defense of the west, this article claimed that Britain had 
instigated another Indian war.66 For Republicans, the example of Wyoming thus provided ample 
evidence of Britain’s continued brutality and supported their arguments about the necessity of 
defending the frontier. To the question of “who gave the Indians tomahawk and knife? Who 
started first the daring savage yell?” many Americans would have agreed with one poet’s reply—
"Let Britain and Wyoming butchers tell!”67  
The Battle of Frenchtown in January 1813 provided the readiest parallel for Republicans 
to link the massacre with the current day. Also known as the River Raisin Massacre, this battle in 
the Michigan Territory saw 500 Kentucky militiamen overwhelmed by a combined force of 
British and native troops. Hundreds of Kentuckians died in the attack, and many more were 
taken prisoner and forcibly marched to Fort Malden in Canada. Those too wounded to move 
 
65 “Character of the War within the State of Maryland,” Baltimore Patriot (Maryland), October 1, 1813, 2.  
66 “From the Lexington Reporter: The British,” American Mercury (Hartford, Connecticut), July 8, 1812, 1.  
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remained behind in two houses, which Native Americans burned the next day with the 
inhabitants still inside. Caught in the flames or escaping the conflagration just to be scalped, the 
wounded Americans perished.68 As a frontier massacre perpetuated by the British and their 
Indian allies that included the burning of helpless individuals inside buildings, the River Raisin 
Massacre fit the script of Holt’s Wyoming account, and Americans took notice. One Republican 
orator lamented that “The bloody tragedy of Wyoming has been repeated on the banks of [the] 
Raisin, and throughout our western frontier.”69 The similarities between the well-known account 
of the Wyoming Massacre and the recent occurrence upon the Raisin certainly helped Americans 
link the two events.  
Just like Wyoming in the Revolution, events at the River Raisin justified revenge in the 
backcountry and continued resistance to the British. “Remember the Raisin” became a popular 
rallying cry and a type of rhetorical “trump card” for Americans in the coming months of the 
conflict.70 Republicans proved particularly eager to use the memory of the Raisin to justify 
retaliatory measures. This memory was also powerful in the backcountry and led Kentuckians to 
commit their own atrocities on natives during the Battle of the Thames in October 1813.71 One 
Enquirer correspondent in April 1813 predicted the Kentuckians’ angry response as well as the 
propagandic usage of the Raisin. He wrote, “the massacre of the Raisin will be inscribed on the 
same imperishable page of history with…the destruction of Wyoming. But the only effect, which 
it will have upon the war, will be to rouse” the people to action “and call forth the Kentuckians to 
revenge the assassination of their Kinsmen.”72 Each time they likened the Raisin massacre to 
 
68 See Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 210-215.  
69 “Fourth of July,” The Columbian (New York City), July 3, 1813, 2.    
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Wyoming, Republicans used these backcountry atrocities to perpetuate a familiar narrative of 
victimhood that allowed Americans to see themselves not as aggressors but as innocent victims 
who retaliated against the fiendish British and Indians only in righteous self-defense.  
As during the leadup to war, Republican denouncements of Great Britain and their 
rhetorical deployment of the memory of Wyoming served partisan purposes intended to not only 
help in the struggle against Britain but also meant to further the interests of the current 
administration. In a highly divided political climate, Republicans worked to defend their 
handling of the war, win reelection, and discredit their opponents. Facing mounting criticism as 
the war progressed, Republicans tapped into incendiary frontier language and a well-spring of 
hatred for the British and Indians to divert attention from military failures and retain control. 
Expounding upon frontier atrocities both past and present or “waving the bloody scalp,” as 
Taylor puts it, “Republicans shifted the focus away from their mistakes [and] onto the misdeeds 
of the British and their Indian allies.”73 Again following in the footsteps of Revolutionary 
Patriots, Republicans used the example of Wyoming to distract from the sagging war effort and 
unite the nation behind their cause, as one 1812 editorial shows. Referencing the battle to prove 
that “the British government has always been deliberately cruel and base,” this Republican called 
for every American to unite in the face of British barbarity. This editorial writer used Wyoming 
to rally the public behind the war effort and subtly asserted that good Americans must assist the 
Republican administration waging it.74 
 
73 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 212.   
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Republicans also utilized Wyoming and the language of atrocity to malign their political 
opponents in newspapers and speeches, sometimes portraying the opposition as “wretches calling 
themselves Americans.”75 Many Republicans tried to quash attempts to criticize their leadership, 
and they commonly accused critics of supporting the British or worse—their savage allies.76 
One, for instance, directly evoked Wyoming—and the horrors of Indian war attached to it—to 
personally attack a political enemy. Condemning a Federalist orator for forgetting “the victims of 
stimulated Anglo-Indian ferocity” at Wyoming and supporting “the abettors…[of] the bloody 
deed,” this Republican portrayed Federalists as hypocrites at best and Loyalists at worse.77 
Another utilized Wyoming and other instances of “savage cruelty” in defense of a proclamation 
that threatened Canadians “should they employ the Savages.” Painting a nightmarish scenario of 
frontier atrocity replete with Native American “prowlers” butchering women and children in the 
night, this writer emphasized the necessity of the proclamation. Most important, however, he 
shamed the opposition for ignoring the suffering that frontier inhabitants would experience in the 
ensuing frontier violence.78 An example of combined British, Native American, Loyalist, and 
now Federalist savagery, Wyoming remained malleable for Republican political ends.  
Republicans more typically utilized Wyoming in their rhetoric, but they faced opposition 
from Federalists who occasionally referenced the battle’s memory in their defense. Generally 
hailing from the region where the battle occurred, those few Federalists who utilized Wyoming 
evoked its memory during Independence Day celebrations, right after the battle’s anniversary. 
While Federalists and Republicans had long competed for attention during Fourth of July 
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festivities, according to Len Travers, this party conflict reached its climax during the War of 
1812, and it shows in each parties’ respective usage of Wyoming in their holiday orations.79 
Referenced in a few Republican orations after the Chesapeake Affair, Wyoming typically 
emerged as an example of British savagery intended to inflame both partisan and anti-British 
passions.80 
 Federalists in the Wyoming region, however, recalled the battle on the Fourth of July to 
resist attempts to squash their free speech and paint them as Loyalists. Local politician Charles 
Miner’s oration, for instance, employed the battle to show how locals had suffered in the 
Revolution and insisted that Federalists had remained true Americans. Miner, however, still 
asserted his opposition to the war and maintained that the constitution protected dissent.81 A July 
4 editorial letter in Luzerne similarly opposed the war and advocated a “change of rulers.” The 
author of this editorial tied Wyoming to current events yet drew different conclusions than 
Republican writers. Aware of “the horrid massacre [that] took place at Wyoming” and the 
current “bloody news…of the inhabitants on our frontiers” who have suffered “in a similar 
manner to those who fell at Wyoming in July 1778,” this author advocated not for continued war 
but for unity to “bring about an honorable peace.” For him, the failures of American arms in 
Canada and across the Great Lakes merely prolonged the suffering on the frontier and brought 
dishonor to the nation.82 Instead of galvanizing support for the war as it did for Republicans, 
Federalists invoked the memory of Wyoming to hasten peace.  
 
 
79 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth, 90, 190-198. As Republicans used the holiday to support the war, Federalists 
called for a day of mourning in opposition to the conflict. 
80 See for example, Morton, An Oration, 7 or “Fourth of July,” The Columbian (New York City), July 3, 1813, 2 or 
“Mr. Overton’s ORATION,” Carthage Gazette (TN), July 23, 1813, 1-2. 
81 “Address, delivered on the 4th of July: By C. Miner,” Gleaner (Wilkes-Barre, PA), July 17, 1812, 1. Miner 
claimed that the war with Britain was partially justified, yet he also believed it was equally so with France.  
82 “Extract of a Letter to the Editor, From an Old and Valued Friend,” Gleaner (Wilkes-Barre, PA), July 16, 1813, 3.  
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When war ended and the peace treaty was signed in early 1815, the Wyoming Massacre 
retained some of its political immediacy in a new era of territorial expansion, especially as 
Americans continued to fight Native Americans on the frontier. While ostensibly a draw, the 
United States largely won the peace in the aftermath of the War of 1812, securing its spot on the 
continent and ensuring future westward expansion. As the war allowed the Americans to cut off 
natives from most foreign allies on the continent, the real losers of that war in Taylor’s 
estimation were Native Americans.83 With the conflict against Britain over, Republicans largely 
pardoned former Federalists for their opposition. The nation entered an era of “good feelings” in 
the aftermath of the conflict, characterized by an awakened nationalism and a brief lessening of 
partisan divides—partially a result of the Federalist Party’s effective collapse after the poorly 
timed Hartford Convention.84 Many Americans, however, never forgave Indians for their 
perceived role in the conflict of 1812 and even 1776. Indeed, the continuing usage of these 
stories, first employed for independence and later revived for the renewed conflict against 
Britain, had tragic consequences for native people. Convincing many Americans that Indians 
were enemies of the nation and unworthy of citizenship, these durable narratives, as Parkinson 
rightly points out, portrayed Indians as “founding traitors.”85 The legend of Wyoming continued 
to play into this idea, painting a lasting image of natives as bloodthirsty and easily manipulated 
monsters that would last far into the nineteenth century. 
 
 
83 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 420-437, esp. 437.  
84 David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 294-296.  While nationalism rose in this period, Waldstreicher notes 
that “mixed feelings,” embodied in sectional and partisan differences, remained. 
85 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 658. Native Americans, of course, were not “founding traitors.” Many tribes had 
assisted the Patriot war effort but were conveniently forgotten by the white political nation. It is all the more 
important to understand the process of creating narratives about the American past that sought to establish Indians as 




The War of 1812 had ended, but the ideological value of invoking the Wyoming 
Massacre did not, particularly on the frontier. Wyoming continued to reappear in writings 
seeking to criticize vicious actions by the British and “savage” Indians, particularly against 
“helpless females” and “tender infants.” One of the most striking examples of this appeared 
during the Seminole War at the end of the 1810s, when Gen. Andrew Jackson executed two 
British captives accused of assisting the Seminoles in their battle against the United States. When 
he justified the deaths of Alexander Arbuthnot and Richard Armbrister as just retaliation for 
horrors enacted against whites, his supporters hastened to remind newspaper readers of the long 
pattern of British and Indian atrocities. One of these was a congressman and newspaper 
correspondent using the pseudonym Wyoming who called for the extermination of native people 
because of their propensity for extreme violence. Because Arbuthnot and Armbrister had “made 
themselves savages,” they were “more deeply stained with guilt than any painted Seminole,” and 
thus deserved execution. 86 Clearly, the constructed memory of British and Indian collusion at 
Wyoming still had the power to galvanize Americans to retaliate and see themselves as the true 
victims on the frontier.  
 
86 For quote on “tender infants,” see “Counter Report,” Baltimore Patriot (Maryland), January 14, 1819, 2. This 
newspaper report reprinted comments from a Kentucky congressman.  See also, “From the N.Y. Columbian: 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister,” Hampden Patriot (Springfield, MA), January 7, 1819, 3. With the pseudonym 
“Wyoming,” this author wrote, “Of all the hordes of savages on earth, the Indian tribes of North America are least of 
all entitled to compassion or lenity in time of war.” Waging wars of cruelty and extermination, this author argued, 
Native Americans deserved like treatment. “What they do to others must be done to them in return,” he rationalized, 
“and Retaliation in its severest form, is but common justice.” The massacre’s legend helped Americans support 
further Native American removal and exclusion in the immediate postwar era. White Americans, however, did not 
forget the roles that people of European descent supposedly played in instigating frontier attacks as evidenced by 
Armbrister and Arbuthnot. Americans like “Wyoming” were quick to blame foreign influences for frontier violence. 
In accusing Armbrister and Arbuthnot for starting the violence and being worse than savage Indians, “Wyoming” 
certainly lived up to his pseudonym.  
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Entrenched in American culture through histories, popular culture, literature, and politics, 
the legend of the Wyoming Massacre remained relevant in the early Republic. Used to attack the 
British and Indians, bolster American resolve, discredit political opponents, or argue for action 
on the frontier, the battle’s memory spoke to a variety of Americans’ concerns in the era around 
the War of 1812. As Americans faced similar enemies and situations first in the War of 1812, 
they turned to the same arguments and examples from the Revolution to support their aims and 
defend their positions. These powerful narratives, passed down and legitimized by early 
historians and literary works, stayed influential and were ripe for use by the politically savvy. In 
the new propaganda war of 1812, the legendary version of the Massacre remained a powerful 
rhetorical weapon against the British, Native Americans, Federalists, and Republicans. Through 
Wyoming, Americans connected the Revolutionary past with their present, a trend that continued 
even when the hostilities with Britain and the Seminoles ceased.   
The Wyoming Massacre became a key part of the Revolutionary story in the nineteenth 
century. Even as the threat from Britain passed and Wyoming’s political relevancy declined, the 
Massacre remained a part of American’s historical consciousness, thanks in no small part to the 
popularity of Campbell’s Gertrude of Wyoming and the continued influence of early historians.87 
Coupled with growing nationalism and a desire to preserve the experiences of the Revolutionary 
generation as it began to pass away, Americans remembered the sacrifices at Wyoming and 
considered it a part of their Revolutionary heritage.88 These trends in history, popular culture, 
and Revolutionary memory converged in the remembrance of Wyoming, illustrating the wide-
 
87 As one historian aptly summarized in 1838, “So long as English poetry exists, will the imaginary tale of Gertrude 
of Wyoming be read, admired, and wept; and thousands, in every generation to come, will receive the beautiful 
fiction for truth, while the details of fact by the faithful historian, rejecting the exaggerations of Ramsay and Gordon, 
and their associate writers of the revolutionary era, together with compilers more modern, who have taken no pains 
to inquire for the truth, may be regarded as too common-place and unimportant for attention.” See, William Leete 
Stone, Life of Joseph Brant—Thayendanegea (New York: A. V. Blake, 1838), I: 318-319. 
88 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 193-195.  
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reaching influence of histories and literature in helping Wyoming become part of the 
Revolutionary mythos. One 1823 article from Vermont, for instance, began with a line from 
Campbell’s poem and provided a historical excerpt that duplicated the legend of the Massacre 
before reminding its readers of the sacrifices made during the Revolution.89 Similarly citing 
Campbell and then giving an excerpt “in the language of America’s great historian,” whom the 
editor considered to be John Marshall, an 1827 article from Philadelphia also encouraged its 
readers to remember the sacrifices of Wyoming and the “almost sacred charge” its survivors had 
left behind.90 Immortalized in history and fiction, the Massacre had become a part of Americans’ 
Revolutionary mythology. The memory of Wyoming reminded a new generation of the sacrifice 
and vigilance needed to protect the nation’s freedom.91 
As a new generation of Americans worked to commemorate the triumphs and sacrifices 
of their Revolutionary forebears, the focus of the Massacre’s remembrance gradually turned 
more inward towards the local community near Wilkes-Barre and Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania. Desiring to memorialize those slaughtered in July 1778 and record the 
recollections of those who had experienced it, locals worked to preserve and shape the memory 
of the battle in new ways in the coming decades of the nineteenth century. Some in the 
community even began to question the popular version of the battle, attempting to discredit the 
 
89 “Battle of Wyoming,” Vermont Gazette (Bennington), September 30, 1823, 3.  
90 “From the Philadelphia Ariel: Old Wyoming,” Torch Light (Hagerstown, Maryland), May 17, 1827, 1. While the 
article did not name Marshall, the reprinted excerpt was from Marshall’s biography of George Washington. See 
Marshall, Life of Washington, 556-560.  
91 See, “Spark for the Altar of 76’,” Norwich Courier (Connecticut), August 27, 1828, 4. An elderly orator in 1828 
considered Wyoming as part of the Revolutionary “inheritance.” He directly referenced Wyoming in what he clearly 
believed would be one of the “the last time[s]” his generation “will ever tell you…the story of our sufferings.” He 
urged the upcoming generation to “defend your inheritance” with virtue. For Wyoming’s continued place in 
Revolutionary mythology, see, for example, Thomas Crawford and William Rinehart, House Bronze Doors, bronze, 
1905, U.S. Capitol East House Portico, https://www.aoc.gov/art/doors/house-bronze-doors. These doors, crafted in 
the 1850s and 1860s but installed in the early 1900s, included Wyoming with other important Revolutionary events, 
such as the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Its inclusion points to the battle’s continued importance in 
nineteenth century America. 
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narratives that Patriot publicists, authentic histories, and political commentaries had all 
reproduced down the decades. Their efforts, as we shall see, only gave rise to a new narrative of 
an equally unverified nature.92 Of course, the legend of the Wyoming Massacre would not easily 
be discredited, and by no means did Wyoming fade from national discourse even as locals 
exerted more control over its memory.93 Rather, as it had during the years surrounding the War 
of 1812, Wyoming’s memory remained malleable in new circumstances.  




92 See, for example, Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 21-25.   
93 As late as 1878, a local historian criticized school textbooks for handing down “monstrous falsehoods” about the 
battle and massacre. The historian wrote, “That such an account should be published as late as 1871 for instruction 
in schools and the edification of families, is an unmitigated, unpardonable outrage.” Clearly, the legend of the 
Wyoming Massacre lived on far into the nineteenth century. See Harry Hakes, Wyoming: Synopsis of the Battle and 
Massacre for the Information of the People, 1878, from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society. 
This source can also be accessed via the Library of Congress at https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.16001200/. 
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Chapter 3 
“A fury in the form of a woman” 
A New Legend Takes Hold 
 
A new legend about the Battle of Wyoming emerged in the mid-1800s, equally as 
sensational as the first. This myth eventually replaced the long-lived narratives of John Holt and 
his Revolutionary counterparts. As regional historians finally discredited those Revolutionary 
accounts starting in the 1820s, they enabled this other legend to materialize, continuing the cycle 
of historical distortion for a new generation. They had help, of course. Influenced by national 
attitudes about Native Americans, patriotism, and regionalism, locals eagerly and uncritically 
adopted wild tales, which then allowed this new legend to spread through other media. Much as 
early Revolutionary historians and Gertrude of Wyoming disseminated the legend of the 
Wyoming Massacre in the era of the War of 1812, historians in the antebellum period and the 
popular literature of the nineteenth century made it possible for a new legend to take hold.   
This legend centered around a woman of probable French and Native American ancestry 
named Esther or Catherine Montour, who became popularly known as Queen Esther. This native 
leader, given the title “Queen” by colonists due to her position of authority, was likely a largely 
fictional composite of three historic Native American women.1 According to some accounts and 
later historians, Esther brutally massacred between seven and twenty-five Patriot prisoners after 
the Battle of Wyoming as an act of revenge for the murder of her son on July 2. She allegedly 
 
1 Warren Hunting Smith, “Queen Esther,” The Virginia Quarterly Review 29, no. 3 (Summer 1953): 400-404. In the 
nineteenth century, authors usually considered Esther responsible, but they sometimes claimed that her sister 
Catherine Montour carried out the killings. Some even argued that Catherine Montour went by the name “Queen 
Esther.” For different names, see Campbell, Annals of Tyron County, 64 [appendix], and William Leete Stone, The 
Poetry and History of Wyoming: Containing Campbell’s Gertrude, and the History of Wyoming, from Its Discovery 
to the Beginning of the Present Century, 4th ed. (Wilkes-Barre: C.E. Butler, 1869), 207-208.  
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slaughtered the prisoners about a mile away from the field of battle around a slightly raised rock, 
which these new accounts came to call “Bloody Rock” or “Queen Esther’s Rock.” With a maul 
in one hand and a hatchet in the other, Esther purportedly chanted an otherworldly dirge as she 
killed the terrified Patriots, who were held captive by native warriors in “the fatal ring” around 
the rock.2  
Just like Holt’s earlier account, the story of Queen Esther found life in histories and 
popular culture. Morphing from an obscure rumor referenced in a few contemporary accounts 
and advanced by some elderly veterans, this myth started making its way into local histories 
beginning in the 1820s, gaining gradual acceptance as historians repeated it. From there, the 
myth disseminated to the community and then the nation. Capable of tapping into the currents of 
regional romance and commemoration, fascination with Native Americans, and cultural 
discourses on American identity, Esther’s legend perfectly fit mid-nineteenth-century tastes as 
well as the public’s understanding of the Battle of Wyoming. As a result, Esther featured in 
popular fiction, travel literature, and commemorative events that introduced her to even more 
Americans. Able to connect Wyoming and Esther to larger regional and national narratives, 
Americans turned to this legend for a variety of reasons.  
This chapter examines the development of this legend in the antebellum period and its 
continued influence later in the nineteenth century. Detailing where it originated, how and why it 
became accepted, and how it spread, the chapter relies on a variety of primary and secondary 
sources to explore the influences of history, literature, and local commemoration on the legend. 
This chapter will use the terms “myth,” “legend,” and “story” interchangeably to describe the 
various narratives that surround Esther or Catherine Montour’s supposed involvement in the 
 
2 Miner, History of Wyoming, 226-233, 53-55 [appendix]. See also, George Peck, Wyoming; Its History, Stirring 
Incidents, and Romantic Adventures (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1858), 48, 284-290.  
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Battle of Wyoming. As Barbara Graymont and Amber Laubach have argued, Queen Esther’s 
legend is likely “completely fictional” and should be treated as such.3 The author concurs with 
this assertion and finds little evidence to suggest that executions occurred around the Bloody 
Rock or that any Native American woman, especially Esther Montour, killed Patriot prisoners. 
Of course, there is no way to definitively prove that this event never occurred, and some 
passionately claimed it did; as a result, the author welcomes historical revision if new evidence 
or interpretations come to light. Ultimately, however, this chapter contends that Esther’s legend 
has little basis in fact and that it should be considered local folklore that locals, historians, and 
authors legitimized for their own purposes during the mid-nineteenth-century. The accuracy or 
inaccuracy of narratives about Queen Esther, nonetheless, does not constitute the primary focus 
of this chapter. Instead, it principally seeks to highlight the complex interaction between local 
and national ideas that affected the remembrance of the Battle of Wyoming as well as the 
acceptance and diffusion of Esther’s myth. It explores why this myth suddenly appeared so 
compelling and relevant more than half a century after the battle itself. 
 
Historians at It Again    
Just as earlier historians of the Revolution reinforced and perpetuated groundless 
narratives of the Wyoming Massacre in the first three decades after 1778, many local historians 
working in the mid-1800s disseminated equally unsubstantiated tales. While some claimed to 
 
3 Indeed, in Laubach’s words, Esther “would not be the first Native person to be [falsely] accused of atrocities at 
Wyoming.” For quote in text, see Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 174. See also, Amber 
Laubach, “Queen Esther Montour of the Munsee Delaware: An Ethnohistoric and Archaeological History of Esther 
Montour and Queen Esther’s Town Preserve” (M.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2018), 50, 81-
82. I agree with Laubach’s assertion that Esther’s story seems about as accurate as Thomas Campbell’s poem. I 
would disagree, however, that the story of Esther was used as a propaganda tool against native people in the late 
1770s. While it could have motivated some of Sullivan’s men, the fact that no newspapers, the chief vehicle for 
propaganda in the period, ever picked it up suggests that it was not well-known and thus likely not used as 
propaganda in the 1770s.  
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correct the falsehoods in earlier accounts, many of these efforts merely gave credence to 
similarly baseless narratives.4 Most local mid-century historians, unlike the earlier generation of 
authors, did not reproduce the hyperbolic narratives of the Patriot wartime press. In fact, these 
historians worked hard to discredit what one called the “downright falsehoods” of John Holt’s 
1770s report, which included the story of the hatchet and the burning of women and children 
inside of Forty Fort.5 As they discredited the more lurid details of popular narratives, however, 
many local historians helped a new myth about the battle gain traction by uncritically accepting 
another long-lived rumor that reemerged around the 1820s and 1830s. This rumor, backed by the 
testimony of a few aged veterans, scant documentation, and local folklore, would become the 
basis for a whole new legend about the Battle of Wyoming.  
 Before a new legend could take hold, local historians first worked to discredit many of 
the older Revolutionary accounts that lacked evidential backing. Though a few historians had 
challenged these accounts from the beginning, many had simply reproduced the hyperbole, 
ensuring that it persisted in popular narratives long into the nineteenth century. The prevalence 
of these misconceptions encouraged many local historians, such as Isaac Chapman, William 
Stone, Charles Miner, and George Peck, to “correct” these stories and try to uncover the true 
course of events. As they presented their findings to dislodge these views, historians related what 
they believed happened in the past, yet their narratives shed light on more than just that. Their 
works inadvertently reveal larger cultural currents in the antebellum period that underpinned 
both the history and memory of Wyoming, currents that influenced the telling of the story and 
the use of evidence.  
 
4 Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 21.  
5 Peck, Wyoming, 58. Like their counterparts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these local 
“historians” were also amateurs with little historical training. The term amateur historians or amateur historical 
writers equally applies to these authors.   
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Beginning in the late 1820s and early 1830s, local historians followed a similar pattern in 
their coverage of the battle, first laid out by Isaac Chapman in his 1830 history of Wyoming. 
Though Chapman still (erroneously) claimed Joseph Brant had been present, he provided a 
retelling of the battle that did not reproduce the narratives that had become central to the popular 
legend. Chapman began by describing of the beauty of the valley before detailing how Native 
Americans and Loyalists triumphed through sheer numbers. An account of the retreat and the 
suffering of defeated Patriots followed, concluding with the plight of distressed frontier families 
fleeing from the carnage.6 Other historians from northern Pennsylvania and upstate New York 
quickly followed Chapman’s lead, citing him within their own histories or even copying parts of 
his work to challenge the misconceptions that had become so popular.7 Chapman’s successors 
regularly included denunciations of John Holt’s 1778 report in their works, and they helped 
finally dislodge this Revolutionary holdover from many histories of the region.  
Chapman’s local situation and national ideas about commercialization, progress, and 
Native Americans influenced his depiction of the battle and its place within Wyoming’s larger 
history. At the end of his book, Chapman reminded his readers of the prosperity the valley now 
enjoyed. Extolling the growth of towns, internal improvements, technology, and especially the 
discovery of coal, Chapman painted a rosy picture of the valley’s present and future, highlighting 
the region’s economic potential. His vision spoke to growing commercial prosperity, and his 
 
6 Isaac A. Chapman, A Sketch of the History of Wyoming (Wilkes-Barre: S. D. Lewis, 1830), 3, 121-128. While 
Chapman’s work saw publication in 1830, he had worked on it much earlier. The preface is dated 1818, and both 
Miner and Stone write that Chapman’s work was published posthumously and in an incomplete form. Chapman 
became the first to write a history of Wyoming, but politician and later historian Charles Miner wrote John Marshall 
about the inaccuracies of his depiction back in 1806. Miner did not publish until 1845, however.  
7 See, for example, William W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon County: Or, The Border Warfare of New York, During 
the Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1924), 64 of appendix, and Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: 319. 
Campbell’s work, which first appeared in 1831, reprinted Chapman’s account before adding a few editorial 
comments. Stone’s work, on the other hand, cited Chapman’s history in his footnotes.   
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work implied that the trials of Wyoming’s history had made modern improvements possible.8 
Like other historians writing from the nearby Mohawk Valley of New York, Chapman endorsed 
the idea of progress and “viewed history as a linear progression that drew together past, present, 
and future.” This narrative of progress served an important cultural function. Helping make sense 
of the violence of war and suggesting that those who perished did not die in vain, the linear 
progression of local history made it seem, in Paxton’s words, like “the Revolutionary 
generation’s sacrifices ushered in a new and better world for their children and grandchildren.”9  
Indeed, within Chapman’s narrative, even the defeat at the Battle of Wyoming eventually 
worked towards the good of the region. As it encouraged the devastation of the Iroquois thus 
removing “the danger of Indian wars,” the author suggested, the battle indirectly created an 
advantageous environment for the valley’s residents to quickly rebuild.10 This perspective was 
not unusual. White Americans often linked progress and the removal of Native Americans. 
Viewing natives as part of the past or as representing a previous stage of societal development, 
many white Americans saw their removal as a sign of progress, and Chapman’s history followed 
suit.11 His work ultimately shows how the exclusion and removal of Native Americans 
undergirded the comforting narrative of progress. It also highlights how local histories endorsed 
these larger cultural ideas and applied them to their own reading of the region’s past. 
In the coming decades, other local historians would build off Chapman’s example, 
dislodging the baseless narratives of the Revolution and advancing similar views of the relation 
of history to both progress and Native Americans. One such author, Colonel William Leete 
 
8 Chapman, A Sketch of the History of Wyoming, 198-209. Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 173. According to Sarah 
Purcell, as Americans looked to a future of progress in an era of increasing commercialization and democratization, 
they still “kept…[their] eyes on the past for inspiration.” 
9 Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 183. Both quotes are from Paxton. 
10 Chapman, A Sketch of the History of Wyoming, 133-134.   
11 See, Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian, 45-55. See also, Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 188-189, and 
Deloria, Playing Indian, 58-63.   
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Stone, built on Chapman’s history in 1838 but went much further to discredit the “gross 
exaggerations” about the battle in his two-volume biography of Joseph Brant. Fully conscious of 
the fiction of Gertrude of Wyoming and the “exaggerations of Ramsay and Gordon…together 
with [those from] compilers more modern who have taken no pains to inquire for the truth,” 
Stone set out to rectify the historical record. He first attacked the idea of a July 4th massacre. He 
concluded, “it does not appear that anything like a massacre followed the capitulation,” and he 
rejected the idea that there were “any specific acts of cruelty other than such as are usual in the 
general rout of a battlefield.” Next, Stone rebuffed the long-standing notion that Brant led the 
raid on Wyoming with John Butler, using sources that he believed proved Brant could not have 
been present.12  
Stone also took issue with another tendency common among white historians of this 
period—the propensity to depict Indians “with the characteristics of demons.” Taking pains to 
stress the prominent role of Loyalists in committing atrocities after the battle, Stone questioned 
this idea by reminding his readers of the savagery exhibited by white men at Wyoming. “In a 
domestic war marked by such atrocity, even among those claiming to be civilized,” he wrote, “it 
becomes us to pause before we brand the untutored savage, who fights according to the usages of 
his own people, with all that is revolting and cruel.” Returning to ideas about white savagery and 
Loyalist depredations, Stone challenged the depiction of Native Americans as bloodthirsty 
monsters that many of his contemporaries advanced. In fact, Stone even defended some Indian 
actions like scalping, arguing that these acts were considered honorable in native culture.13 His 
 
12 Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: 319, 336-339. In a footnote, Stone remarked, “Rarely, indeed, does it happen that 
history is more at fault in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may be applied to nearly every writer 
who has attempted to narrate the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler, Ramsay, and Gordon, and 
Marshall—nay, the British historians themselves—have written gross exaggerations” (339).  
13 Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: xiii-xv, 336-339.  
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desire to present natives sympathetically led Stone to believe native testimony more readily than 
other historians, and his admiration of Brant emerges in his work.   
Despite his more evenhanded interpretation, Stone ultimately remained a product of his 
time in that he subscribed to the prevailing, if toxic, idea that natives would soon disappear. Like 
many Americans on the east coast, most notably James Fenimore Cooper in his 1826 Last of the 
Mohicans, Stone believed in the myth of “the vanishing Indian.” This myth held that Native 
Americans, in Stone’s word, were quickly “melting away before the Anglo-Saxons like the snow 
beneath a vertical sun,” destined to be replaced by white settlers bringing progress further west.14 
Seeing the extinction of native people as inevitable in the face of progress, which equated to the 
advance of white society, Stone and other proponents of this myth mourned the loss of natives 
and found it easier to admire certain native attributes. Ironically, this occurred only after 
government policies and war had effectively removed most Native Americans from the eastern 
United States. More nefariously, this sentimentalization of dying Indians had “profound political 
implications,” providing “whites with an influential narrative of [inevitable] Indian decline” they 
could use to advocate for native removal throughout the nineteenth century.15 This myth subtly 
helped conceal white complicity in this process. An example of what one scholar terms 
“imperialist nostalgia,” the mourning or nostalgia expressed for disappearing Indians in the 
antebellum period helped hide white involvement by presenting them as innocent or passive 
bystanders to native extinction.16 Thus, while Stone did not present natives as heartless monsters, 
 
14 Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: xiii. See also, Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 188-189. 
15 Carolyn Eastman, “The Indian Censures the White Man: ‘Indian Eloquence’ and American Reading Audiences in 
the Early Republic,” William and Mary Quarterly 65, no. 3 (July 2008): 538-539.  
16 Renato Rosaldo, "Imperialist Nostalgia," Representations, no. 26 (1989): 108. See also, Richard Slotkin, 
Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (1973; repr., University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2000), 354-355.  
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his adherence to this myth and the idea of progress ultimately supported the very expansion that 
led to Native Americans’ disappearance.   
Not all local historians agreed with Stone’s interpretation about Wyoming or Native 
Americans. Stone’s friend Charles Miner, for instance, challenged Stone’s argument about 
Brant’s participation in the battle in his own 1845 history of Wyoming. In a detailed footnote, 
Miner claimed that Stone lacked convincing evidence to support his assertion about Brant. 
Doubting the veracity of any testimony from Brant’s “Indian friends” as to his whereabouts at 
the time of the battle, Miner argued that Brant’s infamy and his role in the rest of the war 
suggests that he did, in fact, command the Indian contingent in July 1778. His suspicions of 
Native Americans clearly colored his reading of certain evidence as well as his overall depiction 
of natives.17 Despite his disagreements with Stone, Miner similarly recognized the problems with 
the public’s understanding of the battle and built off Chapman’s example by seeking to present a 
truthful account that discredited the sensationalized details built up around the battle. His own 
interpretation of the battle followed closely with Chapman’s account, and it shared many features 
with other contemporary works on the topic.18 Miner did not repeat Holt’s unfounded stories 
about a July 4th massacre. Calling out William Gordon, David Ramsey, John Marshall, and other 
historians for disseminating myths about the surrender of Forty Fort, Miner declared that “it is 
time the truth of history should be vindicated.” He then asserted that these earlier accounts were 
inaccurate and that no one died at the fort. Of course, this correction did not influence his 
opinion of Butler, Great Britain, or any natives. For him, these actors remained tainted by their 
 
17 Miner, History of Wyoming, 227, 233. Miner did not have a kind view of most Native Americans, comparing them 
to demons. Referring to the torture of prisoners after the battle by Indians, Miner wrote “the vast depths of hell, 
boiling with demoniac passions, never could have devised or executed such horrid tortures (227).”  
18 Miner, History of Wyoming, iii-iv, 216-237. Miner perceived the origins of the misinformation that had colored 
most Americans’ view of the event, and traced the legend’s development from wild rumors to newspapers to 




involvement in the battle and the murder of retreating Patriot soldiers.19 Correcting some of the 
narratives of previous writers and historians, Miner’s account helped further discredit the old 
legend of the Wyoming Massacre in the eyes of many locals.  
Thirteen years after Charles Miner published his book, local minister George Peck added 
his own contribution to Wyoming’s history that sought to dislodge popular misconceptions. 
Peck’s 1858 book, titled Wyoming; Its History, Stirring Incidents, and Romantic Adventures, 
aimed to not only conform to “historic truth” but also inspire future generations. In his coverage 
of the battle, Peck stressed the contrast between Patriot bravery and the barbarity that Indians and 
Loyalists exhibited against retreating men and prisoners. Peck also attacked Holt’s ideas about 
the hatchet and the burning of women and children in Forty Fort. Though he understood how 
many Americans could easily believe such lies about the Tories and Indians who “were with no 
injustice regarded as a sort of demons incarnate,” he emphasized that “these [details] are not 
mere exaggerations, but downright falsehoods.” After rejecting the central fiction of the 
legendary version of the massacre, Peck turned to an even more disputed detail—the role that 
Joseph Brant played in the battle. Weighing the evidence presented by “popular tradition” as 
well as from Chapman, Miner, and Stone, Peck eventually sided with Stone, arguing that Brant 
did not accompany John Butler. Not that this correction altered his estimation of Brant or Native 
Americans. Even without Wyoming on his record, according to Peck, Brant remained a monster 
because of his actions in the Mohawk Valley during the Revolution. In this regard, his disdain 
for Native Americans more generally resembled Miner’s.20  
 
19 Miner, History of Wyoming, iv, 235-237. Miner well-understood the process by which the legend of Wyoming 
took hold in the American imagination. According to him, the basis for the legend started with rumors repeated by 
those escaping from the valley. Newspapers then quickly amplified their stories “to arouse the most powerful 
emotions of the human soul…to strengthen our [the Patriot] cause.” The legend’s prevalence and importance, 
however, ensured that few would challenge it after the war. Instead, historians reinforced myths about the massacre 
by relying on Revolutionary newspaper accounts, such as John Holt’s fabrication. 
20 Peck, Wyoming, vi-vii, 38-58, 87-92.   
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Peck may have showcased his devotion to uncovering the truth, but his history also 
reveals his harsh attitude towards natives and Loyalists, an attitude that many Revolutionary 
Americans would have shared. Just like earlier Patriots, Peck equated Loyalists and Native 
Americans with savagery, and his coverage of Wyoming often focused just as much on “the 
diabolical spirit of the Tories” as Indian depredations.21 Criticizing Loyalists for voluntarily 
choosing “savagery over civilization” and emphasizing that Indians and Loyalists had committed 
heinous acts, Peck helped justify the removal of Native Americans and their allies from the 
region.22 By playing up the savagery of the enemy in contrast to Patriot bravery, Peck presented 
the triumph of the United States and the expulsion of these enemies as a victory of good over 
evil. He placed the Battle of Wyoming at the center of a narrative of the region’s history and 
anchored it to an overarching narrative of progress. Like Chapman before him, Peck presented 
Wyoming’s history as a liner progression and argued that the sacrifices of the past, especially 
from the battle in 1778, ultimately paved the way for a more promising future. Referring to the 
Wyoming Massacre Monument, Peck wrote, “while it points back to a stern, bloody period in 
our history, it should indicate the fact of progress, and prophesy a glorious future.”23 Once again, 
Peck’s work accentuates how locals actively shaped ideas from wider American culture to give 
meaning to their own regional circumstances and history, combining a renewed concern for 
historical accuracy with an adherence to a particular narrative of progress. 
 
 While these authors repudiated the legend of the Wyoming Massacre and criticized the 
cycle of historical distortion that had spread it across the country, many of these same writers 
 
21 Peck, Wyoming, 45-48.  
22 Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 191-193.  
23 Peck, Wyoming, 387.   
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ironically contributed to a new form of distortion in their histories. Their writings fueled the rise 
of a new legend: the legend of Queen Esther and the Bloody Rock.  
Before analyzing how local historians perpetuated Queen Esther’s myth, it is necessary to 
first trace, as much as possible, the legend’s origins. As one scholar attests, “the facts 
surrounding Esther’s involvement in the events of the Battle of Wyoming are sketchy,” and no 
firsthand accounts place her at the site.24 Nonetheless, some contemporary references to Queen 
Esther and a murderous ritual after the battle do exist. The earliest mention of Esther after the 
battle emerges from Colonel Thomas Hartley’s account of his late September 1778 punitive 
expedition into the New York and Pennsylvania backcountry. Angered by the purported 
massacre at Wyoming, Hartley set out to avenge Patriot losses, and he burned several Native 
American towns during his expedition, including “Queen Hester’s [a corruption of Esther’s] 
palace or town.” Hartley, however, never mentioned Esther’s involvement with Wyoming, which 
would be unusual if she had in fact committed atrocities at that battle. Indeed, one would expect 
Hartley to more fully emphasize the destruction of this Indian town to gain favor with his 
superiors, even if there were only unsubstantiated rumors about her.25 No such rumors yet 
existed, however. In fact, the presses that readily disseminated Holt’s sensational account during 
the Revolution never printed a word about Queen Esther, the Bloody Rock, or prisoners 
massacred in a ring.26  
While the legend of Queen Esther received no newspaper coverage at the time, a few 
contemporary journals from 1779 referenced rumors about Queen Esther and the killing of 
prisoners around the fatal ring at Wyoming. In a journal from Sullivan’s expedition against the 
 
24 Laubach, “Queen Esther Montour of the Munsee Delaware,” 50, 81-82.  
25 “May it please the CONGRESS,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), October 17, 1778, 1.   
26 I have found no newspaper accounts that mention Queen Esther’s story before 1823.  
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Iroquois in summer 1779, Reverend William Rogers wrote of visiting the Wyoming battlefield a 
little more than a year after the battle. He recalled visiting “a spot where fourteen wretched 
creatures [Patriot prisoners] …were…made immediately to sit down in a ring” before a group of 
Native Americans “tomahawk[ed] the poor fellows one after another.” Amazingly, one prisoner 
escaped this heavily guarded execution and reported the occurrence to Colonel Zebulon Butler, 
who later “went to the spot and found the bones of the fourteen lying…in an exact circle.” Butler 
allegedly then related this information to Rogers. Rogers also reported rumors about Esther, 
though he did not explicitly connect her with the incidents at the ring. “It is said Queen Esther, of 
the Six Nations, who was with the enemy, scalped and tomahawked with her own hands in cool 
blood eight or ten persons,” he wrote.27 Another veteran of Sullivan’s expedition, Sergeant 
Nathaniel Webb, provided another written mention of Esther’s purported role from before the 
nineteenth century. On August 30, 1779, Webb claimed to have found “the body of Queen 
Esther, who murdered many of the inhabitants of Wyoming last summer” while destroying 
nearby cornfields in an Indian village.28 While far from conclusive, these journal accounts 
suggest that rumors about Esther existed among some men in Sullivan’s army and that some in 
the valley claimed to have witnessed Esther’s actions. Nonetheless, the veracity of these rumors 
remains questionable at best, since no firsthand written sources place Esther at Wyoming or 
mention the Bloody Rock in July 1778. In the end, the silence of most contemporary 
 
27 Rogers, The Journal of a Brigade Chaplain in the Campaign of 1779 against the Six Nations under Command of 
Major-General John Sullivan, 37, 52-53. This journal was published incompletely in 1797 but received full 
treatment in an 1823 newspaper.  
28 Frederick Cook, Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan Against the Six Nations of 
Indians in 1779: With Records of Centennial Celebrations; Prepared Pursuant to Chapter 361, Laws of the State of 
New York, of 1885 (Auburn, NY: Knapp, Peck & Thomson Printers, 1887), 285-287. This journal was not published 
until the 1850s. According to scholar Amber Laubach, there are no reliable records to date when Esther died. See, 
Laubach, “Queen Esther Montour of the Munsee Delaware,” 56. Two other journals from Sullivan’s expedition 
briefly mention Esther. See Smith, “Queen Esther,” 398. 
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eyewitnesses and the Patriot press about these occurrences speak more loudly than the passing 
references mentioned in these journals.  
 After these 1779 mentions, the story of Esther and the fatal ring did not again enter the 
historical record until 1797 when a Philadelphia magazine printed excerpts from William 
Rogers’s journal. Few evidently took notice. The next reference to Queen Esther appeared some 
twenty-six years later when a few Eastern newspapers again reproduced Roger’s journal, helping 
this rumor reach a slightly wider audience.29 Nevertheless, the story remained relatively 
unknown for much of the 1820s until locals from the Wyoming Valley gave it new life. 
The real emergence of Queen Esther in histories occurred because of developments on 
the local level. In 1829, Israel Skinner, a resident of the Wyoming Valley, became one of the 
first historians to include the legend of Esther in his history. Dedicating a few pages to the battle, 
his verse account of the Revolutionary War provided a description of Esther and the fatal ring:  
A squaw, the Indians did queen Esther call, 
Was set apart to tomahawk them all… 
Fourteen lay dead and scalped upon the ground, 
With feet towards each other, circled round. 
Skinner revealed that he learned about these events from aged residents of the valley, who 
claimed to have escaped and saved themselves “from savage vengeance” back on July 3, 1778. 
Specifically, Skinner cited the testimony of Joseph Elliot and Lebeus Hammon (or Hammond), 
two figures to whom later mid-century historians would commonly return in their own accounts 
and who had evidently told others in the community about their experience.30 Skinner accepted 
 
29 “From the Philadelphia Gazette: Extract from a Journal of a brigade Chaplain, written in the campaign of 1779, 
under Ge. Sullivan,” Salem Gazette (Massachusetts), October 17, 1823, 1. On previous printings of the Chaplain’s 
journal, see Rogers, Journal of a Brigade Chaplain, 5-6. The publisher gives a few brief lines on previous printings, 
noting that the original manuscript remains lost.  
30 Israel Skinner, A History of the Revolutionary War between Great Britain and the United States, in Verse. 
(Binghamton, NY: Collier and Canoll, 1829), 153- 155. Hammond and Elliot’s testimony reached at least a few 
locals, such as James May, who gave a speech at the site of the monument. See, “From the Wyoming Herald: 
Wyoming Massacre,” Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania 10 (July-December 7, 1832): 39-42. 
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their testimony as truth and merely repeated the tale, inaugurating  a pattern that many other 
locals would follow. As with “Brant’s imagined participation in the Battle of Wyoming,” 
according to one scholar, Queen Esther’s story grew as “word of mouth became fact, leaving 
little room for doubt in the minds of locals.”31 
Esther’s legend expanded after 1829, often morphing with successive use and quickly 
jettisoning any evidential mooring. William Campbell’s 1831 history of Tyron County, New 
York, for example, added a new spin on the legend in a brief appendix. Mistaking Esther for her 
sister, Catherine Montour, and offering no sources for his commentary on her, Campbell 
provided a fantastical account of this woman, who “might well be termed a fury.” Instead of 
killing prisoners around a stone, Campbell’s Catherine supposedly slaughtered wounded Patriots 
across the battlefield, “barbarously murdering the wounded who in vain supplicated for their 
lives.”32 William Leete Stone’s 1838 biography of Brant presented a similar story of Catherine 
ranging the battlefield “like a chafed tigress, stimulating the warriors of her adopted race to the 
onslaught.” As with Campbell’s appendix, this mention of Catherine lacked any reference to the 
tale’s origin and failed to mention the Bloody Rock. Unlike Campbell, however, Stone 
recognized that “the story can hardly be credited,” and he labored to disprove it by describing 
Catherine as a woman of dignity and solid upbringing. Coupled with Stone’s effort to dislodge 
this view, the inconsistencies of Esther’s (or in this case Catherine’s) story and the absence of 
sources on her involvement within these two histories suggest that Esther had fully entered the 
 
31 Chad Leslie Anderson, “The Storied Landscape of Iroquoia: History and Memory on the New York Frontier, 
1750–1840” (Ph.D., University of California, Davis, 2012), 107. 
32 Campbell, Annals of Tyron County, 64 [appendix].  
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realm of popular folklore and romance during the 1830s. By 1838, Stone described her as part of 
the “the unwritten history of this battle,” suggesting that her legend had grown considerably.33   
Over the next few years, however, new testimony seemingly emerged as locals began to 
record the remembrances of aged residents and veterans in the Wyoming Valley. In 1839, a local 
committee published and sent Congress summaries of twenty interviews they had conducted 
about Wyoming during the Revolution. Hoping to induce Congress to grant them land in the 
West, the committee sent interviews meant to highlight the suffering and patriotism of the 
valley’s older citizens. The committee’s strategy failed to sway Congress, but the interviews 
recorded valuable firsthand accounts from the period. Three interviews from veterans repeated 
stories about Queen Esther’s legend and the story of the Bloody Rock from Lebeus Hammond 
and Joseph Elliot that Israel Skinner had first referenced in 1829. All three related the escape of 
Patriot soldier Lebeus Hammond from the execution around the ring. Often citing Hammond as 
their chief source of information, these recollections indicate that the initial rumors about the 
fatal ring and Esther probably originated with Hammond sometime after the battle; his 
recollections likely preceded Joseph Elliot’s, which fewer sources mentioned.34  
From Hammond, the rumor likely spread to other veterans, who in turn introduced it into 
the historical record through their testimony more than sixty years after the event.35 As more 
 
33 Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I:339-340. Isaac Chapman’s 1830 history did not mention Queen Esther, perhaps 
because he wrote much of it before the 1820s. Still, it is possible that the local legend existed before the 1820s. 
34 My interpretation differs from Chad Anderson’s, which argues that Elliot primarily spread the myth. While Elliot 
certainly did spread it, I believe the more common mentions of Hammond suggest that he originated it. In several 
recollections, Hammond was the only one to escape, and only one of the three testimonies recorded in 1839 
mentioned Joseph Elliot. Skinner does reference Elliot a few lines before Hammond, but that should not be taken as 
evidence that Elliot started the idea. See Anderson, “The Storied Landscape of Iroquoia,” 104-106. 
35 For interviews and committee’s records, see Hayden, The Massacre of Wyoming, 50-51, 61-63, 75. Of the three 
veterans interviewed, none claimed to have seen the event or Esther firsthand. In their late seventies by the time of 
their interviews, however, two veterans remembered finding “mangled bodies…placed in a circle” as they buried 




mentioned this story, some veterans, such as Colonel Nathan Denison—second in command at 
the battle—and possibly also Joseph Elliot, even seemed to re-remember (or perhaps more 
accurately misremember) the events of July 3 and 4, 1778. Adding Queen Esther to his story, 
Denison “claimed that Esther led the Indians at Wyoming,” despite never mentioning her in his 
official report from late July 1778.36 Giving credence to the idea that local rumor eventually 
morphed into fact, locals accepted much of this testimony for the truth. In spite of the 1839 
committee’s admission “that, in answer to their inquiries of the aged people for information, as 
was inevitable from the great lapse of time, much that was learned from friends…was mixed up 
with what was personally known,” few questioned the validity of these veterans’ recollections.37  
Perhaps since the myth conformed to many residents’ understandings of the battle and the 
Revolution, they chose to accept it. The story’s emphasis on Patriot sacrifice and the horrors of 
Indian savagery would have certainly aligned with many people’s preconceptions, and the myth 
would not have seemed incongruous with other more fictionalized portrayals of the region’s past. 
A desire to honor and record the sacrifices of the Revolutionary generation may have also played 
a role in its widespread acceptance, especially for historians. More interested in transmitting the 
stories and values of the passing Revolutionaries than possibly confronting possible inaccuracies 
in their accounts, many historians failed to challenge the veracity of these recollections and thus 
helped the local rumors of Esther gain staying power in the local community as well as in the 
national imagination.38   
 
36 Anderson, “The Storied Landscape of Iroquoia,” 107-108. Anderson also points out that Blacksnake, a native 
leader, rejected the tales related to Wyoming in an “equally plausible denial” of Dennison’s and other’s testimony. 
For Denison’s original report, see Colonel Nathan Denison to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut, Lower 
Smithfield Township, Pennsylvania, July 28, 1778, in Winsor et. al., Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, 3, no. 2 (October 1887): 342-344. Notably, he does not mention any Native American women.  
37 Hayden, The Massacre of Wyoming, 42.   
38 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 190-195. Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting, 183. Paxton writes that local 
historians sought not to rigorously test the sources but to “transmit for posterity the Revolutionary generation’s 
achievements” (183).  
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Armed with newly recorded testimony, local historians began producing a more 
consistent story about Queen Esther and the fatal ring starting in the 1840s. For instance, 
William Leete Stone, now writing a history on Wyoming in 1840, discarded the story of Esther’s 
battlefield antics. In its place, he wrote of Hammond’s escape, the fatal ring, and Esther around a 
stone—all aspects of an emerging common narrative, which drew from the interviews collected 
by the valley’s 1839 committee. Provided to Stone by Charles Miner, a fellow historian and a 
member of the committee, these interviews began to reshape the historical record just a year after 
their publication. As historians accepted the rumors or simply placed them in their histories, they 
advanced the legend of Esther. To Stone’s credit, even with this testimony, he never wavered in 
rejecting the story, a far cry from other historians of this period. He, nonetheless, still clung to 
the idea that Native Americans tortured Patriots around the bloody rock after the battle and that 
another Indian woman could have been responsible.39 Though far from wholeheartedly endorsing 
the Esther myth, this interpretation gave credence to its general idea, namely that an Indian 
woman massacred several prisoners around a stone after the battle.  
Charles Miner also included the story of Queen Esther when he finally published his own 
work on Wyoming’s history in 1845. In his coverage of the battle, he presented the now standard 
narrative of Hammond’s escape and Esther’s executions, describing her as “a fury in the form of 
a woman, [who] assumed the office of executioner with death maul, or tomahawk.”  Unlike 
Stone, Miner believed in this story’s validity and disputed Stone’s evidence, again allowing his 
negative view of Native Americans to influence his interpretation. Playing a conspicuous role in 
the battle, according to Miner, Esther conducted herself “like a demon.”  Interestingly, his view 
of women and his reading of history also contributed to his rejection of Stone’s argument. 
 
39 Stone, The Poetry and History of Wyoming, iv-viii, 207-208. The preface of the work dates from 1840.  
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“Remember the kindred atrocities perpetrated by women during the French Revolution,” Miner 
wrote in reference to Esther, “it required the purity of angels corrupted to make perfect devils.”40 
Presumably considering proper females as pure and above violence, he interpreted Esther’s 
corruption as a transgression of the normal gender order and further evidence of her demonic 
nature.  
Along with these racial and gendered attitudes, Miner’s extensive use of oral testimony 
and interviews also furthered his acceptance of Queen Esther’s legend. Conducting dozens of 
private interviews, Miner provided a total of forty-five interview summaries in one of his 
appendixes, including one from Joseph Elliot—supposed survivor of the fatal ring. He relied on 
much of this testimony in shaping his interpretation and seems to have taken it largely at face 
value.41 As he cited Hammond and Elliot’s testimony based on his reading of the evidence, 
Miner further legitimized this local legend, and his extensively sourced account increased the 
likelihood that others in the future would take it for the truth. As a result, despite having decried 
falsehoods about Wyoming in his work, Miner unwittingly became just like the Revolutionary 
historians he so vehemently denounced as he forwarded this evocative but almost certainly 
fantastic tale. 
Just like Charles Miner, George Peck accepted dubious historical evidence and allowed 
his biases to shape his 1858 history. Referring to Esther as “the priestess of the hellish orgies of 
‘Bloody Rock,”’ Peck repeated the popular account of her deeds as told by Hammond and Elliot. 
As he did for Brant, Peck again weighed the evidence for this claim about the Battle of 
 
40 Miner, History of Wyoming, 226-232.  
41 Miner, History of Wyoming, iii-xiv. Miner was neither the first nor the last to make use of testimony from 
different survivors of the massacre; Chapman had relied on “the recollection of various individuals” a full fifteen 
years before (3), and Peck cited similar recollections in 1858. See, Chapman, A Sketch of the History of Wyoming, 3, 
and Peck, Wyoming, v-vii. 
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Wyoming, eventually arguing that Esther participated. Several factors influenced his decision. 
For one, he believed the testimony of Elliot and Hammond, whom he considered estimable 
community members. Moreover, Peck allowed his view of Native Americans to inform his 
portrayal. While acknowledging Stone’s point that Esther “had amiable qualities, and a certain 
polish in her manners,” Peck maintained that Esther could not escape the tendencies of her native 
ancestry. For “this ‘half-breed’ woman,” according to Peck, “the sound of the battle and the sight 
of human gore aroused the demon within her,” and “according to the most approved Indian 
forms,” she took “sweet vengeance upon the prisoners which had fallen into her hands.”42  
As with their commentary on Brant, Peck and Miner’s take on Esther sheds light on the 
cultural atmosphere of the mid-nineteenth century, specifically as it relates to Native Americans 
and race. The story of Esther, representing how “Indians could be savages poisoned with rage” 
and resistant towards “inevitable white settlement,” served as an image of the “bad Indian” for 
both these historians and many in the valley—and a woman who had abandoned feminine 
characteristics to boot.43 This image easily helped whites justify their triumph over native people 
as a manifestation of progress over savagery. In addition, the appellation of “half-breed” attached 
to Esther fits within the increasingly racist thinking of the antebellum period. As many white 
Americans believed so-called “half-breeds” acquired the worse traits of both races, Esther’s story 
attested to white arguments for racial separation.44 For Peck, Esther’s atrocities were no surprise 
 
42 Peck, Wyoming, 48, 284-288. See also, Darlene Miller-Lanning, “Dark Legend and Sad Reality: Peck’s Wyoming 
and Civil War,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 65, no. 4 (1998): 441. Miller-Lanning 
defends aspects of Peck’s history and argues for a nuanced understanding of the work. In her view, Peck’s vision of 
local history stressed that the country could re-unify and avoid civil war. She further contends that Peck knew the 
limits of his interpretation and should not be too harshly condemned for advancing racism (especially against 
Indians) and failing to scrutinize some of his sources. While one should recognize Peck’s complexities as laid out by 
Miller-Lanning, his narrative did give some historical fabrications legitimacy and thus more power. Surely, 
historians can rightly criticism him for that.  
43 Anderson, “The Storied Landscape of Iroquoia,” 128-131. For discussion of the “bad Indian,” see Berkhofer, The 
White Man’s Indian, 71-80, 119. 
44 Anderson, “The Storied Landscape of Iroquoia,”107. 
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considering her Indian ancestry, while her white ancestry allowed her to display some semblance 
of manners when necessary—a portrayal where the message is hard to miss.  
These depictions of Esther again point to the interaction between local histories and 
national narratives. Influenced by but also informing national ideas, local stories, in the words of 
Paxton, “did not remain local. They rejoined and influenced national conversations about the 
related subjects of modernity, national unity, and Indian removal.”45 In the hands of Peck and 
Miner, Esther’s story spoke to the need for progress and Indian removal in the valley and 
elsewhere. Using national ideas to shape their community’s understanding of the Revolution, 
these historians framed the story of Esther and the history of the Battle of Wyoming at large to 
meet local purposes. At the same time, read by people across the nation, these histories seemed 
to confirm national narratives about progress and the disappearance of Native Americans by 
showing them at work on this well-known local scene.46 
 While regional historians crafted their narratives to fit local needs and replace baseless 
stories from the Revolutionary era, many of them ultimately gave life to their own 
unsubstantiated legend by writing about Queen Esther. Convinced by their own preconceived 
notions about Native Americans, the pervasive influence of local folklore, and collective 
misremembering by many in the valley community, historians fostered a new legend even as 
they discredited Holt’s exaggerations. Uncritical of their source material, historians at mid-
century fell into practically the same trap as earlier Revolutionary historians. As in the early 
nineteenth century, the misconceptions furthered by history found their way into different media, 
 
45 Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 181.   
46 While local histories, these books informed much of the literature about Wyoming, and they truly interested 
national audiences. National publications, such as Harper’s Weekly, published reviews on Peck’s history, which 
seems to have received more national attention than Miner’s work. See, for example, “Wyoming: Its History, 
Stirring Incidents, and Romantic Adventures. By George Peck, D.D. With Illustrations; 12mo, Muslin; $1.25,” 




such as in literature and on the local commemorative scene. Born from local hearsay and boosted 
by historians, the myth of Queen Esther cast quite the shadow on the Battle of Wyoming’s 
historical remembrance.  
 
Regional Romance, Popular Literature, and Local Commemoration   
While historians kickstarted Queen Esther’s myth, her legend benefitted from other 
cultural forces at work, especially considering the timing of the myth’s development starting in 
the late 1820s and fully blossoming by the 1840s. Several cultural currents contributed to 
Esther’s rise. In a period marked by a rise in regional story-telling and mythmaking across the 
country, Wyoming remained a household name and featured in popular history, literature, and 
travel accounts. The Wyoming Valley particularly attracted those looking for this intersection of 
fantasy and romance, especially since many Americans highly regarded the region for its natural 
beauty, history, and the fictional accounts written about it. On the local scene, more residents 
expressed interest in the Battle of Wyoming’s remembrance, eventually constructing a 
monument and holding commemorative events to honor the sacrifices of the region’s Patriots. 
Highly popular, these events attracted residents and visitors alike. The valley’s history with 
Native Americans additionally brought attention as writers turned to natives for compelling 
characters and to explore issues related to American identity and expansion during this time. 
Easily manipulated for romantic effect, in line with most Americans’ view of their past, and 
capable of speaking to contemporary issues, the Battle of Wyoming was also uniquely well-
suited for mythmaking in the antebellum period, and, as a result, many included it in regional 
folklore, local speeches, and popular fiction. Esther’s myth grew in this fertile environment, 
benefiting from the coalescing of these trends on regional and national levels.  
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Queen Esther’s myth began in local rumor and history but quickly expanded into the 
realm of popular culture. Akin to how early historians of the Revolution spread the first legend 
of the Wyoming Massacre, regional historians and locals’ uncritical acceptance of Esther led 
other kinds of authors to fall prey to these oft-repeated narratives and further the cycle of 
historical distortion. A note at the end of the 1840 short story “Meantonimo,” for instance, 
reveals how the embellishments of local rumor and regional history gained the veneer of 
credibility and spread through popular fiction. Reassuring his readers of the historical accuracy 
of the “hair breath escapes” described in his story about the Battle of Wyoming, this author 
asserted his credibility by claiming that he received all his information “from the lips of an actor 
in the scene who is still living.”47 While the testimony of an aged veteran ostensibly gave the 
story’s depiction credibility, such testimony could err in significant ways as seen above in the 
case of Colonel Dennison’s 1830s testimony or even in Solomon Avery’s deposition just a few 
days after the battle. Nonetheless, this author readily accepted this testimony as true and then 
disseminated it to his readers. While not specifically about Esther, this example shows how many 
authors contributed to the spread of misinformation by uncritically reproducing local legend and 
hearsay.  
While Esther’s myth seems to have its origins in local rumor and regional history, 
literature and the wider cultural atmosphere played an outsized role in the acceptance of Queen 
Esther on a local and national level. In fact, the literary environment of the antebellum period, 
especially with its emphasis on regional storytelling and American themes, partially explains 
 
47 “Meantonimo: A Tale of Wyoming,” Easton Gazette (Maryland), October 10, 1840, 1. A similar process also 
occurred with Esther’s rumor as evidenced by one author who decided to write about Queen Esther after learning 
about it “from the lips of men and women whose parents had escaped with their lives at that terrible time.” See, Ann 
S. Stephens, Mary Derwent, A Tale of Wyoming and Mohawk Valleys in 1778, (Wilkes-Barre: Fowler, Dick & 
Walker, 1908). The book was first published in 1858. 
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why Esther’s legend flourished at this specific time. For instance, emerging during a period “ripe 
for regional romance,” in the words of one scholar, Esther’s myth took form around the same 
time that many Americans writers were crafting fictional or pseudo-historical accounts about 
regions across the United States—including Wyoming itself. Most famously, Washington Irving 
wrote several localized tales for New York, authoring “Rip Van Winkle” and “The Legend of 
Sleepy Hollow.” In both short stories, published around 1820, Irving presented a regional culture 
and infused its history with mythical elements. While Irving largely created fictional legends for 
these places, it seems possible that locals in the Wyoming Valley could have adapted rumors 
about Esther to enhance the romance of their own history.48 This is not to say that locals 
necessarily endorsed falsehoods on purpose, but it does suggest a reason why residents may have 
been more eager to accept (or at least not challenge) the stories about her.  
Starting in 1809, as discussed in Chapter 2, Scottish poet Thomas Campbell set a 
precedent for dramatic fabrication that encouraged other writers to embellish different aspects of 
Wyoming’s history for literary effect. Gertrude of Wyoming, Campbell’s popular poem, took 
several creative liberties, such as the creation of a “noble savage” character, and it provided a 
basic narrative framework that many emulated.49 Over the course of the antebellum period, many 
American authors drew inspiration from Campbell’s poem and Wyoming’s history, and, as a 
result, the valley became a popular setting for poems, novels, and short stories. As one literary 
reviewer remarked in 1830, “as a subject to writers in every department of composition—the 
massacre of Wyoming; and that of the cruel Brandt; and remorseless Butler…are conspicuous 
characters,” worthy of fiction and romance.50 Another reviewer agreed, “the tale of 
 
48 Smith, “Queen Esther,” 400.  
49 See, Campbell, Gertrude of Wyoming. In a way, Campbell’s poem contributed to the entrenchment of both 
legends of the Wyoming Massacre. See also, Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian, 79-80.  
50 “The Betrothed of Wyoming,” Saturday Evening Post 9, no. 483, October 30, 1830, 2.  
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Wyoming…is well-adapted to call forth poetical effects.”51 By 1840, several authors, such as 
Joseph McCoy and James McHenry, had created romantic poems or novels about Wyoming, 
infusing romantic and melodramatic bits of fiction into the region’s history.52 This outflowing of 
literature—from both locals and non-locals alike—only increased with the discovery of Frances 
Slocum, a local woman who had been taken captive by Native American during the 
Revolutionary War and who became known as the “Lost Sister.” Like the Battle of Wyoming, 
Frances’ rediscovery inspired writers to produce emotional works of historical fiction centering 
around the valley’s past.53 As these examples attest, antebellum Americans clearly saw 
Wyoming’s history as especially fruitful for fiction and romance. In fact, perhaps too many 
American authors saw it that way. In 1858, an American literary periodical complained that “two 
or three weeks only have passed, since we [last] had to deal with the Valley of Wyoming.”54 
 
51 “For the Register of Pennsylvania,” Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania 6 (July 1830- January 1831): 202. 
52 See, Joseph McCoy, The Frontier Maid, or, A Tale of Wyoming: A Poem, in Five Cantos (Wilkesbarre: Steuben 
Butler & Samuel Maffet, 1819), and James McHenry, The Betrothed of Wyoming: An Historical Tale (Philadelphia: 
Principal Booksellers, 1830). For a short story example, see “Meantonimo: A Tale of Wyoming,” Easton Gazette 
(Maryland), October 10, 1840, 1. 
53 “Valley of Wyoming—The Lost Sister,” Ladies’ Garland: Devoted to Literature, Amusement, & Instruction, 
December 1, 1839, 150-152. Native American raiders took Frances from her family in the Wyoming Valley in 1778, 
and she was never recovered, despite the desperate searches of her mother and other family members. Frances grew 
up with the Delaware tribe before becoming part of the Miami. In 1837, family members finally reconnected with 
Frances, now an elderly woman who spoke no English. With the help of an identifying childhood scar on her finger, 
the family confirmed Frances’s identity. The family reconnection produced an outpouring of writing immediately 
after the event. Frances’s story appeared in histories of the region as well as contemporary newspapers and 
magazines. See, for example, “A Surviving Captive of the Massacre of Wyoming,” Boston Weekly Magazine, 
November 9, 1839, 78, and Miner, History of Wyoming, 247-251. Referring to Slocum’s discovery, Miner remarked 
that “the sensation produced by this…throughout Wyoming can scarcely be imagined” (251).   
54 “New Books,” The Albion: A Journal of News, Politics, and Literature 36, no. 27 (July 3, 1858): 321. The article 
continued, “here is much of the same ground to be gone over again.” This sentiment was far from new. Twenty-
eight years earlier, another reviewer had similarly argued that an overabundance of authors turned to Wyoming’s 
past in their fiction. According to the reviewer, “the subject…and the location [of Wyoming] have so frequently 
been dwelt upon.” These comments further illustrate how Wyoming’s history was commonly featured in the 
romantic literature of the antebellum period. See “The Betrothed of Wyoming,” The Philadelphia Album and 
Ladies’ Literary Portfolio 4, no. 44 (October 1830): 349.  
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Accustomed to seeing the region through a semi-fictionalized lens, many Americans 
viewed Esther’s myth as just another instance of romance in this storied vale.  One 1850 article 
vividly illustrates this idea. According to the author,  
The imaginary Wyoming differs little from that which has a geographical position 
on the banks of [the] Susquehanna. When the cursory narrator of strange events 
has erred, he has seldom erred by exaggeration. When the poet has indulged in 
fiction, his fiction has been strangely like the truth. They, indeed must have a 
tolerably correct, however imperfect an idea, of Wyoming and its history, who 
have read the romantic story of the Lost Sister, the Legends of Queen Esther, and 
the Bloody Rock, and the sweet lay of the Caledonian bard [Campbell].55   
Arguing that one could glean the proper history of Wyoming from popular fiction and local 
fable, this author shows how the numerous stories based on Wyoming’s Revolutionary history 
prepared the average American to uncritically accept exaggerated narratives. In this atmosphere, 
misinformation could clearly flourish, likely first effecting local and then national audiences.  
Regardless of their role in beginning the legend, locals spread and benefitted from it. As 
Warren Smith has argued, “local writers can hardly be blamed for making the most of Queen 
Esther. The annals of American villages are usually dull enough, and a picturesque villain is a 
godsend.” Esther’s story surely added a new element of interest to the area’s history. As “the 
priestess of mid-night massacre,” Queen Esther essentially became the region’s equivalent to 
Sleepy Hollow’s Headless Horseman, helping residents make their history more exciting and 
attract more visitors.56  
Romantic literature and local boosterism about the region’s history continued unabated 
after the development of this myth, both easily incorporating Esther’s story with the mythos 
surrounding the valley. “Romance, or reality, or both, has made Wyoming the spot where 
Catharine Montour or Queen Esther played the Hecate of the night,” wrote one 1841 traveler, 
 
55 “Wyoming,” The Yale Literary Magazine 15, no. 7 (June 1850): 255. 
56 Smith, “Queen Esther,” 400. 
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giving voice to the how easily Esther fit into preconceived notions of the valley’s regularly 
fictionalized history. Taking locals and regional 
historians at face value, such articles disseminated 
Esther’s legend across the nation and allured tourists 
to come visit the region by accentuating these 
fantastic tales. In fact, as the century wore on the 
“Bloody Rock” became quite the tourist attraction. As 
promotional material from the 1878 centennial 
celebration of the battle declared, “all who are 
interested in the history of the valley have a desire to 
view the scene of savage slaughter” at the Bloody 
Rock.57 The rock also became the focal point of local superstition. According to some, the blood 
of Esther’s victims gave the rock its reddish hue.58 
Again, this was part of a larger trend occurring in Wyoming—tourists came not just for 
Esther but because of the other history and legends associated with Wyoming as well. This 
becomes apparent from the variety of travel articles published about the region, which praised 
Wyoming and described it as a beautiful and historic place to visit. As one author wrote, “The 
bards of the Revolution embalmed it in song, and Campbell’s Gertrude made it classic ground. 
The fame of it has ‘gone out into all the world,’ and no American tourist can be regarded as 
 
57 “Queen Esther’s Rock Decorated: Historic Site of Executions of Battle of Wyoming Survivors Attracts Many,” 
The Wilkes-Barre Record, June 29, 1928, 23, from the collection of the Luzerne County Historical Society. This 
1928 article reprinted material first “printed during the centennial celebration of the Battle of Wyoming” in 1878.   
58 For quote see, Erastus Brooks, “Wyoming Valley: The Susquehannah—Incidents of Travel—The Lost 
Traveller—The Captive Maid,” Southern Literary Messenger 7, no. 7-8 (July/August 1841): 553. For rumors on the 
rock’s color, see “Travels in the Dog Days,” New York Spectator (New York City), November 11, 1839, 4.  
Figure 1: Esther's Rock in the Mid-Nineteenth Century. From 
George Peck, Wyoming: Its History, Stirring Incidents, and 
Romantic Adventures (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 
1858), 284.  
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having completed his task until he shall have visited Wyoming.”59 Making sure to mention the 
exciting historical events of the region, which almost always included the Battle of Wyoming, 
the Lost Sister, and now Queen Esther, travel accounts illustrate how Americans readily bought 
into this local myth and historical fantasy. They also point to the important role literature and 
travel accounts played in spreading regional myths to a national audience.60 One must not forget, 
however, that local promotion and the anecdotes which filled travel narratives originated from 
the region and ultimately served local purposes. To fully understand the legend of Queen Esther 
then, a more detailed look at the regional remembrance of the Battle of Wyoming is warranted.  
 
Developments on the local commemorative scene contributed to this legend’s rise by 
similarly predisposing locals to accept Esther’s story before diffusing it far beyond the region. 
For one, valley residents increasing interest in the battle’s remembrance in the 1830s and 1840s 
partially explains their endorsement of the legend, since this interest almost directly coincided 
with the growth of the myth. A community drive to construct a monument to the battle’s fallen 
best indicates this amplified interest in the battle. While some locals had called for a monument 
in the first decade of the 1800s, momentum for commemorating the battle on the landscape grew 
considerably in the 1830s after a long period of neglect.61 In 1832, locals rediscovered the 
 
59 Z. Paddock, “Wyoming,” Methodist Quarterly Review, October 1858, 587, quoted in Miller-Lanning, “Dark 
Legend and Sad Reality,” 409.  
60 For another example of a travel narrative along with Brooks’ narrative and the New York Spectator, see 
“Wyoming,” The Yale Literary Magazine 15, no. 7 (June 1850): 255. See also, “The Wyoming Valley: Its 
Landmarks and Traditions,” The Knickerbocker Monthly: A National Magazine 61, no. 2 (Feb 1863): 118. 
61 “From the Luzerne Federalist: The Wyoming Massacre,” Portland Gazette (Maine), November 20, 1809, 2. 
Charles Miner led the way in this endeavor. In 1809, he recalled the battle in a highly charged editorial that 
emphasized the slaughter of gallant Patriots at the hands of John Butler, Brant, and his “savage myrmidons.” 
Lamenting that “no testimonial of respect has been paid to the memory of the slain,” Miner expressed his interest in 
raising a monument to remember the sacrifices of the Revolutionary generation who gave their life at the battle. 
Three years later, Miner returned to similar themes in a July 4 oration. As he attempted to galvanize more support 
for his idea, he accentuated the heroism and patriotism of Wyoming’s Revolutionary veterans. Despite their service, 
Miner bemoaned, “their bones were gathered and shame to ourselves, not a single stone is raised to mark the place 
of their deposit.” See, “Address, delivered on the 4th of July: By C. Miner,” Gleaner (Wilkes-Barre, PA), July 17, 
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common grave of many Patriot soldiers, and in 1833 they laid a cornerstone for a monument in 
their honor.62 The project stalled for close to ten years, but the all-female Luzerne Monumental 
Association eventually came to the rescue. Raising funds through dinners, fairs, and other forms 
of fundraising, they succeeded where earlier backers had failed. By October of 1843, contractors 
put the finishing touches on the 62-and-a-half-foot tall marble obelisk, completing the Wyoming 
Monument.63 Overlapping with the desire for regional stories, this uptick in community 
involvement with the battle’s remembrance likely made residents more enthusiastic for stories 
about the event, especially the exciting recollections of Hammond and Elliot. Local interest 
could only benefit Queen Esther’s legend.  
The commemorative events associated with the monument contributed to the diffusion of 
Esther’s myth to the community and then the nation. Commemorative events at the monument 
attracted large crowds, bringing the community together and even receiving national attention. 
The 1833 grave uncovering and cornerstone laying, for example, brought two to three thousand 
 
1812, 1. According to Miner, residents would periodically hold meetings and adopt resolutions “favorable to the 
object” of building a monument in the first decades of the 1800s, but “the people, poor, and indebted for their land, 
were not able to meet the expense.” Miner, History of Wyoming, 71-72 [appendix].   
62 By 1832, an additional problem arose in the effort to build a monument. As George Peck related, “Strange as it 
may seem, the grave of the patriots who fell…was for years wholly lost.” Since farmers had consistently cultivated 
the area, they no longer knew where the grave lay. In 1832, two Democratic clubs sponsored a competition to 
ascertain the location of the bones, and on May 22 of that year Philip Jackson discovered the grave, which held 
eighty-three skeletons. Galvanized by the discovery of these bones, Wyoming residents met at the site of the grave 
the next spring and proceeded to fully uncover the Patriot remains, periodically passing around skulls that showed 
visible signs of scalping or bones which had bullets lodged in them. During this macabre community event, locals 
rededicated themselves to constructing a monument and raised 1200 dollars to that effect. See, Peck, Wyoming, 377; 
“Wyoming Massacre,” Niles’ Weekly Register, July 6, 1833, 312; William Lewis, “The Changing Story and 
Historical Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished manuscript, 2020), provided and cited with 
permission of the author; Payne Pettebone, Account of Monument Association and Memoranda of Various 
Proceedings, manuscript, July 3, 1879, from the collection of the Luzerne County Historical Society. 
63 Later in the 1830s, a local monument committee, desperate for funding, even unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Connecticut legislature to support the monument. On the monument association, see Johnson, Wyoming: A Record 
of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and Massacre, July 3, 1778-July 3, 1878, 330-
342. See also, Pettebone, Account of Monument Association; Peck, Wyoming, 380-384; Miner, History of Wyoming, 
72 [appendix].  
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to the grounds and featured in the Niles Weekly Register, an early national magazine.64 
Especially upon the completion of the monument, commemorative events brought in attendees 
from the surrounding area and beyond. The most noteworthy celebration occurred with the 
centennial in 1878 when several prominent Wilkes-Barre citizens planned a massive two-day 
event that featured processions, pageants, restored forts, artifact displays, fireworks, and even a 
presidential appearance by Rutherford B. Hayes. As one of the largest events in the valley’s 
history up to that point, it attracted over 60,000 people according to some estimates, and it 
featured in newspaper articles from Washington to Philadelphia to Chicago to New Orleans.65  
These types of commemorative events, along with histories, fiction, and local folklore, 
helped solidify Esther’s myth into the public mind. At an 1832 event, for instance, one of the 
speakers mentioned Queen Esther—perhaps for the first time at a public event. Heard by the 
thousands of locals in attendance and reprinted for newspapers, his speech and subsequently his 
discussion of Esther reached valley residents and national citizens alike.66 This process of 
diffusion most conspicuously occurred during the 1878 event where Esther’s myth featured 
prevalently. In fact, the first day processional ended at the Bloody Rock, and the keynote speaker 
used “the account of the horrible orgies at what has since been known as Queen Esther’s Bloody 
Rock…[to] close out” his description of the battle.67 Promotional material further capitalized on 
 
64 “Wyoming Massacre,” Niles’ Weekly Register, July 6, 1833, 312, and “The Wyoming Massacre Monument,” 
Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania 12 (July-December 1833): 33-36. 
65 “Massacred Martyrs: Dark Deeds of the British and Savages of Wyoming,” Washington Post, July 4, 1878, 1. 
“The Massacre Memorial: Centenary of the Wyoming Butchery—Programme of the Celebration, and Sketch of the 
Tragedy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 3, 1878, 6. “Wyoming, Second Day’s Proceeding Commemorating the Battle 
and Massacre,” Daily Inter Ocean (Chicago), July 5, 1878, 3. “The Fourth,” New Orleans Times, July 5, 1878, 1.   
66 “Wyoming Massacre,” Niles’ Weekly Register, July 6, 1833, 312, and “From the Wyoming Herald: Wyoming 
Massacre,” Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania 10 (July-December 7, 1832): 39-42. This speech was given by James 
May to a large group gathered to pay respect to the memory of the fallen at the Battle of Wyoming.   
67 Steuben Jenkins, Historical Address at the Wyoming Monument, 3d of July, 1878, on the 100th Anniversary of the 
Battle and Massacre of Wyoming, (Wilkes-Barre: Robert Baur, 1878), 50. Steuben Jenkins, a leading citizen in 
Wilkes-Barre, was one of the chief planners for the hundredth anniversary celebration.  
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the public’s interest and often directed visitors to the Bloody Rock.68 Assisting the spread of 
Queen Esther’s myth to locals and visitors in attendance, these commemorative events ensured 
the legend’s diffusion to a wider audience. 
These events did not simply utilize the interesting history and romance of Esther’s myth 
or the Battle of Wyoming to attract visitors, however. Instead, as with regional history, certain 
memories of the battle—and eventually Queen Esther—allowed locals to make sense of their 
present and connect it with national narratives. Serving as the focal point for commemorating the 
battle, the monument and the events centered around it illustrate how the local community 
looked to the battle to define their identity as valley residents and Americans. Many supporters 
of the Wyoming Monument, for example, envisioned it as a sacred space for the expression of 
what Edward Linenthal calls “patriotic orthodoxy.” “Designed to ensure continued allegiance” to 
the values of a “heroic past,” patriotic orthodoxy, according to Linenthal, warns against “falling 
away from the ideals of cultural heroes who died in battle.” Throughout many wars, Americans 
have employed battlefield monuments to convey this idea and influence the values of the 
present.69 Several Wyoming residents seem to have understood that with both their permanence 
and prominence on the landscape battlefield monuments can uniquely shape historical 
remembrance and perpetuate a version of patriotic orthodoxy.  
Beginning with Charles Miner, many residents looked to the Wyoming Monument to 
properly enshrine the region’s past and pass down the Revolutionary generation’s values to 
succeeding generations. With an eye toward the future, Miner argued in 1809 that the monument 
would please not just “our old men” but instill pride in the past for “our young men” who “shall 
 
68 D. Davidsburg, Pittston Gazette Centennial Hand-Book, 1778-1878: One Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle 
and Massacre of Wyoming, July 3 and 4, 1878 (Pittston, PA: Gazette Print, 1878), 33-34. 
69 Edward Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields, 2nd edition (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1993), 1-5.  
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gather round the tomb—reflect on the virtues of their fathers…[and] as at the altar—shall swear 
a new devotion to liberty, and new fealty to their country.”70 Chester Butler, grandson of 
Zebulon Butler, echoed Miner’s sentiment at the monument in 1833. He declared, “this [the 
monument] shall be the shrine to which children yet unborn will be led, while they learn from 
maternal lips the first lesson of patriotism.”71 Supporters of the monument clearly grasped that a 
proper memorial to the Wyoming dead could provide inspiration to shape the region’s future and 
ensure that no one would forget the ideals of the Revolution.  
 
 
70 “From the Luzerne Federalist: The Wyoming Massacre,” Portland Gazette (Maine), November 20, 1809, 2.  
71 “The Wyoming Massacre Monument,” Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania 12 (July-December 1833): 33-36. 
Figure 2: Photograph of the Wyoming Monument. Created by C.F. Cook, from Wesley Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year 





Connecting local events with national mythology about the Revolution, locals understood 
that the monument could help maintain patriotic orthodoxy in a uniquely material way. This 
connection becomes most apparent through the monument’s full inscription:   
Near this spot was fought 
On the afternoon of Friday, the third day of July 1778, 
THE BATTLE OF WYOMING  
In which a small band of patriotic Americans 
Chiefly the undisciplined, the youthful, and the aged,  
Spared, by inefficiency, from the distant ranks of the republic,  
Led by Col. Zebulon Butler, and Col. Nathan Denison,  
With a courage that deserved success,  
Fearlessly met and bravely fought,  
A combined British, Tory, and Indian force  
Of thrice their number.  
Numerical superiority alone gave success to the invader, 
 And wide-spread havoc, desolation and ruin  
Marked his savage and bloody footsteps through the valley.  
 
THIS MONUMENT 
Commemorative of these events, 
 And in memory of the actors in them, 
 Has been erected  
OVER THE BONES OF THE SLAIN 
By their descendants and others who gratefully appreciated  
The services and sacrifices of their patriot ancestors. 
 
Giving a succinct history lesson that stressed Patriot virtue and bravery, highlighted the “savage” 
ways of the enemy, and demonstrated the gratitude of modern residents, this epitaph quite 
literally set in stone this patriotic interpretation of the battle. A visual testament to Revolutionary 
sacrifice and bravery, this monument to Wyoming’s memory would remind succeeding 
generations of the costs of liberty and independence both in the past and in the present. As one 
speaker declared at the 1878 celebration, “never did lofty column rest upon the bones of braver 
or more patriotic men whose names are carved upon its tablets. It is the monument of our Bunker 
Hill…The hundred thousand people who today are residents of the Wyoming Valley claim this 
monument, and the glories which cluster around it, as their common property, and their joint 
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inheritance.”72 Showcasing local contributions to the Revolution, this monument allowed locals 
to look to their regional (and national) past with pride. 
Along with connecting regional history with the nation’s Revolutionary mythology, 
locals used the commemorative space provided by the monument to reaffirm the community’s 
values and connect their history with other national narratives. For example, in an 1833 speech, 
Chester Butler used the Battle of Wyoming to articulate a vision of American identity and defend 
his ancestor’s actions. Extolling the region’s sturdy pioneer ancestors for escaping the “vices 
or…follies of the old world” and representing the virtues of the New World, he presented the 
settlers of the Wyoming Valley as the best of American civilization—conveniently forgetting the 
violent clashes between Pennamite and Yankee settlers that had plagued the valley for decades. 
With this positive depiction cemented in his mind, Chester could easily justify white conquest of 
the valley. “Unlike many who first invaded the secluded retreats of the natives of the forest,” 
Chester remarked, “it was by honorable purchase, and not by force or fraud that our ancestors 
sought to possess themselves of the country. Unwilling to endure oppression themselves, they 
could not practice it against others.” While largely inaccurate, Chester’s reasoning provided a 
comforting narrative that minimized white complicity in one of the community’s darker 
moments.73 Just one example of how locals could take meaning from the battle and apply it to 
present realities, Chester Butler’s speech reveals how commemoration, much like regional 
history, used the memory of the Battle of Wyoming for local purposes—and how those purposes 
were often undergirded via connections to larger national ideas. 
 
72 Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and 
Massacre, July 3, 1778-July 3, 1878, 117-118. This quote comes from Colonel Wright’s speech at the 1878 
centennial. 
73 “The Wyoming Massacre Monument,” Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania 12 (July-December 1833): 33-36. 
Drawing a direct line between the sacrifice of the Patriots of 1778 and the “happy husbandry and avocations of 
civilized industry” that now marked the valley, Chester also praised the current civilized state of the valley. 
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Queen Esther’s myth helped locals further cultivate a regional identity from the Battle of 
Wyoming. Adding the Bloody Rock and Esther’s executions to the typical narrative of the battle, 
residents could use her to accentuate different aspects of the story depending on what message 
they hoped to get across. For example, one orator in 1878 used Queen Esther to highlight the 
“barbaric deeds” of Loyalists and Native Americans and to show how Patriots suffered. 
Presenting the modern day as an achievement made possible by the sacrifices of these suffering 
Patriots, the orator also utilized Esther to present a contrast between the past and present that 
ultimately supported his vision of progress.74 The legend additionally reinforced the common 
portrayal of the battle—practically identical to the one inscribed on the monument—that brave 
Patriot soldiers fought against a wicked enemy. Merely confirming what locals already claimed 
to know, the addition of Queen Esther proved that the Loyalist and Native American forces who 
attacked their region in 1778 were savage, merciless invaders. Such depictions of the enemy 
ultimately allowed locals to paint their ancestors as both victims and heroes. The Patriots of 
1778, in their eyes, valiantly suffered the full wrath of savage raiders, capable of all the horrors 
of the Bloody Rock, and died so “that we might be free,” prosperous, and in control of the 
valley.75 In this sense, local commemorative events so frequently employed Queen Esther’s 
legend because it aligned so well with the regional and national narratives of progress, Indian 
removal, and patriotism to which they already subscribed. Able to speak to local concerns, 
Esther’s myth proved equally applicable to national ones.  
 
 
74 Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and 
Massacre, July 3, 1778-July 3, 1878, 210. This quote comes from Reverend W.M.P Abbott’s speech on July 3, 
1878. 
75 Jenkins, Historical Address at the Wyoming Monument, 76. This line originated in the poem “Battle of Wyoming” 
by Steuben Jenkins.   
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Nineteenth-century Americans’ penchant for stories about native people also fed into the 
outpouring of popular stories about Wyoming and the eventual emergence of Esther on the 
national scene. In the first half of the century, the reading public eagerly consumed numerous 
stories related to Native Americans, such as James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales. 
For Romantic fiction and regional folklore alike, Native Americans were indeed the perfect 
characters. Lurking in the wild and dark forests of the frontier, the strange and violent customs of 
Indians added to the evocative power of these stories, and natives’ perceived “vanishing” at the 
end of many of these tales enhanced the emotional effects that authors wished to elicit.76 
Possessing a dark history with natives and a picturesque and wild environment, Wyoming thus 
offered Romantic authors and local boosters with a readymade formula for compelling fiction 
and interesting anecdotes. Queen Esther merely enhanced Wyoming’s allure to authors, and it 
provided local promoters with another shocking Indian character capable of appealing to the 
public’s voracious appetite for stories featuring Native Americans. 
The fantastical and romantic elements of native characters, however, do not totally 
explain the obsession that antebellum Americans displayed for literature featuring Native 
Americans, Wyoming, and later Esther. Rather, like locals who used the Battle of Wyoming to 
craft a regional identity, more literary minded authors hoped to use natives to forge a distinct 
national literary style. As part of this, many writers turned to native people to highlight what they 
saw as uniquely American themes, commonly presenting Indians “as metaphors in the struggle 
between savagery and civilization.” Through this literary exploration, according to Robert 
Berkhofer, authors grappled with one of the chief paradoxes of nineteenth century American 
identity: the struggle to find a balance between European civilization and the regenerative yet 
 
76 Berkhofer, White Man’s Indian, 87-89.  
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potentially savage nature of the American wilderness.77 These authors also wrestled with 
conflicting ideas about American Indians as they sought to explain and defend the triumph of 
white civilization in their present. In the view of scholar Roy Harvey Pearce, Americans 
eventually justified their conquest of native people by altering or contesting the idea of the 
“noble savage,” a stock literary character that stood outside of and uncorrupted by the vices of 
civilization. American literary works slowly transformed this idea “replacing it with the 
conception of a savage in whom nobility was one with ignobility” or by simply discarding the 
idea of Indian nobility all together. Still others made the noble savage “a prehistorical culture 
hero” in order “to save history, or at least modern history, for his own civilization.” Presenting 
Native American history as equivalent to North America’s childhood, authors sentimentalized 
the Indian of the past while also arguing that their disappearance ultimately benefitted the whole, 
since it brought on the United States’ adulthood—understood as white civilization.78   
As a familiar and dramatic frontier battle with conspicuous (if not actually present) 
Indian villains, the Battle of Wyoming provided authors with the elements to craft a narrative 
that could articulate a new national style and grapple with these issues. For example, one literary 
critic lauded Jacob McCoy’s 1819 epic poem, The Frontier Maid, or, A Tale of Wyoming, for 
contributing to the nation’s incipient literary scene. The 1820 reviewer wrote, “at a time when 
the citizens of the United States are actively endeavoring to absolve themselves from a 
dependence on foreign artists…, it is truly gratifying to behold the literati of the country joining 
in the march, and conducting the rising muses, clad in ‘American Scenes and incidents,’ to the 
 
77 Berkhofer, White Man’s Indian, 86-87, 91-96. See also, Deloria, Playing Indian, 73-90. According to Deloria, 
some white authors hoped to tap into Native Americans as muses for American identity.  
78 Roy Harvey Pearce, "The Virtues of Nature: The Image in Drama and Poetry," in Savagism and Civilization: A 
Study of the Indian and the American Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): 169-195, quoted in 
Literature Criticism from 1400 to 1800, ed. Michael L. LaBlanc, vol. 79 (Detroit, MI: Gale, 2002), Gale Literature 
Resource Center (accessed February 12, 2021).  
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grateful land of independence.” 79 Self-conscious in his use of American history, McCoy, like 
other American authors, turned to the Battle of Wyoming to show that the new nation’s history 
could provide proper material for high literary forms. A local poet from the Wyoming Valley, 
McCoy also used the poem to speak to both the region’s and nation’s Revolutionary experience. 
His poem revealingly, according to Pearce, “center[ed] on the attack of British-maddened 
Indians on idyllic frontier farmers.” Playing up the contrast between the peaceful white settlers 
and savage Indians, the poem spoke to the related themes of progress, civilization, and savagery, 
ultimately helping to justify the displacement of Native Americans in favor of supposedly 
peaceable whites.80  In coming decades, other literature about the Battle of Wyoming also helped 
Americans reaffirm the nation’s independence and its expansion.81 Both aesthetically and 
thematically, the battle represented an authentically American story that some believed could 
help explore the nation’s character and defend its conduct.  
Like other elements of the Battle of the Wyoming, Esther’s story met the needs of 
American authors during this period. Used to exploring larger themes through Wyoming’s 
history, many authors subsumed Queen Esther into the wider mythos surrounding the battle and 
started including her in their fiction, spreading the legend even further. In an 1854 short story, 
 
79 “For the Record: Remarks on the ‘Frontier Maid,’” Village Record (West Chester, PA), February 23, 1820, 4.  
80 Pearce, “The Virtues of Nature.”  
81 For example, “Meantonimo,” a short story written in 1840, focused more on native actors but still justified 
American conduct and eventual victory over the Indians. For one, the story accentuated native cruelty by portraying 
Brant as a malicious monster who even kills a woman of his own race—albeit unintentionally. This depiction of a 
“bad Indian” implied that Indians were more viscous and less deserving of the land than the white narrator, a Patriot 
veteran of the battle. The fate of the “good Indian” in the story, a beautiful woman named Meantonimo who shared a 
romantic bond with the narrator, furthers this message. Sacrificing herself to Brant’s knife to protect the narrator, the 
“noble hearted Meantonimo” gave her life because this white soldier had shown her kindness. Her death not only 
provides the story’s dramatic climax, but it helps exonerate the Patriot soldier and by extension his cause for the 
eventual conquest and removal of natives. The reasoning goes that if Meantonimo willingly gave her life for this 
man, he and his nation must have been worthy of her sacrifice. Moreover, the narrator’s kindness to Meantonimo 
effectively hides his complicity in her people’s eventual demise and suggests that he was not personally responsible. 
Like the “vanishing” Indian trope, Meantonimo’s death endorsed the triumph of white civilization while mourning 
the loss of some natives. See, “Meantonimo: A Tale of Wyoming,” Easton Gazette (Maryland), October 10, 1840, 1. 
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for instance, the executions of Esther provided the author with a thrilling scene and an evil 
villain—a “weird and horrible-looking squaw.” The suspenseful scene, replete with descriptions 
of Esther as “the female monster” or “the crimson queen,” ultimately ended when the protagonist 
escaped by killing Esther and evading “the savage actors” who had assisted in her bloody work. 
An 1858 novel, Mary Derwent, similarly included scenes of Esther as a savage Indian intent on 
brutally killing whites, taking no prisoners, and urging her followers to commit atrocities.82 
While these authors likely included Esther for dramatic reasons, their depictions, nonetheless, 
give voice to certain cultural attitudes and narratives prevalent at the time. Indeed, both these 
stories did the same cultural work as the Frontier Maid and regional histories in that they 
touched on themes of savagery, progress, and settlement. Most noticeably, these works 
dehumanized Esther and other Native Americans as savage, bloodthirsty monsters, which made 
it easier to justify their expulsion and defend past actions against them. By defending retribution 
in the past, these authors justified the present reality of white settler control while also 
legitimizing violence against natives in the present. The legend of Queen Esther, just like other 
accounts of Wyoming’s history, helped justify backcountry violence and reinforce the legitimacy 
of the United States’ claims to native land.  
These stories shaped ideas about American identity as well. This becomes most apparent 
when comparing the depictions of whites and most Native American characters in such stories. 
Overwhelmingly, whites appear much more favorably, and they are practically always the 
protagonists. Mary Derwent’s title character serves as a prime example. Described as a “lovely 
and unselfish character” by one reviewer, Derwent purposefully stands out from the bloodthirsty 
 
82 J.H Robinson, “The Royal Greens:--Or, The—Scout of the Susquehanna: A Tale of Wyoming,” Flag of Our 
Union 9 (June 3, 1854): 22. Stephens, Mary Derwent, 209-215, 385.  
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Esther.83 Such depictions of virtuous white characters seem to suggest that white settlers had 
successfully struck a balance between the good qualities of European and American life. 
Unsullied by the extreme vices of civilization or the savagery of natives, these characters 
represented an American ideal. Native American villains, such as Queen Esther, served to 
highlight this ideal through noticeable contrast, vividly displaying the one extreme of 
unrestrained savagery in the process. Clearly, Esther’s story attracted authors not just for its 
romance but for its ability to speak to American themes and identity.  
As the antebellum period progressed and eventually gave way to the Gilded Age, the 
eccentric Queen Esther easily took place alongside more established villains of Wyoming’s 
history and legend, and her fantastically bloody execution scene attracted attention across the 
nation. Originating from within the region, Esther’s legend became accepted on the local level in 
part because of Wyoming’s long history of fabrication and fantasy, the antebellum push for 
literature about American locales, and the local commemorative furor of the mid-nineteenth 
century. The legend than spread through media that accepted local’s testimony or took regional 
historians at their word. Fiction and tourist promotion alike capitalized on Esther’s story, adding 
her to attract readers or visitors and occasionally using her to connect to national arguments 
about Native Americans or American identity. Just like regional historians, those that utilized the 
Battle of Wyoming and Queen Esther in their fiction, their travel narratives, or their celebrations 
show how antebellum culture influenced the memory of the Battle of Wyoming and the telling of 




83 “New Books,” The Albion: A Journal of News, Politics, and Literature 36, no. 27 (July 3, 1858): 321. 
Tharp 136 
 
From its humble origins in Revolutionary rumor and the testimony of two aged veterans, 
Queen Esther’s legend grew tremendously over the course of the antebellum period. By the late 
1850s and especially by 1878, Esther’s myth had become an integral part of the Battle of 
Wyoming’s public memory, even more so than the original legend of the Wyoming Massacre. 
Indeed, as regional historians began to banish this first legend of the Wyoming Massacre—born 
from the unverified claims of Holt and Avery—to the dustbin of history, they paved the way for 
the equally sensational story of Queen Esther to take its place. This new story replaced the old 
but still provided a way for Americans to take meaning from the battle. For local historians and 
speakers, Esther’s myth could help them extoll progress, justify the removal of Native 
Americans, or highlight the patriotic devotion of valley residents. Just as importantly, Esther’s 
fantastical story attracted visitors by contributing to the region’s romantic allure. On the national 
scene, authors and travel writers turned to Wyoming and Esther for similar reasons. Looking for 
interesting events, exotic Indian characters, and a way to discuss American issues, these writers 
utilized Esther for their own purposes, introducing her to readers far and wide.  
Diffusing via regional history, travel literature, popular fiction, and local promotion, 
Esther’s myth originated within the community before reaching Americans across the country. 
The process by which the legend emerged, however, is no simple narrative of transmission from 
a locality to the nation. Instead, the process of diffusion—as seen above—reveals how local and 
national trends often overlapped and interacted. For one, the process that led to this myth’s wide 
acceptance in the community complicates the narrative. Local developments, of course, 
influenced the acceptance of Queen Esther’s story, especially the increasing interest in 
commemoration and the desire to record the sacrifices of the valley’s Revolutionary veterans. 
National trends, however, played an equally important role. In this, the national desire for 
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regional romance and the propensity to fictionalize aspects of Wyoming’s history for literary 
effect created an environment where locals were more likely to accept Esther’s legend. Since the 
atmosphere of romance and fantasy surrounding the valley contributed to the myth’s acceptance, 
national trends and writings clearly disposed locals first to believe Esther’s myth and then spread 
it. The multiple meanings that residents and other Americans took from Esther similarly attests 
to this overlap between regional and national narratives. On the one hand, valley residents 
worked hard to connect the local history of 
Wyoming to national values and narratives, yet, on 
the other, American writers tried fashion a more 
national identity by referencing these regional 
events. No simple narrative of transmission seems 
to apply in these cases, and neither local nor 
national trends necessarily influenced the memory 
of the Battle of Wyoming more than the other. 
Rather, the development of Queen Esther’s legend 
suggests that one cannot fully understand the 
remembrance of this battle without reference to 
both.  
The confluence of both regional and 
national ideas that helped birth Esther’s myth, 
eventually led to her ascendancy in the public 
memory of the battle. By 1878, one promotional handbook could write that “none of the tragic 
events connected with the struggle of July 3, 1778 retains a stronger hold on the popular mind 
Figure 3: Howard Pyle's Painting of Queen Esther. From Scribner’s 
Magazine 31 (April 1902): 413. 
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than the treacherous and brutal murder[s]” of Queen Esther.84 Indeed, as the nineteenth century 
progressed, Esther increasing became the story of the Battle of Wyoming as one well-meaning 
historian’s comments reveal. Rejecting the “monstrous falsehoods…published concerning the 
battle and the massacre” in its immediate aftermath, this 1878 historian went on to mistakenly 
argue that Esther’s “unlawful, wicked, cruel, and brutal murder of prisoners captured after the 
battle…has given to history and posterity the name, ‘Wyoming Massacre.’”85 While mistaken, 
his remarks certainly illustrate how Esther’s legend would effectively replace the earlier myth 
and continue to wreak havoc on the public’s understanding of the event.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Esther’s myth undoubtedly reigned. Painted by 
the popular illustrator Howard Pyle at the turn of the century, Queen Esther’s hideous image 
became chiefly associated with the battle, so much so that the official souvenir booklet for the 
1928 sesquicentennial celebration included it on its cover. Esther’s story was everywhere in 
1928, especially inside the booklet where an article told the history of Esther, “the wickedest 
woman in American history,” and included a short story about her. Tapping into an early 
twentieth century fascination with Indians and the tropes commonly associated with dime novels, 
this short story presented “in the form of stirring fiction the perils and privations of the hardy 
pioneers of the Wyoming Valley and the sinister character of wicked Queen Esther.”86 Though 
decades removed, Esther’s myth remained potent, appealing to early twentieth century 
 
84 Davidsburg, Pittston Gazette Centennial Hand-Book, 1778-1878, 33-34. 
85 Hakes, Wyoming: Synopsis of the Battle and Massacre for the Information of the People. 
86 Catherine McNelis and Hugh Weir, Official Souvenir: Sesqui-Centennial of the Battle of Wyoming 1778-1928 
(Wilkes-Barre: McNelis and Weir, 1928), from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society, box 4, 
shelf 15. Locals even printed 100,000 copies of Pyle’s painting to distribute during the event. See, “Famous Painting 
to Be Exhibited,” Wilkes-Barre Record, June 24-28, 1928, from the collections of Luzerne County Historical 
Society, box 4, shelf 15. Article found within the Notebook Containing Clippings on Celebrations, pp. 99.  
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Americans in much the same way it had originally enthralled their antebellum predecessors. Like 
Holt’s 1778 fabrication, this legend aged well.87  
Perhaps too well. In 1962, locals “partially absolved Queen Esther of killings at 
Wyoming in 1778,” changing the wording on a historic sign at the site of the Bloody Rock to 
reflect their uncertainty as to the identity of the Indian woman responsible 88 This changed 
wording, though a step in the right direction, ultimately still affirmed the myth’s essence. Late 
twentieth-century locals may have challenged certain details of the legend, but they still believed 
that an Indian woman had massacred Patriots around the Bloody Rock.  
This much maligned woman—alternatively called a Hecate, a fury, a monster, and a 
demon incarnate for more than a century—lived on in popular remembrance of the Battle of 
Wyoming, whether as Queen Esther or as a more anonymous Native American woman.  
Her legend endures even today.   
 
 
87 Even in 1959, textbook companies sent letters to the Wilkes-Barre and Luzerne community to ascertain the 
truthfulness of Queen Esther’s legend. See, Muriel Bisbee to Luzerne County Chamber of Commerce, February 2, 
1959, from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society, Queen Esther Vertical File.  
88 “Wording is Changed: Queen Esther Partially Absolved of Killings at Wyoming in 1778,” Times-Leader (Wilkes-
Barre, PA), September 23, 1962, from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society, Queen Esther 
Vertical File.  
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While the remembrance of the Battle of Wyoming eventually faded on the national level, 
it remained robust in the late nineteenth century. Remembered through a large celebration in 
1878 and remaining a popular historical and literary topic, Wyoming was not in danger of being 
forgotten. Rather, many Americans still referenced the battle to explain or make sense of their 
present until at least the 1930s. Although Americans in the period between 1878 and the first 
decades of the twentieth century often relied on similar references to progress, Indian removal, or 
patriotism when discussing Wyoming, they still modified their interpretations to reflect the 
concerns of the Gilded Age or the early twentieth century. Once again, the changing perceptions 
of the battle reflected larger societal trends. The battle’s remembrance, however, gradually faded 
from the national scene and lost its place within the nation’s Revolutionary mythology. By the 
mid-twentieth century, Wyoming had become increasingly obscure. 
 The 1878 centennial celebration marked a high point in the battle’s memory. Attracting 
tens of thousands of visitors to the valley and garnering national publicity, the event proved 
wildly successful, and the attention it garnered indicates its familiarity to many.1 While some 
came to the celebrations for costumed pageants, fireworks, parades, and musical performances, 
others earnestly sought to commemorate this well-known Revolutionary battle.2 Bringing people 
together to celebrate and remember the sacrifices of those who had died during the battle, this 
massive event further enshrined a patriotic vision of American history that placed Wyoming at 
its center. “This is no empty and unmeaning pageant,” asserted one 1878 speaker, “it is an 
 
1 Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 30-46. 
2 Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 35-45. Regardless of their own personal motives, 
Americans who attended these commemorations would still have come away with a certain view of the past as the 
activities at these events often featured patriotic history lessons as part of their appeal. 
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electric cord that binds the living to the dead.”3 Ultimately, such pageantry helped the battle 
retain importance in the nation’s cultural and political atmosphere.  
To connect Wyoming with larger Revolutionary and cultural narratives, later nineteenth-
century Americans relied on much of the same rhetoric in use earlier in the century. Like 
previous generations, these later Americans presented the brave Patriot defenders of Wyoming as 
models to emulate or commemorated their sacrifice in creating a better nation. For instance, local 
leader Steuben Jenkins’s keynote address in 1878 connected Revolutionary sacrifices with 
modern freedoms and the country’s current greatness. According to him, “the nation they [the 
Wyoming veterans] fought and sacrificed and died to establish, is great and mighty, the home of 
freemen, the abode of liberty.”4 Far from a new sentiment, this patriotic interpretation of 
sacrifice and devotion could have easily aligned with those of Revolutionary Patriots, early 
nineteenth century Democratic-Republicans, or local speakers at the Wyoming Monument in the 
1830s or 1840s. Mentions of Native Americans and the settling of America also proved long-
lasting. Many Gilded Age Americans, including President Rutherford B. Hayes in his brief 
remarks at the 1878 event, referenced Wyoming to articulate ideas about ongoing Native 
American policy and progress, much like earlier antebellum writers and speakers.5 Whatever 
their purpose, references to Wyoming in the late nineteenth century followed patterns akin to the 
ones first laid out in the century between the battle and the 1878 commemoration.  
 
3 Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and Massacre, 
113. The speaker was Colonel Wright.  
4 Jenkins, Historical Address at the Wyoming Monument, 65-67, 75. In a poem he also performed during the 
festivities, he similarly explicated the lesson the battle “taught posterity: ‘Tis sweet and glorious to die/ For country, 
home, and liberty” (75). Another prominent attendee agreed, revealing comparing “the name of ‘Wyoming’” with 
Thermopylae, arguing that it acted as “a synonym for desperate valor and a patriotic devotion to the cause of country 
with us as Spartan valor was regarded as the highest type among the Greeks of old.” See, Johnson, Wyoming: A 
Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and Massacre, 25-26. 
5 For summary of Haye’s remarks, see “Wyoming’s Martyrs: Second Day’s Celebration of the Massacre,” 
Washington Post, July 5, 1878, 1.  
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Of course, those who used Wyoming’s memory in the years between 1878 and the early 
1900s did so with an eye towards influencing their present, and they were likewise affected by 
societal trends at work in this period. Hayes’s speech in 1878, for instance, reflected some of his 
era’s chief concerns, such as westward expansion and Native American policy, and was 
influenced by prevailing ideas about race and civilization. Comparing the settlement of the 
Wyoming Valley with current expansion into Idaho, Arizona, and Colorado, Hayes argued “that 
the settlers of Western frontier were undergoing the same trials to-day that beset those pioneers 
of Wyoming a century ago.” In Hayes’s speech, these settlers—supposedly bringing civilization 
out of the savage wilderness—signified progress and spoke to white America’s superior moral 
character. The settlers’ example also furnished Hayes with lessons about current policies related 
to Native Americans. In his interpretation of Wyoming’s history, Hayes asserted that the 
pioneers of Wyoming, while ready to go to war if necessary, had engaged with Native 
Americans “in good faith” and that the modern nation should follow their example. Connecting 
the national narrative of westward expansion to Wyoming’s history, Hayes’s speech mirrored the 
work of antebellum historians and speakers in that he drew on this regional history to discuss 
national occurrences. Nonetheless, his utilization of the battle’s memory reinterpreted the event 
in light of current circumstances.6 Despite a changing cultural and political atmosphere, Hayes’s 
speech shows how Wyoming’s memory remained adaptable enough to stay culturally relevant in 
the final decades of the nineteenth century.  
For more than one hundred years, Wyoming’s memory stayed powerful in the American 
imagination. As we have seen, narratives about the Wyoming Massacre fueled pro-Patriot 
 
6 “Wyoming’s Martyrs: Second Day’s Celebration of the Massacre,” Washington Post, July 5, 1878, 1. See also, 




sentiment during the Revolution, anti-Indian rhetoric after the war, and reinvigorated American 
nationalism during the War of 1812. The addition of the Queen Esther story provided new ways 
for later nineteenth century Americans to adapt the battle’s remembrance to their changing 
circumstances. Utilized in a myriad of ways, narratives about the battle and Queen Esther 
supported diverse objectives—from justifying Indian removal to enhancing the romantic appeal 
of popular literature in the mid-nineteenth century. Americans took so many meanings from the 
Battle of Wyoming because its stories were capable of speaking to a variety of anxieties and 
contradictions within American culture and politics in the century between 1778 and 1878. Most 
notably, Americans readily connected with narratives about Wyoming because many still used 
the British, Loyalists (or those accused of aiding America’s enemies), and Native Americans as 
reference points in the search for American identity. Whether working to distinguish themselves 
from the British during the Revolution or seeking to justify white possession of the valley in the 
antebellum period, Americans relied on narratives about the Battle of Wyoming to understand 
themselves and their place in the world.  
The world that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans inhabited, however, 
changed rapidly during the twentieth century. New concerns and political struggles increasingly 
overshadowed the battle’s memory, leading to a slow decline in the battle’s importance to 
national audiences. Though it received some attention in literature during the first half of the 
1900s, remembering the Battle of Wyoming became an almost exclusively regional affair in the 
large Wilkes-Barre area starting in the twentieth century.7 The battle became replaced by more 
 
7 Even after the closing of the frontier around the turn of the century, Americans still occasionally recalled the 
memory of this frontier battle even as it began to fade from national consciousness. Much like their antebellum 
counterparts, some writers returned to Wyoming because it could interest American readers, who continued to 
devour stories about the frontier and Anglo-Indian conflict.  Reflecting the staying power of ideas about westward 
expansion that became popular in the 1890s and early 1900s, some even reinterpreted this complex Revolutionary 
conflict as a simple battle between pioneers and Native Americans—an image that fit within the prevailing notion of 
westward expansion at the time. The stock image of savage Indians attacking upright frontier families became 
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recent events, and it lost its political and cultural relevancy as the concerns of Americans shifted. 
In part, the passage of time doomed Wyoming’s memory on the national level. As William 
Lewis has written, Wyoming’s importance diminished because more contemporary events like 
the Civil War, Spanish American War, and World War I understandably took attention away 
from smaller Revolutionary conflicts like the Battle of Wyoming.8 The battle’s memory also 
declined because of the nation’s markedly different political atmosphere. With frontier war no 
longer a threat and independence secure beyond a doubt, the Battle of Wyoming lost much of the 
political potency it had enjoyed during the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the antebellum 
period. In 1900, a Philadelphia newspaper asked, “is it well to keep alive the memory of the 
massacre of Wyoming…?” Questioning the relevance of Wyoming’s memory to the present, the 
newspaper continued, “the orator of the occasion last Tuesday could draw from it no lesson but 
revenge. Revenge on whom? Not on the Indians—they were exterminated long ago. Not on the 
Tories—they are dead and no grudge is felt against their descendants.” Indeed, the newspaper 
could identify no one deserving revenge.9 In the twentieth century, Americans no longer had any 
need to retaliate against any British, Loyalists, or Native Americans. As a result, the Battle of 
Wyoming simply did not seem to matter as much. 
As the battle slowly retreated from national memory, its remembrance shifted almost 
exclusively to local commemorations, publications, and the occasional newspaper reference. 
After the success of the 1878 celebration, locals began to hold an event at the Wyoming 
 
applied to Wyoming, leaving out Loyalists and much of the Revolutionary War context of the battle. While 
Wyoming’s memory still spoke to British savagery, its remembrance increasingly centered more on the interaction 
between natives and whites. See, Ellis, Red Jacket, 213-216, 240-242; Alfred Matthews, “A Story of Three States,” 
Scribner’s Magazine 31 (April 1902): 407-419; “Prisoners of Esther” by J. M. Hoffman in McNelis and Weir, 
Official Souvenir: Sesqui-Centennial of the Battle of Wyoming 1778-1928. 
8 Lewis, “The Changing Story and Historical Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished manuscript, 
2020), 17-18, provided and cited with permission of the author.  
9 “The Massacre of Wyoming: From the Philadelphia Ledger,” The New York Times, July 8, 1900, 4.  
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Monument every year, and this eventually became the chief means of remembering the battle. 
Not only did this yearly event manage to bring locals together but it also received modest 
national news coverage and created a forum for scholars to discuss the battle’s importance.10 In 
1928, the Sesquicentennial celebration of the battle even helped bring about a brief popular 
resurgence in the battle’s memory. Bringing 250,000 visitors to the valley, the celebration 
replicated many of the activities of the hugely successful 1878 commemoration. Its success 
proved short lived, however. By the early 1930s, William Lewis reports, “even the annual 
ceremonies…became less focused on the Battle,” and no celebration ever matched 1928’s 
success again.11 For the rest of the twentieth century, the memory of Wyoming became 
overwhelmingly local with many in the Wilkes-Barre region continuing to participate in yearly 
anniversaries to honor their Patriot ancestors or their region’s part in the Revolution. Interrupted 
only twice since 1878, memorial services continue at the Wyoming Monument today.12   
 
The Wyoming Massacre’s staying power in American history and memory ultimately 
demonstrates both the importance and fallibility of historical narratives in shaping conceptions of 
the present. Throughout the century covered in this thesis, the groundless legends that emerged 
from the Wyoming Valley exerted remarkable influence in determining how Americans 
conceived of the nation. That such baseless, often partisan rumors intimately informed this 
process offers a warning to modern readers in an age awash with misinformation and rancorous 
 
10 Lewis, “The Changing Story and Historical Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished manuscript, 
2020), 17, provided and cited with permission of the author. 
11 For quote, see Lewis, “The Changing Story and Historical Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished 
manuscript, 2020), 19-20, provided and cited with permission of the author. See also, Francavilla, “The Wyoming 
Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 38-46.  
12 See, Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 61-63. Only the great flood brought on by 
Hurricane Agnes in 1972 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 have led to a cancellation of the festivities since the 
1880s. As of this writing, a socially distanced celebration is planned for July 3, 2021.   
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partisanship. As this thesis shows, stories matter and can have long-lasting effects. In the case of 
Wyoming, narratives that demonized or exaggerated the misdeeds of the “villains” of the battle 
assisted Americans in articulating a nascent national identity. This came at a frightful cost, 
however, especially for Native Americans. In the modern era, Americans must again contend 
with partisan narratives that threaten to negatively shape public discourse by demonizing others 
and propagating unsubstantiated claims. Learning from Wyoming’s example, citizens of the 
modern United States must be wary of such stories and sensitive to the contexts in which 
information emerges.  
Above all else, the legends related to the Battle of Wyoming underscore that Americans, 
historians or not, should be critical of what they accept as accurate information—it just might be 
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